POMPEY THE GREAT

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THE RETURN OF POMPEIUS

When Pompeius reached Brundisium towards the end of 62 his behaviour was more conventional, more overtly conciliatory than it had been on his return from the Sertorian war in 71. Then, even after the defeat of Spartacus, he had kept his army together until his triumph. Now he disbanded his troops immediately on landing.[1] Several reasons may have contributed to this change. Pompeius did not intend to seize power, but his capacity to do so in 62 was far greater than it had been in 71, and it is easy to imagine that the fearful expectations aroused by his advent were in their turn correspondingly more acute. It was not only Pompeius' increased strength that might inspire disquiet; he was coming from the East, from a war against Mithradates, and that ominous coincidence was bound to stir memories of Sulla, under whose banner Pompeius had once served, even in men whose reason might tell them that open resort to violence was not Pompeius' way. Knowing that the alarm he caused was greater than it had been before, Pompeius had good reason to try to demonstrate that such fears were devoid of justification. As early as the spring of 62 he had written publicly, giving a guarantee to those who were prepared to believe him that he had no intention of making trouble, but was dedicated to the preservation of *otium*.[2] No doubt the conduct of the over-enthusiastic Metellus Nepos had made some such gesture a matter of urgency. This letter had given much pleasure to Cicero, who knew Pompeius well enough to expect no less of him, but others had been less happy. Cicero's fears in 63 had not been groundless: many who were discontented with their lot, those whom Cicero describes as Pompeius' *ueteres hostes, noui amici* ('old enemies, new friends'), had hoped and believed that he would come home like Sulla and make their fortunes for them in the process.[3] To them his declaration of his peaceful intentions had come as a bitter blow.

Pompeius was also perhaps more confident than he had been in 71. He was now a consular of eight years standing, and his successes in the East and the adulation they had earned him cannot have been without their effect on his already redoubtable conceit. But if confidence may have led him to disband his army, his response to the political situation at Rome reveals a curious mixture of overconfidence and insight. His first action was to divorce his wife Mucia, on whose conduct during his absence rumour cast the gravest suspicions. To replace her he selected a niece of Cato, daughter of the consul D. Silanus and Servilia, and requested the hand of her sister for his eldest son.[4] Pompeius' vanity is striking. It was rash in the extreme to dispense with Mucia before making sure of the match with the Juniae. Perhaps past experience enhanced his inherent belief that an alliance with Rome's greatest general must prove irresistible, for in the eighties Sulla and the Metelli had been only too ready to ply him with brides to secure his loyalty. More important is the motive that dictated Pompeius' choice. It has often been seen as the reflection of a shift in the balance of power within the upper strata of the senate, a decline in the numbers and authority of the Metelli and a corresponding increase in the influence of Cato and his friends. Such schematism is to be resisted: the gulf between 'Metellans' and 'Catonians' implied by this view simply did not exist.[5] Pompeius' reason was less general, more ruthlessly practical. Cato's attitude to the candidature of M. Piso had shown, as had his vigorous and effective opposition to Metellus Nepos, that he was likely to prove a thorn in Pompeius' flesh. From Pompeius' point of view a marriage alliance was the obvious means of neutralizing Cato, if not of actually gaining his support. That at least was certainly how Cato himself saw the matter, and he refused to allow his freedom of political action to be circumscribed in this way.[6] Both girls were eager for the match, and so, more surprisingly, was their mother, despite Pompeius' previous lethal intervention in her domestic affairs (above, p. 71), but Cato firmly refused to allow it, and Pompeius found himself rebuffed.

The incident was little short of a political disaster. By divorcing Mucia Pompeius had run the risk of offending her half-brothers Celer and Nepos at a time when Celer's attitude was vital, since he was a candidate for the consulship of 60 and his stance might have a decisive effect on the success or failure of Pompeius' dealings with the senate. At the same time Cato's behaviour had shown that Pompeius' worst fears of opposition from that quarter would be realized, since if Cato had not already been determined to resist Pompeius' demands when he put them to the senate, he would have had no reason to react as he had done to his proposal. The great man had made a fool of himself, and the immediate future looked stormy.

By late January 61 Cicero was in private already critical of Pompeius, but his attitude may have been to a large extent dictated by Pompeius' failure to lavish adequate praise on the achievements of his consulship. Pompeius and Cicero were the two vainest men in Rome, and Cicero's remarks in the *Fourth Catilinarian*, where he praised Pompeius for his victories abroad but trumpeted his own successes at home as equally great, if not greater,[7] cannot have failed to touch Pompeius on a sore spot. He made friendly overtures to Cicero now, for he was well aware of the power of Cicero's tongue and he knew that he would need every friendly voice he could muster if his objectives were to be achieved. Nervousness and embarrassment may well have made his advances sound as insincere as in fact they were. At all events Cicero claimed that Pompeius praised him only because he was afraid to criticize and claimed to see through the professions of friendship to the envy and resentment that lurked beneath. His crushing verdict on Pompeius at this time, *nihil come, nihil simplex, nihil ἐν τοῖς πολιτικοῖς inlustre, nihil honestum, nihil forte, nihil liberum*, though stimulated by pique and shaped by malice, is valid testimony to the awkward situation in which Pompeius found himself.[8]

Though his head was full of his own concerns, he found when he reached the neighbourhood of the city that other men had no time to give him the attention he thought he deserved, for Rome was in the grip of a highly entertaining political and religious scandal.[9] At the end of 62 the rites of the Bona Dea, from which all males were rigorously excluded, had been celebrated in the house of the *pontifex maximus* Caesar. Pandemonium had broken out when it was found that the ceremony had been polluted by the presence of the notorious P. Clodius, disguised as a woman. Opinions varied as to whether his quarry had been Caesar's wife Pompeia or simply one of the maids. Caesar seized the chance to utter a famous quotation and divorced Pompeia, but did not pursue the matter further. Others, however, saw an opportunity to remove a dangerous figure from the political scene or simply to create an awful example to check impiety and sexual licence in the young. The matter was raised in the senate by Q. Cornificius, but the consuls were divided. M. Valerius Messalla, backed by Cato, was hostile to Clodius, but Piso, though forced to join Messalla in bringing a motion, worked to frustrate his own proposal out of friendship for Clodius.[10] This explanation of his behaviour is quite sufficient: it should not be seen as a clue to Pompeius' attitude, for it is clear from his subsequent reaction that Pompeius knew little of the affair and cared less.

However, it was forced on his notice on his first public appearance, which pleased nobody, if Cicero is to be believed. It held out no hope of

revolution or reform to the poor or the discontented, but good men found it lacking in weight.[11] It is unlikely that Pompeius had wanted to speak at all. The tribune Fufius Calenus, encouraged by Clodius' friend M. Piso, brought him before a public meeting and asked him if he thought it was just for the praetor presiding in a court of law to handpick his jury, as the senate had decreed should take place in the trial of Clodius for sacrilege. Pompeius, who was probably ill-informed about the details of the case and not very interested, extolled the authority of the senate in general terms.[12] But he was not to be allowed to get off so lightly. In the senate it was not Clodius' supporters who tried to make him commit himself, but the consul Messalla who asked him what he thought of the whole affair and in particular his views on the composition of the court. Pompeius again refused to be drawn, speaking in praise of all decrees of the senate, and remarking in an aside to Cicero as he sat down that surely he had said enough about the matter.[13] The watchful Crassus saw a chance to play on Cicero's easily wounded vanity and drive a wedge between him and Pompeius. His apparent approval of Cicero's consulship had won Pompeius some applause, but he had not been fulsome. Crassus now launched into an elaborate speech in praise of Cicero's achievements and drew the reaction he had hoped for from Pompeius. Cicero noted Pompeius' annoyance, but was unsure whether the cause was anger at seeing Crassus get the credit which he could have had for himself had he spoken more generously, or envy at the senate's high regard for Cicero's deeds.[14] Both factors may well have played a part.

Meanwhile the protagonists in the Bona Dea affair kept up a lively campaign. Inside the senate Clodius had little support except for Piso, Fufius and C. Curio, the consul of 76. Outside he organized public meetings and attacked Messalla, Lucullus and Hortensius, while a band of young aristocrats led by Curio's son demonstrated in his favour. Despite the efforts of Piso and Curio, the senate voted for the specially constituted court, and Fufius conceded defeat.[15] Then Hortensius abruptly changed his position and devised a compromise bill for Fufius which substituted a normal jury. It seems he was afraid that Fufius would veto the motion of the consuls and eager that Clodius should at least come to trial. Perhaps too he believed that it would make no difference, since Clodius' guilt was manifest. Cicero was not so sanguine, and events were to prove him right. Clodius was defended by Curio, large sums were expended on his behalf, and the jury acquitted him by 31 votes to 25.[16] In the course of the trial Cicero took a stand that was to have catastrophic results for his own future. His testimony destroyed Clodius' alibi, and from that day Clodius was determined to have his

revenge.[17] But despite the outcome of the trial Cicero was euphoric. He continued to attack the villains of the piece in the senate, somehow depriving the consul Piso of the province of Syria and in his own estimation at least shattering Clodius.[18] He also enjoyed the benevolence of the masses, who believed that he was on uniquely good terms with Pompeius. Indeed their outward amity was so great that young Curio and his friends tried to provoke Pompeius by addressing him as Cn. Cicero.[19] But Pompeius had cause to bridle his vanity and cultivate Cicero, for he had so far made no progress at all towards the achievement of his ends. Piso had proved an egregious failure, and despite the escape of Clodius Cicero had given repeated proofs of the power of his oratory. For the moment he was clearly to be humoured.[20]

With the year half over and nothing accomplished, Pompeius decided to cut his losses and hope for better service from the magistrates of 60. His former legate Metellus Celer was standing, and Pompeius continued to lend him his support.[21] But Celer was hardly to be relied upon. He might co-operate with Pompeius for as long as it suited him, but he did not need him in order to secure the consulship that he thought of as his birthright, and there was no guarantee that he would use it to further Pompeius' ends, especially since the divorce of Mucia might well have offended him gravely. More trustworthy from Pompeius' point of view was L. Afranius. But like other men who owed their success in life to Pompeius' patronage Afranius had no personal influence or ancestral connections.[22] Only massive bribery could ensure his election. His opponents did their best to resist: two decrees of the senate were proposed by Cato and his brother-in-law Domitius Ahenobarbus, and the tribune Lurco received a special dispensation to bring an *ambitus* bill before the people after the announcement of the elections.[23] A clause in the senatorial decrees, that enquiries should be made into the conduct of magistrates at whose houses the distributors of bribes carried on their operations, reflected the rumour that the consul Piso was attempting to make up for his own lack of success in securing Pompeius' objectives by organizing the campaign for a suitable successor. But Cato's efforts proved vain, and Afranius was elected with Celer.

The celebration of his third triumph, timed to coincide with his forty-fifth birthday, gave Pompeius a brief respite from the problems of politics. The festivities occupied two days, 28 and 29 September.[24] In the inscription recording the dedication of his spoils to the goddess Minerva he claimed to have received the surrender of more than twelve million people and over fifteen hundred towns and fortresses, to have sunk or captured almost eight hundred and fifty ships, and to have conquered all the lands from Lake

Maeotis to the Red Sea.[25] The announcement of the triumph mentioned his suppression of piracy, his restoration to Rome of command of the sea, and the defeat of Mithradates and Tigranes, and listed the regions and peoples he had subdued: Asia, Pontus, Armenia, Paphlagonia, Cappadocia, Cilicia, Syria, the Scythians, Jews and Albani, Iberia, Crete (he still nursed his grudge against Metellus) and the Bastarnae.[26] Another inscription, perhaps from the temple of Venus Victrix dedicated in 55,[27] gave more details of the kingdoms and provinces over which he had extended his protection and the kings and tribes he had conquered. He boasted that he had extended the boundaries of the empire to the ends of the earth and did not overlook the tangible benefit this had brought to the revenues of the Roman people.[28] Similarly the placards carried in the procession commemorated not only the nations over which he had triumphed but revealed that he had almost doubled Rome's provincial income and was in addition bringing to the treasury booty to the value of twenty thousand talents.[29] All the treasures of Mithradates, later to be dedicated on the Capitol, graced the celebration,[30] the major events of the war were represented by tableaux,[31] and even trees found a place.[32] But most striking of all was a giant float which described itself as a trophy of the inhabited world, a piece of ostentation which belies the apparent moderation of Pompeius' refusal of all surnames drawn from his conquests.[33] Many distinguished prisoners and hostages preceded the victor's chariot, including the young Tigranes and Aristobulus.[34] Pompeius himself appeared in a cloak that he claimed had once belonged to Alexander.[35] The end of the proceedings once again revealed his humanity: all the prisoners were sent home at the state's expense except the kings, and even of these only Aristobulus was put to death.[36]

Towards the end of 61 came the first of the developments that were to play so dramatic a part in shaping the history of the last decade of the republic. The equestrian tax-farmers who at the most recent auction had purchased the right to collect the taxes of the usually highly profitable province of Asia found that because of the ravages of the Mithradatic War the province was exhausted.[37] So far from making the customary enormous profit, they would be unable to cover their costs. Instead of accepting the results of their own miscalculation with as much equanimity as they could muster, the *publicani* had the impudence to go to the senate and ask for a rebate. They had the support of Crassus, who was eager to extend his influence and no doubt had a financial interest in the matter.[38] Cicero too defended their claim in the senate. He regarded it as outrageous, but felt that the need to preserve concord between the orders, which had been artificially forged in 63 by the threat to private property and law and order,

but which he saw fit to make a lasting political goal, outweighed the moral consideration. However, the consul designate Metellus Celer spoke against the *equites* at the beginning of December, as would have Cato had time allowed.[39] Pompeius, who probably saw the affair as yet another irrelevancy likely to delay still further the accomplishment of his own ends, seems to have offered no opinion, though he remained on outwardly friendly terms with Cicero.[40] But the bond between senate and *equites* was already severely strained by the threat of an enquiry into the bribery at the trial of Clodius, which the equestrian jurors saw as a reflection on the dignity of the whole order, and in January 60 Cicero lamented that the *concordia ordinum* had been shattered.[41]

Pompeius now at last made an attempt to secure land for his veterans and the ratification of his acts. The prospects were not good. Afranius was proving an even more disastrous failure as consul than his predecessor Piso had been, while his colleague Celer, who had broken completely with Pompeius, was effectively hostile. The agrarian law was introduced by a tribune, L. Flavius: its content was modelled on the bill of Plotius in 70, which had been intended to provide land for the veterans of the Sertorian war, but as in the bill of Rullus the urban plebs was also to benefit.[42] Opposition to the bill, and to the ratification of Pompeius' arrangements in the East, came not only from Cato and Celer, but also from Crassus and Lucullus, who dragged himself away from his fishponds to attend the senate and thwart systematically the man who in his opinion had robbed him of the glory of ending the Mithradatic War.[43] The matter was made worse by Pompeius' own highhanded attitude: he asked the senate to ratify his acts *en bloc*, without considering the detail of his arrangements. Lucullus on the other hand insisted that each item be scrutinized and discussed at length. Such discussion could have dragged on indefinitely, and Pompeius in frustration was eventually compelled to let the matter drop. Even Cicero tried to sit on the fence, proposing numerous modifications in Flavius' bill, which he hoped would earn him the favour of landowners without alienating Pompeius or the people.[44] Despite Pompeius' eagerness that the measure should go through, the majority of the senate was hostile, suspecting his intentions.[45] So, when Flavius lost patience with Celer and carried him off to prison, the senate was ready to meet there at the consul's summons. The tribune, however, placed his bench across the prison entrance and his sacrosanct person on the bench, whereupon Celer solemnly ordered the prison wall to be breached. Embarrassed by this constitutional farce, Pompeius was compelled to tell Flavius to set his opponent free.[46] Cato also kept up his stand on the Asian taxes, preventing any decision in

the matter: Cicero castigated his conduct as more honest than wise.[47] It is hardly surprising in the circumstances that Pompeius was prepared to swallow his pride in an attempt to keep Cicero's support. Cicero had resented Pompeius' long silence on the subject of his own achievements, but in March he remarked with satisfaction to Atticus that Pompeius had now more than once made speeches in the senate giving him credit for saving the empire.[48] But Cato won the day. By June both the question of the Asian taxes and Flavius' agrarian bill had been dropped.[49] Pompeius had been humbled. He kept up his links with Cicero, though Atticus was afraid that the closeness of their association would discredit Cicero with the optimates.[50] Cicero, however, was sanguine: he felt that he himself was the only man to deserve the name of optimate since the death of Catulus, and insisted that it was not he who had made concessions to Pompeius, but Pompeius who had made a move away from *popularis* levity towards moderation and respectability.[51]

Thus when Caesar returned from his praetorian province of Hispania Ulterior the political situation that confronted him was full of possibilities for a man of imagination and daring. Pompeius had been alienated from the senate by the consistent and successful opposition to his efforts to acquire land for his veterans and secure the ratification of his acts. Crassus and the *equites* had been offended by the attempt to rake up the Bona Dea trial and the senate's refusal to make any concession in the matter of the Asian taxes. If one man was responsible for this dangerous state of affairs, it was Cato, who had baulked Pompeius, Crassus and the *publicani* at every turn. Small wonder that Cicero accused him of doing harm, because he behaved as if he were living in Plato's republic.[52]

Caesar's return aroused considerable interest. Confident as ever of his own influence for good, Cicero hoped to win him for the optimate cause, just as he thought he had already won Pompeius.[53] That Caesar had his eye on the consulship had been common knowledge for some time. Cicero had remarked in December 61 that Pompeius' close friend L. Lucceius was eager to stand and was meditating an electoral compact either with Caesar, to be arranged by Q. Arrius, or with Caesar's principal rival, Cato's son-in-law M. Calpurnius Bibulus.[54] But a slight hitch developed in Caesar's plans. His treatment of the unfortunate Spaniards had moved them to rebel; indeed it is not unlikely that he had deliberately provoked them beyond endurance in order to win the glory of a successful war.[55] His suppression of the rebellion he had caused had duly won him a triumph, but he reached the vicinity of Rome somewhat later than he had planned and found that there would not be time for him both to prepare for and celebrate his

triumph and to hand in his nomination for the consular elections by the appointed day. So he wrote to the senate with the not unreasonable request that he be allowed to stand in absence and so be able to enjoy his triumph in the normal manner.[56] But the request was opposed, almost inevitably, by Cato, and once again Cato got his way.[57] It is hard to see the point of this petty and shortsighted policy. No doubt Cato and everyone else assumed that no man, especially one so dedicated to personal glory as Caesar, would forgo the honour of a triumph. But even if Caesar had reacted as expected and given up his chance of standing for 59, there would have been no long-term gain: the problems that might arise in the consulship of one who had already proved himself disquietingly energetic and ambitious would only have been postponed for a year.

However, Caesar shattered expectations by abandoning, not the consulship, but his triumph.[58] Instead he entered the city without pomp and presented his candidature by the appropriate date. The campaign was a furious one. Cato and his friends threw all their weight behind Bibulus. Cato communed with his conscience and decided that in such a situation bribery was in the interests of the state, and so no expense was spared.[59] Caesar found a source of funds by concluding the projected arrangement with the wealthy Lucceius, whereby they pooled their resources: Caesar's energy and influence in return for Lucceius' money.[60] But Caesar's sights were set higher. He had exerted himself in Pompeius' interest in the past; now was the time for Pompeius to repay the debt. With Crassus too he had co-operated before, and Crassus had paid off his numerous and pressing creditors and so enabled him to leave for Spain in 61.[61] Crassus, like Pompeius, had good cause to help Caesar now. Both men, as Caesar was quick to realize, would want a return for their investment, and both at this moment had specific ends, of which the senate had frustrated them, but which they could hope to achieve through the agency of a friendly consul, a consul, unlike Piso and Afranius, of talent and determination. When Caesar approached Pompeius and Crassus he no doubt promised that if elected he would see to it that Pompeius' acts were ratified, that land was provided for his troops,[62] and that the improvident *publicani* of Asia were reimbursed at least in part. Both men were impressed, and both gave him their backing. Pompeius may have felt misgivings. A man like Caesar was a dangerous tool. A tribune who passed a helpful law was no problem: such a man could be helped to the praetorship or simply forgotten. A consul was a different matter. There might still be little or no cause for alarm if he were a nobody like the wretched Afranius. But a consul of lofty lineage and loftier ambition might require an imposing reward for his services in the shape of a

noteworthy provincial command, which might prove the first step on the road to rivalry. But even if Pompeius gave a thought to the distant future, as things stood he had no choice. He had tried to gain his ends by employing tribunes and consuls of no consequence, but thanks to the relentless opposition of Cato, Celer, Lucullus and the rest the methods that had worked in 67 and 66 had led to abject failure in 61 and 60. He had no alternative but to raise the level of the struggle and trust himself to a consul of a different stamp, regardless of the possible consequences, if he was not to recede into insignificance, his credit with the veterans and the common people destroyed, his godlike stature in the provinces and kingdoms of the East undermined, and his self-respect in shreds. For the coalition that Roman hindsight was to see as the cause of the civil war of 49 Cato must bear much of the blame, for it was Cato who ineluctably drove Pompeius into Caesar's arms.[63]

The result of the election was perhaps predictable. The Roman people had little interest in policies, and though it was happy to take Lucceius' money it did not know his name. Of the candidates who presented themselves, Caesar and Bibulus were the most distinguished and both paid well, so Caesar and Bibulus were elected. Many men must have voted for them both, however absurd this may appear to modern eyes.[64] Before the election the senate had decreed that the consuls of 59 should have as their province *siluae callesque*, the forests and cattle tracks of Italy.[65] This has often been seen as a proleptic effort to deprive Caesar of a worthwhile provincial command, but this is unlikely. At the time when the allocation was made, in accordance with the law of C. Gracchus, Caesar had not yet been elected, and even if the optimates had already felt certain that he was bound to take one place, they would not have wanted to rob their own candidate Bibulus of a proper command. Besides, they must have realized that the expedient would prove futile, since the possibility had to be reckoned with that Caesar would obtain a province, as in fact he did, by a law of the people, regardless of the senate's arrangements. The true explanation lies in a desire to comply with the *lex Sempronia* of C. Gracchus (which ordained that consular provinces should be assigned before the consuls concerned were actually elected) in a manner which could subsequently be revoked without the need for any general redistribution of provinces. The consuls were in effect being held in reserve because of the unsettled situation in Gaul during the spring of 60. In March there had been great fears of a Gallic war, inspired by the beginnings of the Helvetian migration and the defeat of the Aedui.[66] The senate had reacted in near panic, proposing that the consuls should draw lots for the Gallic provinces, that a levy should be held and all leave cancelled, and envoys sent to ensure

the loyalty of the Gauls. Yet by May the news from Gaul was of peace.[67] However, the situation remained unsettled, and in the circumstances the senate's decision was a wise one. If further trouble ensued, the consuls of 59 could be sent to Gaul and *siluae callesque* could revert to quaestors without upsetting whatever arrangements for praetorian provinces might have been made in the meantime.

Caesar then had come to the consulship with the individual backing of Pompeius and Crassus. But he nurtured a more ambitious design: to increase their political effectiveness and his own by reconciling them and persuading them to work together.[68] Pompeius and Crassus were not of course open enemies, but their co-operation in 70 had been uneasy and brief, and Crassus had been unfriendly since Pompeius' return. Their aims in 60 were by no means incompatible, but there was always a danger that Crassus in particular might work to keep Caesar from satisfying Pompeius out of jealousy, malice or sheer love of intrigue. So Caesar set about his task. His appeal was, as it had to be, strictly practical. He pointed out that if the three of them agreed to work together, no force in Rome could stand against them and they could control the city.[69] As events were to show, this forecast held good only while Caesar was in office, and even then only at the cost of much effort and great unpopularity, but the objectives of all three partners were short-term, and it is perhaps unlikely that any of them gave much thought to the ultimate future of their coalition.[70]

So was born the compact which modern scholarship has misleadingly dubbed the 'First Triumvirate'. The date of its formation remains problematical.[71] Certainly negotiations were not completed until well after Caesar's election to the consulship, perhaps even not until after he had entered office.[72] In December 60 Cicero received a visit from the Spaniard L. Balbus, friend and confidential agent of both Pompeius and Caesar.[73] He promised that as consul Caesar would take the advice of Cicero and Pompeius in all matters of state, and would try to reconcile Pompeius and Crassus. Caesar's eagerness to add Cicero to the coalition was no doubt shared by Pompeius, if not by Crassus, and is not hard to explain. Both men had had ample cause in recent years to acknowledge the power of his oratory. If he could be persuaded to use it to further the purposes of the coalition, this would be an invaluable gain. Moreover, Cicero was a paragon of respectability, and his adhesion might therefore serve to win support among moderate men in Rome and all over Italy, support of which, if Cato and Bibulus were resolute in keeping up their opposition, the three might well find themselves sorely in need.

88 Plut.*Cato* 29, Dio 37.43.4. His eventual return to Rome is recorded by Plut.*Cic.*26. That he too was eventually reinstated in office is made clear by Cic.*Fam.*5.2.9.

89 Plut.*Pomp.*43.

90 Cic.*Flacc.*32. Cf. Parrish, *Phoen.* 27, 1973, 363, 369; Ward, *Crassus* 193f.

91 Cf. Parrish, *Phoen.* 27, 1973, 369.

92 Cf. Ward, *Crassus* 197f. against the more far-reaching suggestions of Marshall, *Crassus* 93f.

93 Plut.*Pomp.*44, *Cato* 30. Dio 37.44.3 speaks of a postponement which was granted, not to allow Pompeius to canvass in person, but to permit Piso to stand. This may be garbled, but it is possible that both reports are true, and that a first postponement was granted, a second not. It is equally possible, as suggested by Gruen, *LGRR* 85 n. 9, that a single postponement was requested for both purposes, but one adequate only for the first was conceded.

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1 Vell.2.40.3, Plut.*Pomp.*43, Dio 37.20.6, App.*Mith.*116.566.

2 For doubts and fears as to Pompeius' intentions, cf. Vell.2.40.3, Plut.*Pomp.*43, who ascribes the demobilization to a desire to dispel alarm.

3 Cic.*Fam.*5.7.1. This passage has been correctly interpreted, with convincing arguments, by Gruen, *Phoen.* 24, 1970, 237ff. The attempt at refutation by Mitchell, *Historia* 24, 1975, 618ff., misinterprets *otium* and denies *hostes* its proper force, which Gruen's view allows.

4 Cic.*Att.*1.12.3, Plut.*Pomp.*42, 44, *Cato* 30.

5 For a recent brief but cogent demonstration of this, cf. Wiseman, *LCM* 1, 1976, 1ff. On the meanings of *factio* in general, cf. Seager, *JRS* 62, 1972, 53ff.

6 Plut.*Pomp.*44, *Cato* 30, who sees Pompeius' approach as a direct response to Cato's opposition to his request for the postponement of the consular elections. For Servilia, cf. Plut.*Brut.*4, Liv.*per.*90.

7 In *Cat.*2.11 Cicero is prepared to equate himself, as leader on the domestic front, with Pompeius, in 3.26 he treats his own achievement as equal to that of Pompeius, but in 4.21 the implication is clear that his own success is greater. His lost poem on his consulship took a similar line, cf.*Pis.*72ff., with disingenuous disclaimers. Note Schol. Bob.167St. on Pompeius' reaction to Cicero's letter in praise of his own achievements, for which cf. also Cic.*Sull.*67.

8 'Nothing obliging, nothing straightforward, nothing transparent in political matters, nothing honourable, nothing courageous, nothing open': Cic.*Att.*1.13.4, cf. 1.19.7. He later claimed that Pompeius gave him the credit for saving the state at their very first meeting in 61 (*Phil.*2.12); cf. also *off.*1.78.

9 In general, cf. Balsdon, *Historia* 15, 1966, 65ff.

10 Cic.*Att.*1.13.3; on Cicero's motives for interfering, cf. *Att.*1.18.2.

11 Cic.*Att.*1.14.1.

12 Cic.*Att.*1.14.2.

13 Cic.*Att.*1.14.2. The meaning of *istae res* in this passage is debated. Some think it refers to Cicero's consulship, but that is unlikely (cf. Shackleton Bailey *ad loc.*): Pompeius had no occasion to speak of it at all in this context, and even he was not so crude as to allude

to it in such slighting terms. The reference must therefore be to the Bona Dea affair, distinguished by *etiam* from Pompeius' more general reflections. *Suspicarentur* in the following sentence would not make sense if Pompeius had said anything specific, however brief and grudging, about Cicero's consulship.

14 Cic.*Att.*1.14.3.

15 Cic.*Att.*1.15.5f.

16 Cic.*Att.*1.16.2ff., *Pis.*95, *Mil.*13, Val.Max.9.1.7, Sen.*Ep.*97.2f., 6, 9, Dio 37.46.1ff., Schol.Bob.85St. The interpretation of Cic.*Att.*1.16.5 remains problematical: against a reference to Crassus, cf. esp. Wiseman, *Cinna* 147ff.; most recently in favour of an allusion to Crassus, cf. Marshall, *Crassus* 183ff., Ward, *Crassus* 227ff. The arguments on both sides are unsatisfactory, but the burden of proof must lie with those who wish to find a mention of Crassus.

17 Plut.*Cic.*29, who makes it clear that Clodius had a right to expect at least neutrality, if not actual support, from Cicero, Val.Max.8.5.5, Quintil.4.2.88, Schol.Bob.85St.

18 Cic.*Att.*1.16.8ff.

19 Cic.*Att.*1.16.11.

20 Cf. Stockton, *Cicero* 162.

21 Dio 37.49.1.

22 He had hoped for the consulship of 61, but had realized that he had no chance without Pompeius' backing, and so had had to wait (Plut.*mor.*806B).

23 Cic.*Att.*1.16.12f. For Pompeius' bribery on behalf of Afranius, cf. Plut.*Pomp.*44, *Cato* 30.

24 Apart from the detailed sources cited below, cf. *MRR* II 181.

25 Plin.*NH* 7.97, cf. Plut.*Pomp.*45, App.*Mith.*117.576. On the alleged figures for the founding of cities, cf. Dreizehnter, *Chiron* 5, 1975, 215ff., who goes so far as to emend the claims in Plutarch and Appian out of existence.

26 Plin.*NH* 7.98.

27 Cf. Gelzer, *Pompeius* 123.

28 Diod.40.1.4.

29 Plut.*Pomp.*45, cf. App.*Mith.*116.568.

30 Strabo 12.3.31, Plin.*NH* 33.151, 37.11, App.*Mith.*116.569f.

31 Dio 37.21.2, App.*Mith.*117.574ff.

32 Plin.*NH* 12.20, 111.

33 Dio 37.21.2f.

34 Plut.*Pomp.*45, App.*Mith.*117.571ff.

35 App.*Mith.*117.577, with open disbelief.

36 App.*Mith.* 117.578.

37 Badian, *PS* 100, points out that competition will have been especially fierce for the first contracts since the establishment of peace. Cf. Schol.Bob.157St.

38 Cic.*Att.*1.17.9, *Planc.*34, Schol.Bob.157St., mistakenly assuming, as 159, that Caesar was present in 61. On the ways in which senators could enjoy an interest in equestrian business operations, cf. Badian, *PS* 101ff. Cf. Marshall, *Crassus* 97f.; Ward, *Crassus* 211f., refuting (n. 53) the views of Parrish, *Phoen.* 27, 1973, 374ff.

39 Cic.*Att.*1.17.9. For the threat to *concordia ordinum*, cf. *Att.*1.18.3, 1.19.6, 2.1.7f., *off.*3.88. Cf. his later criticism of the opposition to the *equites* (*Planc.*24).

40 Cic.*Att.*1.17.10.

41 Cic.*Att.*1.17.8, 2.1.8.

42 Cic.*Att.*1.18.6, Dio 37.49.2, 50.1; for Flavius, Pompeius and Caesar in 59, cf. Cic.*QF* 1.2.11. On Afranius, cf. Cic.*Att.*1.18.3, 5, 1.19.4, 1.20.5, Dio 37.49.3. He may have come from Cupra Maritima in Picenum, cf. *ILS* 878; Taylor, *VD* 188.

43 Plut.*Pomp.*46, *Lucull.*42, *Cato* 31, though he claims (*Lucull.*41) that the two men remained on good terms in private, Dio 37.49.3–50.1, App.*BC* 2.9.31f. Cf. Vell.2.40.6, Suet.*DJ* 19.2. For Lucullus' earlier withdrawal from public life, cf. Plut. *Lucull.*38. Crassus' part, which indicates that he had come to no positive arrangement with Pompeius in 62, is accepted by Ward, *Crassus* 204, rejected, but without good reason, by Marshall, *Crassus* 96f.; it is, however, true that Crassus does not seem to have played a prominent role.

44 Cic.*Att.*1.19.4.

45 Cic.*Att.*1.19.4. Shackleton Bailey *ad loc.* offers no convincing reason for reading *actorem* instead of *auctorem.*

46 Cic.*Att.*2.1.8, Dio 37.50.1ff.

47 Cic.*Att.*1.18.7, cf. *off.*3.88, Dio 38.7.4.

48 Cic.*Att.*1.19.7, 1.20.2, 2.1.6.

49 Cic.*Att.*2.1.6 (Flavius), 2.1.8 (Asian taxes).

50 Cic.*Att.*2.1.6.

51 Cic.*Att.*1.20.2f., 2.1.6.

52 Cic.*Att.*2.1.8, 2.9.1f., cf. Plut.*Lucull.*42, *Cato* 30.

53 Cic.*Att.*2.1.6.

54 Cic.*Att.*1.17.11, cf. 2.1.9. For the sense of 1.17.11, cf. Shackleton Bailey *ad loc.*; Stanton–Marshall, *Historia* 24, 1975, 217.

55 Cf. Dio 37.52.3f.

56 Plut.*Caes.*13, *Cato* 31, Dio 37.54.1f. (confused), App.*BC* 2.8.28f. Caesar's haste to return is noted by Suet.*DJ* 18.1, Dio 37.54.1, who remark that he left his province before his successor's arrival.

57 Plut.*Caes.*13, *Cato* 31, App.*BC* 2.8.30, Suet.*DJ* 18.2 without naming Cato.

58 Plut.*Caes.*13, *Cato* 31, Dio 37.54.3, Suet.*DJ* 18.2.

59 Suet.*DJ* 19.1.

60 Suet.*DJ* 19.1.

61 Pompeius: Plut.*Cato* 31; Crassus: Plut.*Caes.*11, *Crass.*7, Suet.*DJ* 18.1 without naming him; both: Plut.*Pomp.*47, *Caes.*13, *Crass.*14, Dio 37.54.3, Suet.*DJ* 19.2. Cf. Marshall, *Crassus* 99ff.; Ward, *Crassus* 213ff.

62 Vell.2.44.2, App.*BC* 2.9.33, Suet.*DJ* 19.2.

63 Cf. Hor.*Carm.*2.1.1ff., Luc.1.84ff., Plut.*Lucull.*42, *Cato* 30, Flor. 2.13.8f. The judgement is ascribed to Cato himself by Plut.*Pomp.*47.

64 Cf. the remarks of Gruen, *LGRR* 142f.

65 Suet.*DJ* 19.2. For the essentials of the view expounded here, cf. Balsdon, *JRS* 29, 1939, 180ff.

66 Cic.*Att.*1.19.2ff.

67 Cic.*Att.*1.20.5.

68 This view has recently been challenged by Stanton–Marshall, *Historia* 24, 1975, 205ff., cf. Marshall, *Crassus* 99ff. Their arguments are not convincing. That Pompeius and Crassus were in general terms much stronger than Caesar in 60 is true, but both needed a consul in office to attain their ends. That they could have arranged a reconciliation of their own accord without Caesar's mediation is also true, but provides no ground for

rejecting the evidence for Caesar's part and suggesting that Balbus was deliberately deceiving Cicero: the attempt to evade the natural meaning of Cic.*Att.*2.3.3 is impossibly strained. Cf. Ward, *Crassus* 215 n. 61.

69 Plut.*Crass.*14, cf. Suet.*DJ* 19.2. On the relative position of the partners, cf. Dio 37.56.3ff., Flor.2.13.10ff.

70 Cf. Meier, *RPA* 280; Stockton, *Cicero* 182.

71 Stanton–Marshall, *Historia* 24, 1975, 210, rightly stress Plutarch's error (*Crass.*14) in placing Caesar's reconciliation of Pompeius and Crassus before the consular elections. Suet.*DJ* 19.2 is unclear; he appears to put all Caesar's dealings with Pompeius and Crassus after the elections, or at least after the decree on *siluae callesque*, which can hardly be right. Liv.*per.*103 assigns the reconciliation to the time when Caesar was a candidate for the consulship, but the epitomator's chronology is more than usually vague at this point and the degree of abridgement even more acute than normal. The clearest statements are in Vell.2.44.1, who dates the formation of the coalition to 59 itself, and Dio 37.55.1 (cf. 54.3, 56.1), who places the reconciliation of Pompeius and Crassus after Caesar's election.

72 Cf. Ward, *Crassus* 215.

73 Cic.*Att.*2.3.3f., cf. *prov.cos.*41, *Pis.*79.

8 THE CONSULSHIP OF CAESAR

1 A powerful case for Vatinius' authorship is made by Pocock, *Commentary* 161ff., *CQ* 19, 1925, 16ff. On the chronology of Caesar's legislation, cf. Appendix 2.

2 Dio 38.2.1.

3 Dio 38.2.2f.; for Cato, cf. Gell.4.10.8, Plut.*Cato* 31f., Dio 38.3.1.

4 Dio 38.2.3.

5 Dio 38.3.2f., Val.Max.2.10.7 (who confuses the occasion), Sen.*Ep.*14.13, Suet.*DJ* 20.4, Gell.4.10.8.

6 Dio 38.4.1ff.

7 Dio 38.3.2.

8 Dio 38.4.4–5.5, Plut.*Pomp.*47, *Caes.*14, App.*BC* 2.10.36 (confusing the two agrarian laws).

9 Dio 38.6.1ff., Plut.*Pomp.*48, *Cato* 32, App.*BC* 2.11.37ff. (again confused), Suet.*DJ* 20.1.

10 Dio 38.6.4, Plut.*Pomp.*48, *Cato* 32, Sen.*Ep.*14.13, *Dial.*2.1.3.

11 Dio 38.6.4, Suet.*DJ* 20.1.

12 Dio 38.6.5ff., Vell.2.44.5, Plut.*Pomp.*48, *Caes.*14, Suet.*DJ* 20.1; cf. Cic.*Fam.*1.9.7. For Vatinius' part, cf. Cic.*Vat.*21, Dio 38.6.6.

13 Cf. Dio 38.1.4ff.

14 Cf. *MRR* II 191f. for the known members.

15 Cf. Gelzer, *Pompeius* 136.

16 *ILS* 46.

17 Dio 38.7.1f., Plut.*Cato* 32.

18 Cic.*Rab.Post.*6, Luc.8.518f., 595, Dio 39.12.1.

19 Suet.*DJ* 54.3. On Ptolemy's wealth, cf. Plin.*NH* 33.136 from Varro.