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Civil-Military Relations in Thailand and Burma. by Moshe Lissak; The Peruvian Experiment:
Continuity and Change under Military Rule. by Abraham F. Lowen...
Review by: Amos Perlmutter
World Politics, Vol. 33, No. 1 (Oct., 1980), pp. 96-120
Published by: Cambridge University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2010257
Accessed: 27/02/2013 18:34

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THE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF MILITARY REGIMES:
Formations, Aspirations, and Achievements

By AMOS PERLMUTTER*


I. MILITARY REGIMES: CIVILIAN AND MILITARY COALITIONS

The modern military regime is distinctly and analytically a new phenomenon, restricted to the developing and modernizing world. In 1979, there were fourteen military regimes in sub-Saharan Africa, five in the Arab states and North Africa, three in Southeast Asia, one in South Asia, one in East Asia, and nine in Latin America; during the 1970s, there also were military regimes in two South and Southeast European states. It is quite likely that we will see an increase in the total number of military regimes in the 1980s.

A military regime is, basically, a system of managing government by the military. Government can be defined as the administration of the state by the legitimate power-holding group, the instrument of

* I gratefully acknowledge the help of my colleague William M. LeoGrande, American University.


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* World Politics 0043-8871/80/010096-25$01.25/1
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society that centralizes political and legal authority. Military regimes are authoritarian and autocratic, though the degree of authoritarianism varies from regime to regime.

Though almost all modern military regimes have developmental and modernizing aspirations in common, certain recognizable variations are emerging. We can approach our fledgling typologies with, if not absolute certainty, at least some degree of confidence. The types to be examined here are corporative, market-bureaucratic, socialist-oligarchic, army-party, and tyrannical military regimes. Some regimes are a combination of types, while others more closely approximate the "ideal" type.

However they are categorized, military regimes are no longer regarded simply as regimes that are dominated by the military. Not only did the early literature overlook the role of civilian bureaucrats and politicians in military regimes; it also ignored the fact that even regimes that came to power through a coup d'état, or transitional military regimes, were not organized by purely military elites. In fact, I have recently argued that "modern military regimes are not purely military in composition. Instead they are fusionist, that is, they are military-civil regimes." Linz points out that the organic-statist military regime in Latin America is fusionist. Not only does the military depend on the support of the technicians and the bureaucracy, but its regimes combine military, technocratic, corporative, and bureaucratic elites. The role, in fact, of the bureaucratic elite in dominating the administration of military regimes in Brazil, Peru, and Argentina has long been underestimated; but it has recently been discovered by O'Donnell, Stepan, Linz, and Lowenthal. Bienen and Fitton are correct in stating that "observers have abandoned the dichotomy between civilian and military regimes. They have focused instead on civilian-military relations" (Panter-Brick, 27). In civilian-military regimes, governmental authority resides in a coalition of the military and civilians, bureaucrats, managers, politicians, and technocrats; the executive arm of a military regime is not necessarily composed only of military or former military professionals.

As is the case with all modern authoritarian regimes, military regimes are products of political, economic, and societal crises, of social change, and of nationalist and revolutionary aspirations. Military (and

other authoritarian) regimes are most commonly found in societies undergoing change and lacking legitimate political order and support. They tend to thrive in unstable, politically underdeveloped, structurally noncohesive, and, in most cases, nonfunctioning or poorly functioning governments. Military regimes are established to replace weak regimes, weak executives and governments, and, especially in Latin America, to defend the state from a communist or extremist revolutionary takeover.

Though we now possess a considerable literature—monographs, dissertations, essays—that specifically deals with military regimes, we have not yet established a theory or conceptual framework for a comparative analysis. As the titles and topics of the books under review demonstrate, they are monographic, dealing with a single state; they are country-oriented and not comparative, except on a regional or geographic level. However, the studies under review are replete with information, analysis, and interesting theoretical-comparative information, and could serve as preliminary efforts at a comparative approach. My purpose here is to deduce and extract from these well-researched and informative studies a preliminary taxonomy and explanation of modern military regimes.

II. FROM “OLD” TO “NEW” PROFESSIONALISM: STRUCTURAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES OF MILITARY MISSIONS

There are numerous reasons for military intervention; they include anticolonialism, nationalism, opposition to a nationalist civilian regime, anti-oligarchism, the urge to protect the military institution from encroachment and the fear of losing the military’s autonomy and power, the desire to promote modernization and economic development, and response to a threat from the left.

The variety of reasons for military intervention, however, is insufficient to explain the creation of military regimes that attempt to develop

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and stabilize the unstable political system inherited from the civilians. For the military to establish such a regime, there must be considerable changes in structural, motivational, perceptual, intellectual, and corporate orientations. Moshe Lissak, Alfred Stepan, Abraham Lowenthal, John Fitch, as well as Harold Maynard (fn. 5), and Henry Bienen (in Panter-Brick) have offered convincing reasons for such changes, primarily of a military, institutional, and political-structural nature.

The motivational sources for military regimes must be sought in the changing nature of the military institution and the military’s perception of its role in the developmental-modernization revolution of the society it governs. To this end, the various authors examine the changing role of military doctrine and mission from the restrictive, “old” classical and isolated professionalism, to the “new” professionalism and its changed doctrines and orientations, as described by Stepan.

Lissak examines the military as a social system and assigns a new mission to it: role expansion. So does Maynard, who examines the military’s perception of its role and the modification of military doctrines in adjusting this role to the new political environment. Abraham Lowenthal and the other authors in his edited volume on Peru examine the changing role of the military: its “civilianization” as well as its relation to the new “technicos,” to economics, social structures, and interest groups. All of the authors are thus analyzing the changing role of the military (doctrine, mission, and the perception of self) as the key to the establishment of military regimes; they explain systematically the interaction between the military and politics as a consequence of the military’s structural and intellectual changes and its adoption of new roles as reformers, modernizers, and managers.

John Fitch pursues a purist structural approach in explaining the military’s changing role. He establishes a cybernetic model on the relationship between the military subsystem (military doctrines, decision criteria, and underlying motives) (p. 4) and the civilian political arena (political system variables and political outcomes). In describing the changing role of the military in Ecuador, he examines its structural changes, its modernization, its new role definition, its changed doctrines associated with developmental roles, its improved professionalization, its adaptation to new weapons systems, and its response to the changing variables of the political environment. He also observes changes in political participation, distribution of population, populist movements, organizational strength or weakness of political parties and groups, and political support. Thus, Fitch’s model of a military
regime describes the coup d'état as a political process. A new type of military regime is created by the military's response to the changing political environment and by the systematic connection between the military's new institutionalist interests and the political system. Most importantly, according to Fitch, "a very high level of professionalization . . . directly enhances perceptions of military capacity to govern" (p. 164). He argues that different patterns of intramilitary coalitions in four Ecuadorian coups demonstrate that the successful coup is of the institutionalized interactive type. Yet he concludes that it is "more than merely a symptom of political decay," as other authors have argued (Huntington, Perlmutter), and that "the institutionalization of the coup d'état as a political system has, in fact, become a major barrier to political development and to basic changes in social and economic structure" (p. 173).

III. "Old" AND "New" Professionalism AND Military Regimes

Stepan elevates the military to new heights (pp. 127-36). In Peru (and also in Brazil), it is a strategic elite. From its original role as caretaker, it has metamorphosed to "a radicalizing group that would restructure both state and society" (p. 127)—the new professionals. The concept of the new professional, first introduced by Stepan in Authoritarianism in Brazil (fn. 3), is based on Stepan's distinction between "old" and "new" corporatism as well as between "old" and "new" professionalism.

The new corporative state consists of "a particular set of policies and institutional arrangements for structuring interest representation" (p. 311). It is a response to a "crisis situation" in the Latin American context. The old corporatism was conservative, royalist, an expression of historical authoritarianism. The new corporatism, analyzed by Schmitter, Linz, Stepan, and Kaufman-Purcell, represents modern authoritarianism, especially the authoritarian military regime.6

Two fundamental structural changes distinguish old from new corporatism. The new corporative state responds to the crisis of modernization by replacing old oligarchies and liberal politicians (who have failed to manage the crisis) with the military (which asserts it can overcome the crisis). The new corporatism in Latin America is almost inconceivable without the active intervention and continuous support of

the military. Stepan suggests why, in his view, the military has become the strategic elite that responds "to the perception of impending crisis" (p. 128). The military elite, in installing the new corporative model, does so at the expense of changing its attitudes toward professionalism. "Old professionalism" (classical professionalism of the Huntington vintage) responds to threats to external security and is highly specialized, its scope of action is restricted, socialization is neutral, and its general attitude is apolitical. The new professionalism responds primarily to problems of internal security; its military skills are police-like and managerial, and there are so restrictions on the scope of its action (p. 130).

John Fitch's study of the Ecuadorian army also identifies the rise of the new professionalism and the changing role of the Ecuadorian army in terms of psychological and institutional systemic changes (p. 13). The degree of military professionalism and developmental ambition has changed aspirations; it has made the army interventionist, if not reformist. Institutional variables influence every aspect of the military's interaction with its political environment.

Stepan (as well as Schmitter and O'Donnell)\(^7\) distinguishes two subtypes of the Latin American new corporatism: inclusionary corporatism, in which the state elite attempts to forge a new equilibrium between state and society by means of policies that incorporate new economic models and the working classes; and exclusionary corporatism in which the equilibrium between state and society is based on coercive policies and the restructuring of salient working-class groups. The former includes new political and economic forces within the system; the latter excludes autonomous organizations and groups. Significantly, inclusionary corporatism coalesces with the national bourgeoisie while the exclusionary model coalesces with the international bourgeoisie and technocracy. Inclusionary corporatism considers the old oligarchy and foreign capital its enemies; the enemies of the exclusionary type are populists, radical leaders, and autonomously organized working classes. The legitimacy orientation of one is populist; the other is oriented toward order. Inclusionary corporatism is the hallmark of the new professionals' military regimes in Latin America. The military's scope of concern, concept of modern warfare, and requisite skills have been changed by the adoption of the new professionalism. Its attitudes toward the state, society, and politics have also changed. It is now ready to govern in coalition with other corporate

\(^7\) Schmitter (fn. 6); O'Donnell (fn. 4).
groups, as is the case with the authoritarian military regimes of Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Peru. The emphasis on internal security, unrestricted scope of military action, politicization of the military, managerialism, and role expansion distinguishes the "new" from the "old" professionalism. It also distinguishes the interventionist military arbiter, who comes to the aid of fallen executives and retires to the barracks after order has been restored, from the ruler, who establishes a new corporate authoritarian regime by means of which the military intends to govern. Thus, as Stepan concludes, "The organic-statist experiment that began in Peru in 1968 is one of the most interesting cases of this type of political system to appear in Latin American history" (p. 14).

Cynthia McClintock offers an interesting analysis of why the ultimate designs of the military regime in Peru failed. The military was "hermetically sealed" from the potential input of the civilians (hermetismo). Final decisions were made in closed sessions, creating the image of an arrogant and abrupt elite unapproachable by civilians when ultimate decisions were made. Unlike their Cuban counterparts, the Peruvian officers systematically refused "any attempt to redistribute power away from themselves." Their political independence from civilian social forces relying on the military as a political base brought on the demise of the reformist Peruvian military regime.

IV. ROLE EXPANSION AND MILITARY REGIMES

If the concepts of old and new professionalism help to explain military regimes in developed Brazil and Chile and relatively developed Peru, what explanations are there for the military regimes in less developed South and Southeast Asia and sub-Saharan Africa?

Moshe Lissak is clearly the originator of the concept of military role expansion: "the penetration of the officer corps, either collectively or as individuals, into various institutional fields, such as economic enterprises, education and training of civilian manpower, fulfilling civilian administrative functions, and engaging in different forms of power politics" (p. 13). Role expansion means that the military shoulders civilian functions, a situation totally different from that of Brazil and Peru, where civilians share the rule with the military.

Where the regime penetrates society, as in Thailand and Burma, it is necessarily the military that penetrates. The Peruvian case is not a role-expansion model of a military regime: SINAMOS (National Society Mobilization System) was established by the military to be run mainly by others. Lissak demonstrates that in Burma and Thailand the military, as a social system, employed its own instrumental and managerial skills to advance modernization (p. 14). The stratification of the military in these two states, and the consequences of military coups and revolutions, increased the military's propensity not only to intervene but also to participate in consolidating a military regime that was expected to expedite and dominate the modernization revolution. The military's advantage as an agent of modernization, according to Lissak, depended upon (1) its pioneering in technological-logistic and administrative jobs; (2) the combination of traditional structural features (ritualism, hierarchy, and rigidity) plus a division of labor based on universalistic principles; and (3) the solidarity role it played in a fragmented society (Lissak, pp. 29-30). It failed (and more about that later) in efficiency, civil-military collaboration, and as a mediator (p. 30).

In the case of Indonesia, Harold Maynard demonstrates the importance of the institutional and intellectual changes in Indonesian military doctrine and military mission as the army became politicized. The military regime was established on the reformulated and modified military doctrines and the self-image of the officer class. General Abdul Harris Nasution, Indonesian military hero and the most important figure in designing Indonesia's new military doctrines, argues that the role of the military is not restrictive, and describes the expansion of this role in the area of general social and economic policy and activities. The military self-image concerns itself with the military as an ideological task force for revolutionary nationalism and independence, an instrument of the state, and the stabilizer of order. Maynard quotes Nasution: "The Army must participate in deciding national policy because national policy is the mother of political policy, economic policy and military policy." The army's Doctrine on National Defense (1966) called for modernization, legitimization of the military regime, and a campaign seeking popular support. Clearly, this manifesto was a call for a role expansion of the military regime in Indonesia, paralleling the Burmese and Thai experiences.

The ethics of a military regime are represented by the transfer of role perception from "old" to "new" professionalism. The constitution

10 Maynard (fn. 5), 115-16. 11 Ibid., 124. 12 Ibid., 166.
of the military regime is based on the transfer of corporate, exclusionist military values into national and regime values. Competence and confidence become universal. However, the military, either as a role-expansion type or as a civil-military coalition, is still subject to tests of achievement. Developmental achievements are as important as the ability to annihilate the enemy’s forces.

V. A Comparative Analysis of Military Regimes

All modern military regimes can be categorized as developmental. Of course, this description is too broad to be useful, but it is the commitment to the modernizing developmental revolution that is the essential underpinning of any viable coalitional regime. The types of military regimes introduced by Decalo, because they are personalist (although in most military regimes, the factor of personalism is important) are not of interest as modern military regimes: changes in the military’s doctrine and mission are made not to accommodate development, but to enhance and strengthen the police functions of military tyranny. Personalist types of military regimes do not govern, as modern military regimes do in the cases of Peru, Brazil, Nigeria, Burma and Thailand, with the aid of an independent bureaucracy. They rely instead on a system of sycophants. Contrary to the Weberian concept of traditional authority, a tyrannical military dictator governs with the aid of essentially disloyal personnel, bootlickers of the military—witness the style of Idi Amin, Bokassa, or Mobutu.13

To establish a meaningful classification of military regimes, the following criteria may be used to explain the differences between various types of military regimes:

a. The nature of relationships between the military and the civilian elites and structures.

b. The scope of the military and civilian organizational and institutional autonomy in the military regime.

c. The nature of the political and administrative instruments employed by the military regime to achieve modernization and legitimacy: bureaucratic structures, commissions, political parties, interest groups, and of course, the military itself.

d. The classes or groups penetrated by the military regime, and the class it seeks to co-opt or collaborate with.

A. THE CORPORATIVE MILITARY REGIME

Corporative military regimes are characterized by a military fusionist rule. Stepan prefers to call this type of military regime "organic statism.” Governmental authority resides in a tightly linked coalition of military and civilians (bureaucrats, managers, and technocrats) who govern with little or no external political control. In the executive, civilians or officers may be in the majority. The supreme head may be a civilian without military skills. But the single most important source of political support for this type of military regime is the military establishment. In corporative military regimes, additional support can come from groups such as the bureaucracy, the church, labor unions, and the technocracy, but it remains secondary. The support of the military establishment is paramount.

The corporative military regime also seeks to widen its base of support by including workers and peasants. On the whole, Brazil, Argentina, and Peru—the major states of the corporative military type—have engaged in restricted and highly disciplined political mobilization. However, in the area of economic modernization, the corporative type of regime is actively promoting industrialization and economic transformation (as in Peru), although it does pursue these goals while restricting the growth of alternative political groups.

The military regimes in these major South American states are committed to agrarian and industrial modernization, even to social and tax reforms, and are dependent on civilian bureaucrats and politicians to pursue the modernizing revolution. The political and administrative instruments employed by the corporative military regimes are, on the whole, functional and bureaucratic. Peru serves as a model. The Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces, the military regimes of Velasco and Bermudez (1968–1973), installed a special structure for political participation, SINAMOS, which was designed to create new forms of economic organization, industrial education, and aid to peasants. Established in 1971, three years after the Velasco coup, SINAMOS

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14 On authoritarian-bureaucratic, military, and populist corporatism in Latin America, see: O'Donnell (fn. 4); James Malloy, ed., Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977), esp. the essays by Malloy, O'Donnell, Kaufman, Skidmore, Mericle, and Dietz; Schmitter (fn. 6); Peter Cleaves, Bureaucratic Politics and Administration in Chile (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975); Kenneth Erickson, Corporatism in Brazil (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977); Kaufman-Purcell (fn. 6); David Collier, ed., The New Authoritarianism in Latin America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979); Howard J. Wiarda, Corporatism and Development: The Portuguese Experience (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1977); Helen Kremmer, "The Dynamics of Authoritarian Regimes: The Case of Brazil," unpub. (LASA/ASA Conference, Houston, Texas, November 1977).
was the Peruvian military’s response to the challenge of modernization.15 SINAMOS organized the “training, orientation, and organization of the national population; the development of social interest entities; and the communication and particularly the dialogue between government and the national population.”16 It represented a local coalition of civilians and military officers whose purpose was structural and economic reforms. The SINAMOS organizational chart was impressive;17 it included an office for mobilization support, regional coordinating committees, local participation units, and so forth. SINAMOS was intended to serve the community and its organized interests, such as “social property” and peasant cooperatives. It was a very impressive political-civilian operation conducted by the military. Yet SINAMOS did not produce the expected results. Whatever successes it did achieve are due to the military’s isolation, its adoption of a distinctive ideology, the weakness and failure of civilian politicians, the lack of challenge from the left, and anti-Americanism.18 But this regime of reformers failed to cope with Peru’s basic structural problems. The military elite was in charge of a program it could not effectively execute.

B. THE MARKET-BUREAUCRATIC MILITARY REGIMES

The military regimes of the state-capitalist type, such as those of Thailand, Korea, Nigeria, and possibly Ghana, should be called market-bureaucratic military regimes. The political history of modern Thailand, according to Lissak, is “closely bound up with the history of the interrelationships between the military establishment and the civilian administration . . .” (p. 73). The civil bureaucracy linked to the center is composed of the military and senior bureaucrats. The bureaucracy in Thailand conceives of itself as a superior structure straddling other civilian organizations. Thus, a bureaucratic-military apparatus, after 1932, “became the central focus of the political structure” (p. 79). Lissak describes the army’s role in political mobilization as “civilianized” (p. 91-94). The military has taken upon itself the political and administrative task of economic modernization (role expansion). As the “heart” of the bureaucracy, it has also become the

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16 Middlebrook and Palmer (fn. 15), 18.

17 Ibid., 20.

18 Philip (fn. 9), 43.
protector of the executive-administrative center, at the expense of a weak legislative branch and an unorganized periphery. The process of institutionalization and modernization at the center, combined with the military's role expansion since the 1960s, has enhanced the military-bureaucratic establishment. It became the political oligarchy—a process that has been going on since the 1930s but was accelerated by modernization and role expansion, and the concentration of power at the center. Thailand, according to Lissak, is a "bureaucratic polity" (p. 106). We might add that it is a market-capitalist military-bureaucratic polity, in that its military-bureaucratic regime seeks to manage the modernization process within the framework of a capitalist market economy.

Modern Nigeria is another case of a civil-military dyarchy. Black Africa's most populous state, Nigeria has starred in a renaissance of qualitative literature of which Soldiers and Oil, edited by Keith Panter-Brick, is only one example. A collection of essays, it deals with the politics of the civil-military dyarchy, the military in office, political economy, federal and local government, and constitutional reform. Nigeria has rapidly moved from colonial dependency to an export economy (oil), and is now one of black Africa's chief capitalist countries (Douglas Rimmer in Panter-Brick, 141-65). The economics of oil marketing, argues Rimmer, reduced the autonomy of the state governments, and enhanced federalist orientations and the creation of the most significant regional institutions: the marketing boards that have "been placed under federal control" (p. 153). Oil also gave the military state a form of revenue that was easy to collect, which led to centralization. Yet, according to both Bienen-Fitton (Panter-Brick, 27-58) and Ian Campbell (Panter-Brick, 58-100), Nigeria is ruled by a civil-military dyarchy, a constitutional arrangement where full civilian control is preferred, but "needs to be established in a manner that does not detract from the efficiency of the armed forces as a profession and guards against use of the army for partisan purposes" (p. 325; emphasis added).

The Nigerian army, like that of Thailand, is an integral part of the society and not divorced from the community (p. 326). Also as in Thailand, the military is an active, but not the single most authoritative

political elite. Bienen-Fitton and Campbell explain the interesting mechanism of the Nigerian dyarchy. Civilians in Nigeria play important roles in consultative and advisory groups. Both politicians and civil servants are extremely important in the federal, but especially the regional, governments. The political center in Nigeria is not powerful enough to dominate a vast country with a booming oil economy. This contrasts with Thailand, which is essentially a one-city political culture with a weak periphery; in Nigeria, the dyarchy is a product of strong, historical regionalism, probably the result of the civil war that strengthened the military and established proper constitutional arrangements between federal and regional authorities. In fact, according to Bienen-Fitton, “the civil service has been seen as a net gainer from military rule in Africa” (Panter-Brick, 29), gaining in power almost as much as the military, especially in the Western State (p. 43). When polled, members of the Western House Assembly felt that civil servants had gained more than the military as a result of the military regime, and that most civil servants did not want to return to civilian rule (Panter-Brick, Table 5, p. 42).

The complexity of the Nigerian political system has created an intense factionalism in the regions that are governed by civil-military coalitions, for these are sometimes more cohesive than the federal dyarchy. Here the role of regional politicians has been essential to the maintenance of regional autonomy and influence.

It is quite clear from Bienen and Fitton’s study of the Nigerian Western State that “there was a sharing of authority between civilians and military although ultimate power rested with the military” (Panter-Brick, 51). They correctly assert that civilian participation (politicians, commissioners, civil servants) “suggests that military rule is a term that needs redefining” (Panter-Brick, 53). It certainly needs redefining in complex political systems, in regimes of the corporative and market-military type. The authors under review have provided us with considerable empirical information that corroborates the complexity of military regimes. The civil servants and the politicians of Nigeria play a key role in the modernization and mobilization of Nigeria, using administrative and bureaucratic instruments to enhance the economic development of society.

Political parties, on the other hand, do not play a significant role in market, corporative military, or dyarchic civil-military regimes. We shall next examine models in which political parties are employed in the conduct of military regimes.
C. THE SOCIALIST AND OLIGARCHIC MILITARY REGIMES

The 1962 military coup of General Ne Win in Burma is considered not a simple coup, but a revolution.\textsuperscript{20} The Burmese military went through a transformation and role expansion. Submitting to the socialist ideology contained in two official documents—The Burmese Way to Socialism (B.W.S.) and The System of Correlation of Man and His Environment (S.C.M.E.)—the military now directed itself toward the fulfillment of the socialist and revolutionary ideology of the latter. The ideology of the Revolutionary Command (R.C.) of the Burmese Army rested on three basic principles—change, revolution, and socialism—which drew both from the Buddhist tradition of Burma and from Marxist socialism. Burmese military doctrines were changed to meet the goals of the S.C.M.E. The military's Revolutionary Command during the 1960s shared little of its power with civilians,\textsuperscript{21} but in recent years has harnessed the governmental machinery to its tasks. The real agency of mobilization that was at the disposal of the R.C. was a socialist alliance organized by the military—the Burma Socialist Program Party (B.S.P.P.)—to consolidate power and secure a political instrument. This effort at role expansion soon collapsed, however. Neither the structure (the presumed monopoly of power) nor the absence of opposition conferred stability and capability on the B.S.P.P. The R.C.'s efforts failed to create a mass organization. In 1971, the B.S.P.P. was transformed into a military dictatorship, not a single mobilizing party. The gap between the elite and the masses remained, despite the exalted doctrines of socialist commitments and role expansion.

An oligarchical military regime is not a simple military tyranny. It is allied with civilians. The cabinet of such a regime is composed mainly of civilians, civil servants, and politicians. But what characterizes it is that, despite the military's claim to have changed its function, and its aspiration to a new mission of role expansion, it reverts back to exclusivist military elitism. That is true of the Burmese military dictatorship since 1974, and certainly also of Nasser's regime in Egypt.

Egypt under Nasser is an interesting case study of inverted and perverted military socialism. The military elite and regime of Nasser between 1952 and 1956 was composed mainly of military men; after

\textsuperscript{20} For the evolution of military rule in Burma, see Joseph Silverstein, Burma: Military Rule and the Politics of Stagnation (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1977), chap. 4.

\textsuperscript{21} \textit{Ibid.}, 31-32.
1956, civil servants, nonpolitical technocrats, and “progressive” politicians were recruited in order to help the military rule. The military dominated a semi-bureaucratic party which went through several (mostly undistinguished) evolutions that contributed very little to the mobilization of the Egyptian masses. (They were the Liberation Rally of 1952-1956, the National Union of 1956-1970, the Arab Socialist Union of 1971-1979, and its successor, the New Democratic Union of 1979.) The parties were neither cadre parties nor mass parties, but bureaucratic instruments of the military oligarchy.22

The typical military oligarchy in the Middle East has been characterized by some authors as a military-populist regime heading a mass political party. Nothing could be further from the truth. Nasser’s three attempts at building a political party out of the army demonstrate not only that he was opposed to a cadre party, but also that he could never make up his mind whether the Arab Socialist Union (A.S.U.) should be a populist party or not. In fact, the A.S.U. was an auxiliary instrument of the military oligarchy. Mark Cooper argues that “Egyptian Arab Socialism is a blend of bureaucratic populism in the polity and populist developmentalism in the economy.”23 Actually, it was elitist socialism under Nasser and is elitist mixed capitalism under Sadat.

Dependency has been seen as the major obstacle to development by Third-World intellectuals and liberal analysts. Unquestionably, the politics of contemporary Egypt, Peru, Cuba, and Bolivia could not be explained without emphasizing the legacy of dependency. Egypt’s efforts to overcome its economic and social dependency have created (and continue to create) the need for a developmental model. Egypt experienced practically all three models of economic development prevailing since 1945: (1) a graduated state-capitalist experiment (1956-1961), (2) a state-socialist experiment (1962-1967), and (3) oligarchic capitalism (since 1971). In all three economic experiments, the etatist, patrimonial, and authoritarian orientations prevailed. The models of modernization and development were distorted by the military’s oli-

22 The literature on Nasser’s (and Sadat’s) military rule is very extensive. Among the few works that deal specifically with their military regimes are Eliezer Be’eri, Army Officers in Arab Politics and Society (New York: Praeger, 1971); P. J. Vatikiotis, The Egyptian Army in Politics (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1966); Dekmejian (fn. 5); Amos Perlmutter, Egypt, the Praetorian State (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Press, 1974); Leonard Binder, In a Moment of Enthusiasm: Political Power and the Second Stratum in Egypt (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978).

23 Cooper (fn. 5).
garchic tendencies, orientations, and practices. The struggle between the Arab Socialist Union and the military was over political power, not over the economic model of socialism espoused by the A.S.U. It was a struggle between the military oligarchy and the populists, and the former won.

As Raymond Baker has so aptly put it, “Real power in Egypt did not flow through the officially prescribed constitutional channels. Crucial to the actual system of rule was the relationship established by Nasser between his regime and the military establishment” (p. 81). Thus, both Nasser and Sadat governed through the power of executive authoritarianism and were supported by layers of patrimonial relationships. The people recruited to the most intimate structure of power—the presidential office—came from the patrimony of family, village, kinship group: the nuclear and most fundamentally oriented loyalty system. All were, of course, civilians, and several in fact were totally nonpolitical. The bureaucracy and the military were feudal patrimonies composed, again, of relatives, plus loyalists in the military, the polity, the single party, the parliament, the press, the governments of Cairo, Alexandria, and the 24 provinces. Weak corporate associations of professors, lawyers, engineers, and physicians also infiltrated the bureaucracy, the military, and the A.S.U. party.

The contact between state and feudal power, again according to Baker, created two serious problems: a struggle between the old and the new oligarchy, and a “critical personalization of power” (pp. 80-81). Power was derived from the barrel of patrimony, whose highest political value was a personal loyalty to the rais. Nasser and Sadat were ambivalent about the autonomy of the military, for both were military conspirators whose power was solely dependent on the loyalty of the army. When they were able to, Nasser and especially Sadat destroyed military sources of power. Nasser tried and failed after 1967 (pp. 94-114). Sadat purged his military three times—in 1971, 1973, and 1978. Yet each time he made sure that the outgoing military purges would be replaced by other army officers. In their efforts to professionalize and politically neutralize the military, Nasser and especially Sadat used the military against itself, a practice that can be explained by the nature and structure of an oligarchic military regime. The professionalization of the army by Sadat was always linked to officers who combined professional skills with personalism and loyalty. The Egyptian high command since 1970 has been a highly professional group even if its relationships with its rais are patrimonially oriented. Paying lip
service to populist solutions, the A.S.U., Nasser’s answer to the political challenge of a society in transition, ended up as another appendage to the elephantine Egyptian bureaucracy.

The military oligarchy nevertheless explains the dynamics of Egypt’s uncertain revolution from Nasser to Sadat. “In the Egypt of Sadat, as of Nasser,” writes Baker, “real power rested with the military police complex, not with civilian institutions. If anything, Sadat only enhanced the power and prestige of Egypt’s officer corps” (p. 158). The patrimonial-military autocracy governs in the space between a classical patrimonial relationship and modern institutionalized patrimonialism (misperceived by some as “populism”), inculcated into the institutions of the state, the presidency, the polity, the military, the party, the press, and the parliament.

In Burma, Lissak summarizes, “the military have made a great effort, with relative success, to reach an integrated and balanced conceptual relationship . . .” between the components of professionalism and role expansion (p. 230). Nasser was less ambitious than the Burmese, for he did not start the “reign of socialism” until 1962, ten years after the coup; but he was even less successful, being without inclination toward role expansion of the military. Inherent Egyptian conditions and the continual wars with Israel meant that Nasser had not even a theoretical chance to try an alternative mission for Egypt’s military.

D. THE ARMY-PARTY MILITARY REGIMES

The next relatively successful and stable military regime we encounter in the literature is the army-party regime. Cuba, Syria, and Iraq fall into this category.24


It is remarkable how little has been written that is concrete and reliable about Iraq. For a general synopsis (based on meager information), see Michael Hudson, Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), 274-80. On party-army relationships, see Eric Rouleau’s articles in Le Monde, July 21, 22, and 24, 1973 (certainly outdated); Ayad al-Qazazz, “The Changing Pattern of the Iraqi
Scholars and critics have seriously questioned whether Castro’s Cuba is a military regime. The answer is that it is a special kind of military regime. We may define an army-party regime as one whose composition, structure, and orientation are derived from a symbiosis of military and political-party elites. This would not apply to Cuba between 1959 and 1971, when the military was the single and most authoritative elite. In an army-party regime, the military is not just a strategic elite, nor an alliance of the military, the civil servants, and the assorted politicians; nor is it a role-expanding institution. The military is either the creator and innovator of the single party, or the single party is its vehicle of rule and authority. The special relationships between the army and the new Communist Party in Cuba, and the neo-Baath Party in Syria and Iraq, are of particular interest to us. Unlike the three types previously discussed, the army-party regime represents a web, a network of connections between complex organizations.

In Cuba, the party and the army are integrated and symbiotic. In an army-party regime, the military is always a senior partner. The alliance is not between civilian and military elites, but between two separate and powerful political organizations. The military is the protector of the party; it guards its legitimacy and primary values. It is a quasi-revolutionary agent, the guardian of the ideological heritage. The military plays a key role in the transfer of power as well as in the security of the state. Both the party and the army tolerate, to a high degree, the penetration of one organization by the other. Military interventionism is a natural and constitutional behavior in the army-party regime. Both structures are highly political; they are tightly linked to one another. The military functions as a political party, an


instrument of interest articulation, and a source for the elite’s political mobility.

Cuba has been ruled in large part by military men who govern large segments of both military and civilian life, who are the bearers of the revolutionary tradition and ideology, who have politicized themselves by absorbing the norms and organization of the Communist party, and who educated themselves to become professional in politics, economics, managerial engineering, and educational as well as military affairs. Their civilian and their military lives are fused.26

The military is both a parallel and a political auxiliary structure. To buttress the authoritarian revolutionary regime and to facilitate the mobilizing revolution, the military in Cuba (as in China and Vietnam) either creates, or itself becomes, a parallel political structure. The military and the party are parallel in the sense that both duplicate, or substitute for, traditional functions of political institutions. The army becomes a party, a legislative body, the protector of revolutionary values. These military structures also serve as the mailed fist of the political takeover and as the instrument that defends the party against corruption and “decadence.” The military cooperates with the party in organizing and controlling propaganda, cultural activities, economic modernization, professional groups, and, of course, national security.

The Cuban experiment is analagous to the Soviet concept of the dual state, but with greater autonomy and political power being given to the military organization. The central role played by the Cuban armed forces in politics during the 1960s was in large measure a heritage of the predominance of the Rebel Army.27 The Cuban revolution is a progeny of the Rebel Army, which was the instrument through which the agrarian and political expropriations were carried out. The Rebel Army preceded by nearly a decade the formation of the new Communist Party. Even after the party’s creation, the role of the military continued to be central. The party apparatus in the military was, throughout the 1960s, the best developed section of the party and had tremendous influence over the party as a whole.28 The authoritarian, centralistic, professional, and revolutionary norms and organizational skills of party and army were meshed. The integrity of command and the party’s revolutionary functions were autonomous but

26 Dominguez, Cuba . . . (fn. 24), 342.
28 Ibid., 265.
politically integrated.\textsuperscript{29} Institutionally, the Cuban political elite found its place in both party and army. But, as LeoGrande correctly observes, the Cuban experiment in a comparative perspective “suggests the potential applicability of two different models of civil-military relations.” The first is a model of civil-military relations in underdeveloped nations; the second, a model of civil-military relations in communist political systems.\textsuperscript{30}

What has been said about Cuba cannot be said of the military regimes of Syria and Iraq, although on the surface the symbiotic relationship between the Baath Party and the Syrian and Iraqi militaries is reminiscent of Cuba. The mutual dependency of party and army, the organizational autonomy of the Baath and the army, and their functional-institutional roles are analogous to those of Cuba. Also, the relative stability of the Syrian and Iraqi Baath regimes may be linked to the dual governance of party and army. The role of the Syrian army as the protector of the neo-Baath ideology in Syria, and of the party as its inculcator into the Iraqi army, suggests such a symbiotic relationship. In Iraq, the party dominates the army and represents interest groups, whereas in Syria, the military controls the Baath and represents interest groups. The analogy ends here. Neither Syria nor Iraq have experienced the revolutionary and mobilizing stages that Cuba did. The army-party relationships in Syria and Iraq strengthened the army-party elites and enhanced their political mobility. But neither in Syria nor in Iraq did the revolution go far enough to claim that the regime was revolutionary. These are cases of not very highly institutionalized army-party regimes; the Cuban model, as suggested by LeoGrande, nevertheless can serve to identify the Syrian and Iraqi regimes as army-party regimes. The relationships between the Baath, the presidency, and the military in Syria are relationships between relatively autonomous political institutions. Although the most powerful office is the President’s,\textsuperscript{31} he could not effectively or safely govern without the party and the army. The army and the party are parallel structures. Both are sources for elite recruitment and political influence.

The military regimes of Syria and Iraq are certainly guaranteed greater stability than the three types discussed earlier. Rabinovich also finds that the installation of the new elites, the creation of an effective Syrian state, and the domination of society and the military was a product of a “party-army symbiosis” (pp. 209-12). The elaborate military organization and the Baath created a new kind of military re-

\textsuperscript{29} \textit{Ibid.}, 270-71.  
\textsuperscript{30} \textit{Ibid.}, 285.  
\textsuperscript{31} Dawisha (fn. 24).
gime in the Middle East. Organizational autonomy and symbiotic relationships between party and army *enhance* stability in the case of Iraq and Syria and in the revolutionary-mobilizing regime of Castro's Cuba.  

E. THE TYRANNICAL MILITARY REGIMES

Although the classical definitions and explanations of autocracy and authoritarianism are quite similar, "autocracy" and "tyranny" describe the nature of the ruler, while "classical authoritarianism" describes the nature of the regime. *Autocracy* may be defined as rule by a single person wielding absolute executive power. Autocratic government contains no provisions for legal limitation of power, accountability, or orderly succession. Rule is arbitrary and maintained by force. *Tyranny* is an arbitrary government in which authority is secured and maintained by fear.  

Military tyranny is prevalent in sub-Saharan Africa, exemplified by despotic rulers such as Idi Amin, Bokassa, and Mobutu. The system depends on a staff composed of sycophants, and on graft. The military regime, in Andreski's apt term, is a *kleptocracy*—a government of rip-off artists. The tyrant arbitrarily dominates the army, the sycophantic civil servants, and the political court jesters and executioners. As Decalo writes,

> Indeed, many African armies bear little resemblance to a modern complex organizational model and are instead a *coterie of distinct armed camps owing primary clientelistic allegiance to a handful of mutually competitive officers of different ranks seething with a variety of corporate, ethnic and personal grievances* (pp. 14-15; emphasis in original).

We have witnessed the rise of several military tyrannies in sub-Saharan Africa: Uganda, the Central African Republic, Chad, Togo, and Congo-Kinshasa. In each, tyrants have emerged whose chief motivation has been to stay in power and to eliminate and annihilate opposition within the military and outside it. Decalo's model describes

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32 Reinhard Selten and I have analyzed 56 military coups in the Middle East between 1936 and 1973, and have found that military-party coups are the most durable ones. See Perlmutter, *The Military and Politics in Modern Times* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), 165. Robert Jackman corroborates Selten-Perlmutter in "The Predictability of Coups d'Etat: A Model with African Data," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 72 (December 1978), 1273: "The results [of this study] show that party dominance is stabilizing."


military tyrannies by several African armies that are noncohesive, tribal, non-Westernized, nonprofessional and personalist; they are also as corrupt and inefficient as the civilian regimes they have replaced, with recruitment and promotion not based on skill or merit, but on personal idiosyncracies and tribal connections. The military is neither interested in nor capable of accelerating the momentum of modernization; grievances are not corporate but personalist, with greater importance being placed on competing ambitions than on so-called national aspirations; army rule is corrupt (at least not less so than former civilian rule); and economic development policy is bankrupt. Where the economy has improved, it has done so in spite of the military regime. Personal rather than political institutionalization is of the utmost concern to the competing ruthless and venal officers. Finally, the hallmark of praetorianism is pre- eminent: instability.

VI. SUCCESS OR FAILURE: WHITHER MILITARY REGIMES?

In comparing the performance of military regimes, Robert Jackman has found (on re-examination of the data) "the military governments have no unique effects on social change, regardless of level of economic development," and that the optimistic prognosis of a progressive military promoting social change does not stand up to empirical analysis. "This implies that many observers may have been mistaken in attributing unique political skills to the military, whether directed toward progressive or conservative ends." The authors under review, as well as those mentioned in the footnotes, offer various explanations that, on the whole, strengthen Jackman's proposition.

I concur with Kaufman-Purcell that the developmental proclivities of authoritarian regimes are reactive, tending to initiate developmental schemes from above. She clearly demonstrates the truth of this proposition in her study of Mexican corporatism. O'Donnell argues that it is the military regime's attitude toward development that determines the type of regime it is. The exclusionary regime, which deactivates the popular sector, is of the "bureaucratic-authoritarian" type. The inclusionary regime, the "populist-authoritarian" type, makes efforts to integrate the populist sentiment and political demands. Both models are developmental military-authoritarian regimes.

36 Jackman (fn. 35), 1097.
37 Kaufman-Purcell (fn. 6), 1-11.
The distinction between the two major types of authoritarian regimes—the revolutionary and the military—depends primarily on their orientation toward development, modernization, urbanization, and other variables that spell socioeconomic change. In most military regimes, the attitude toward development is reactive and defensive; in revolutionary authoritarian regimes, the developmental drive is aggressive (U.S.S.R., China) and all-inclusive. The case of Cuba is unique in that the revolutionary army created a revolutionary military regime, and the ideology of the revolutionary army spilled over into society. The corporative and oligarchic army at best is reformist (Peru, Burma, Egypt), but not revolutionary. The Syrian and Iraqi armies are classical professional armies. Their elites are radical-nationalist but not revolutionary, nor are their military regimes. Modernization can—and does, in several nonrevolutionary and in military and authoritarian regimes—create reactive and defensive anxieties. Stepan categorically concludes that the "technical" skills of civilians, their "loyalty" and "brilliance," cannot be recruited into "the strategic state elite" (the military) "because the military carry with them their own institutional recruitment patterns" (p. 313). "... military bureaucrats... despite their 'new professionalism,'... were not technically qualified to perform." And, "because governance, even military rule, has an indispensible political component," the military violated "strict seniority patterns" by nominating officers with political talent which "weakened its institutional unity" (p. 314), and thus its political performance.

According to Stepan, the military failed to integrate the economic and social groups at the national level into the organic-statist military regime (p. 315). Lissak demonstrates that, in the cases of Burma and Thailand, the military regimes representing the center failed to integrate political action satisfactorily and to crush the opposition on the periphery (p. 172). Military regimes, argues Lissak, represent "incomplete institutionalization of the political framework" (p. 173), and the military's "unlimited ability to solve problems of the order of those with which the Burmese army is dealing is no more than a myth" (p. 175). The failure of military regimes of the corporative and role-expansion types has been due to the fact that the military organization's political skills were institutionally and perhaps even intellectually ineffective and limited. "In the Thai army the corporate loyalty of the military professionals is more important than expertise or public responsibility... . . . the Burmese military have made a great effort, with relative success, [in this direction]" (p. 230). Stepan argues that seniority, a pillar of corporatism, was an obstacle to successful reform in Peru.
According to Fitch, radical military regimes operate under two important constraints even where conditions are favorable: the military's antipathy toward autonomous mass mobilization, and its general distaste for partisan politics. Both are institutional limitations of military organization, with serious implications for military regimes. "SINAMOS was doomed to failure by the military's insistence on heavily bureaucratic controls over its clients..."38 The chances are that few radical military regimes in Latin America, even under the most favorable conditions, "will implement significant socio-economic reforms."39

There is little to be said for tyrannical military regimes, either as "progressive" or "modernizing" or "mobilizing" regimes. The corporative, bureaucratic (capitalist and socialist) role-expansion military regimes and the Syrian-Iraqi army-party regimes are certainly civil-military systems, but their governmental performance lags because the military institution is an inflexible political structure that does not incorporate the skills of the elites of political parties and interest groups. Only when the army becomes the twin of the party, adopting its skills and behavior, and changing its professional ideology into a revolutionary ideology—as in the cases of China and Cuba—can the military become an innovating and successful political structure.

Notwithstanding Stepan's heroic effort to persuade us of the "new professionalism," the military in Peru acted as old professionals would. Its motivations were certainly different, and so were its aspirations; but unless the military undergoes a complete revolution of values, norms, mission, and doctrine, and acquires political skills, it will remain in the doldrums between "role expansion" and "new professionalism."

We have learned from the authors under review that civil-military relations in military regimes—corporative, role expansion, bureaucratic and army-party types—must be analyzed and explained differently from the explanations found in the older literature. The presumed neutrality, isolation, and separation of the army from politics is unquestionably a West European and American concept that cannot be applied to civil-military relations in military regimes. The nature and structure of military regimes depends on (a) high military participation in politics; (b) the mutual dependency between the organized

39 Ibid., 32.
military and the organized civilian structure; (c) the degree of contiguity and permeability between the two; (d) their shared values concerning the norms of society, politics, and attitude toward violence; and above all (e) the degree of convergence between the two. The last includes both the acceptance by civilians of values that are historically and institutionally assigned to the military: violence, hierarchy, professionalism, order, command, authoritarianism, and the acceptance of new values by the military: modernization and developmentalism, and economic reform. The congruence between the norms, values, and orientations of the military and civilian elites is crucial to an explanation of the behavior of modern military regimes. In some cases, the norms and values of civilian and military elites are permeable (Brazil, Syria, Iraq, Peru, Burma, and Ecuador); in other cases, they are integral (Cuba and Thailand); but in most cases, they are fragmented (sub-Saharan Africa, North Africa, and most of Latin America). In all cases there is a spillover of military values into the politics of military regimes.

Our final question is whether a military regime with permeable civil-military values can aspire to greater stability and a more progressive legislative program than a fragmented military regime which must necessarily defend a personal ruler by means of tyranny and repression. The U.S.S.R., clearly a party-army system, remains a conflict model of politics; and although the future of civil-military conflict in Cuba and China is unknown, for the present it appears to be contained through the mechanism of symbiosis between party and army.