

guistique de Prague 4 [1931], 190). "The sentence, in order to be realized, must be given the intonation of the phrase. . . . The phrase is a function of dialogue. It is a unit of exchange among conversing parties. . . ." (S. Karcewski, "Sur la parataxe et la syntaxe en russe," in *Cahiers Ferdinand de Saussure*, no. 7 [1948], 34).

Aleksey Shakhmatov (1864–1920), linguist and academician whose most important works were devoted to the history of the Russian language, modern Russian, and comparative studies of the grammars of different Slavic languages. "Communication" has a rather distinctive meaning for Shakhmatov: it refers to the act of thinking, this being the psychological basis of the sentence, the mediating link "between the psyche of the speaker and its manifestation in the discourse toward which it strives" (A. Shakhmatov, *Sintaksis russkogoazyka* [Syntax of the Russian language] [Leningrad, 1941], pp. 19–20).

9. The Russian word Bakhtin uses here (*milenkiy*) is a diminutive of *milyj*, itself a term of endearment meaning "nice" or "sweet."

10. In *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language*, the specific sense of an utterance is defined as its *theme (tema)*: "The theme of an utterance is essentially individual and unrepeatable, like the utterance itself. . . . The theme of the utterance is essentially indivisible. The significance of the utterance, on the contrary, breaks down into a number of significances that are included in its linguistic elements" (pp. 101–2).

11. Aleksandr Peshkovsky (1878–1933), Soviet linguist specializing in grammar and stylistics in the schools. His "stylistic experiment" consisted in artificially devising stylistic variants of the text, a device he used for analyzing artistic speech. See A. M. Peshkovsky, *Voprosy metodiki rodnogoazyka, lingvistiki i stilistiki* (Problems in the methodology of folk language, linguistics, and stylistics) (Moscow-Leningrad, 1930), p. 133.

12. Leibniz identified monads with the metaphysical individuals or souls, conceived as unextended, active, indivisible, naturally indestructible, and teleological substances ideally related in a system of preestablished harmony.

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The Problem of the Text in Linguistics, Philology, and the Human Sciences: An Experiment in Philosophical Analysis

Our analysis must be called philosophical mainly because of what it is not: it is not a linguistic, philological, literary, or any other special kind of analysis (study). The advantages are these: our study will move in the liminal spheres, that is, on the borders of all the aforementioned disciplines, at their junctures and points of intersection.

The text (written and oral) is the primary given of all these disciplines and of all thought in the human sciences and philosophy in general (including theological and philosophical thought at their sources). The text is the unmediated reality (reality of thought and experience), the only one from which these disciplines and this thought can emerge. Where there is no text, there is no object of study, and no object of thought either.

The "implied" text: if the word "text" is understood in the broad sense—as any coherent complex of signs—then even the study of art (the study of music, the theory and history of fine arts) deals with texts (works of art). Thoughts about thoughts, experiences of experiences, words about words, and texts about texts. Herein lies the basic distinction between our disciplines (human sciences) and the natural ones (about nature), although there are no absolute, impenetrable boundaries here either. Thought about the human sciences originates as thought about others' thoughts, wills, manifestations, expressions, and signs, behind which stand manifest gods (revelations) or people (the laws of rulers, the precepts of ancestors, anonymous sayings, riddles, and so forth). A scientifically precise, as it were, authentication of the texts and criticism of texts come later (in thought in the human sciences, they represent a complete about-face, the origin of *skepticism*). Initially, *belief* required only understanding—*interpretation*. This belief was brought to bear on profane texts (the study of languages and so forth). We do not intend to delve into the history of the human sciences, and certainly not into philology or linguistics. We are

interested rather in the specific nature of thought in the human sciences that is directed toward other thoughts, ideas, meanings, and so forth, which are realized and made available to the researcher only in the form of a *text*. Regardless of the goals of the research, the only possible point of departure is the text.

—We shall be interested only in the problem of *verbal* texts, which are the initial givens of the corresponding human sciences—primarily linguistics, philology, literary scholarship, and so forth.

Every text has a subject or author (speaker or writer). Various types, subcategories, and forms of authorship are possible. Within certain limits, linguistic analysis can disregard authorship altogether. The text can be interpreted as an *example* (model judgments, syllogisms in logic, sentences in grammar, “commutations” in linguistics, and so forth).¹ There are imagined texts (exemplary and other kinds) and constructed texts (for purposes of linguistic or stylistic experiment). Special kinds of authors appear everywhere in this area: those who think up examples and experimenters with their special authorial responsibility (there is even a second subject here: the person who could speak this way).

The problem of the limits of the text. The text as *utterance*. The problem of the functions of the text and textual genres.

Two aspects that define the text as an utterance: its plan (intention) and the realization of this plan. The dynamic interrelations of these aspects, their struggle, which determine the nature of the text. Their divergence can reveal a great deal. “Pelestradal” (Leo Tolstoy).² Freudian slips of the tongue and slips of the pen (expression of the unconscious). Change of the plan in the process of its realization. Failure to fulfill the phonetic intention.

The problem of the second subject who is reproducing (for one purpose or another, including for research purposes) a text (another’s) and creating a framing text (one that comments, evaluates, objects, and so forth).

The special feature of thinking in the human sciences, which involves two planes and two subjects. Textology as the theory and practice of the scientific reproduction of literary texts. The textological subject (textologist) and his particularities.

The problem of the point of view (spatial-temporal position) of the observer in astronomy and physics.

The text as an utterance included in the speech communication

(textual chain) of a given sphere. The text as a unique monad that in itself reflects all texts (within the bounds) of a given sphere. The interconnection of all ideas (since all are realized in utterances).

The dialogic relationships among texts and within the text. Their special (not linguistic) nature. Dialogue and dialectics.

The two poles of the text. Each text presupposes a generally understood (that is, conventional within a given collective) system of signs, a language (if only the language of art). If there is no language behind the text, it is not a text, but a natural (not signifying) phenomenon, for example, a complex of natural cries and moans devoid of any linguistic (signifying) repeatability. Of course, each text (both oral and written) includes a significant number of various kinds of natural aspects devoid of signification, which extend beyond the limits of research in the human sciences (linguistic, philological, and so forth), but which are still taken into account (deterioration of a manuscript, poor diction, and so forth). There are not nor can there be any pure texts. In each text, moreover, there are a number of aspects that can be called technical (the technical side of graphics, pronunciation, and so forth).

And so behind each text stands a language system. Everything in the text that is repeated and reproduced, everything repeatable and reproducible, everything that can be given outside a given text (the given) conforms to this language system. But at the same time each text (as an utterance) is individual, unique, and unrepeatable, and herein lies its entire significance (its plan, the purpose for which it was created). This is the aspect of it that pertains to honesty, truth, goodness, beauty, history. With respect to this aspect, everything repeatable and reproducible proves to be material, a means to an end. This notion extends somewhat beyond the bounds of linguistics or philology. The second aspect (pole) inheres in the text itself, but is revealed only in a particular situation and in a chain of texts (in the speech communication of a given area). This pole is linked not with elements (repeatable) in the system of the language (signs), but with other texts (unrepeatable) by special dialogic (and dialectical, when detached from the author) relations.

This second pole is inseparably linked with the aspect of authorship and has nothing to do with natural, random single units; it is realized completely by means of the sign system of the language. It is realized by means of pure context, although natural aspects also enter into it. The relativity of all boundaries (for example, where does one include

plan
of
plan

the timbre of the voice of the reciter, the speaker, and so forth?). A change of functions also effects a change of boundaries. The distinction between phonology and phonetics.³

The problem of the semantic (dialectical) and dialogic interrelations among texts within the bounds of a particular sphere. The special problem of historical interrelations among texts. All this in light of the second pole. The problem of the limits of causal explanation. The most important thing is to avoid severance from the text (even if it is only potential, imagined, or inferred).

The science of the spirit.⁴ The spirit (both one's own and another's) is not given as a thing (the direct object of the natural sciences); it can only be present through signification, through realization in texts, both for itself and for others. The criticism of self-observation. But there must be a profound, rich, and refined understanding of the text. The theory of the text.

The natural gesture acquires a signifying quality in the actor's performance (as arbitrary, as performative, as something subject to the design of a role).⁵

Natural uniqueness (for example, a fingerprint) and the semantic (signifying) unrepeatability of the text. All that is possible for a fingerprint is mechanical reproduction (in any number of copies); it is possible, of course, to reproduce a text in the same mechanical way (i.e., reprinting), but the reproduction of the text by the subject (a return to it, a repeated reading, a new execution quotation) is a new, unrepeatable event in the life of the text, a new link in the historical chain of speech communication.

Any sign system (i.e., any language), regardless of how small the collective that produces its conventions may be, can always in principle be deciphered, that is, translated into other sign systems (other languages). Consequently, sign systems have a common logic, a potential single language of languages (which, of course, can never become a single concrete language, one of the languages). But the text (as distinct from the language as a system of means) can never be completely translated, for there is no potential single text of texts.

The event of the life of the text, that is, its true essence, always develops on the boundary between two consciousnesses, two subjects.

The transcription of thinking in the human sciences is always the transcription of a special kind of dialogue: the complex interrelations between the text (the object of study and reflection) and the created, framing context (questioning, refuting, and so forth) in which the

scholar's cognizing and evaluating thought takes place. This is the meeting of two texts—of the ready-made and the reactive text being created—and, consequently, the meeting of two subjects and two authors.

The text is not a thing, and therefore the second consciousness, the consciousness of the perceiver, can in no way be eliminated or neutralized.

It is possible to proceed toward the first pole, that is, toward language—the language of the author, the language of the genre, the trend, the epoch; toward the national language (linguistics), and, finally, toward a potential language of languages (structuralism, glossematics).⁶ It is also possible to proceed toward the second pole—toward the unrepeatable event of the text.

All possible disciplines in the human sciences that evolve from the initial given of the text are located somewhere between these two poles.

Both poles are unconditional: the potential language of languages is unconditional and the unique and unrepeatable text is unconditional.

Any truly creative text is always to some extent a free revelation of the personality, not predetermined by empirical necessity. Therefore, it (in its free nucleus) admits neither of causal explanation nor of scientific prediction. But this, of course, does not exclude the internal necessity, the internal logic of the free nucleus of the text (without which it could not be understood, recognized, or effective).

The problem of the text in the human sciences. The human sciences are sciences about man and his specific nature, and not about a voiceless thing or natural phenomenon. Man in his specific human nature always expresses himself (speaks), that is, he creates a text (if only potential). When man is studied outside a text and independent of it, the science is no longer one of the human sciences (human anatomy, physiology, and so forth).

The problem of the text in textology. The philosophical side of the problem.

The attempt to study the text as "verbal reaction" (behaviorism).⁷

Cybernetics, information theory, statistics, and the problem of the text. The problem of incarnating the text. The boundaries of this incarnation.

A human act is a potential text and can be understood (as a human act and not a physical action) only in the dialogic context of its time (as a rejoinder, as a semantic position, as a system of motives).

"All that is beautiful and sublime"—this is not a phraseological unity in the ordinary sense, but a special kind of intonational or expressive combination of words. This represents style, world view, a human type. It is redolent in contexts; it involves two voices, two subjects (the person who would speak seriously in this way, and the person who parodies him). Taken individually (outside the combination), the words "beautiful" and "sublime" lose their double-voicedness; the second voice enters only in the combination of words, which becomes an utterance (i.e., it acquires a speech subject, without which there can be no second voice). One word can also become double-voiced if it becomes an abbreviated utterance (that is, if it acquires an author). The phraseological unity is created not by the first, but by the second voice.

Language and speech, sentence and utterance. The speaking subject (generalized "natural" individuality) and the author of the utterance. The change of speaking subjects and the change of speakers (authors of the utterance). Language and speech can be identical, since in speech the dialogic boundaries of the utterances are erased. But language and speech communication (as a dialogic exchange of utterances) can never be identical. Two or more sentences can be absolutely identical (when they are superimposed on one another, like two geometrical figures, they coincide); moreover, we must allow that any sentence, even a complex one, in the unlimited speech flow can be repeated an unlimited number of times in completely identical form. But as an utterance (or part of an utterance) no one sentence, even if it has only one word, can ever be repeated: it is always a new utterance (even if it is a quotation).

The question arises as to whether science can deal with such absolutely unrepeatable individualities as utterances, or whether they extend beyond the bounds of generalizing scientific cognition. And the answer is, of course, it *can*. In the first place, every science begins with unrepeatable single phenomena, and science continues to be linked with them throughout. In the second place, science, and above all philosophy, can and should study the specific form and function of this individuality. The need to be clearly aware of a constant corrective to the claim that abstract analysis (linguistics, for example) has completely exhausted the concrete utterance. The study of kinds and forms of dialogic relations among utterances and their typological forms (factors of utterances). The study of extralinguistic and at the same time extrasemantic (artistic, scientific, and so forth) aspects of

the utterance. The entire sphere that falls between linguistic and purely semantic analysis. This sphere has disappeared for science.

A sentence can be repeated within the bounds of one and the same utterance (nonarbitrary repetition, self-quotation), but each repetition makes it a new part of the utterance, for its position and function in the entire utterance have changed.

The utterance as a whole is shaped as such by extralinguistic (dialogic) aspects, and it is also related to other utterances. These extralinguistic (dialogic) aspects also pervade the utterance from within.

The speaker's generalized expressions in *language* (personal names, personal forms of verbs, grammatical and lexical forms of expression of modality, and expressions of the speaker's attitude toward his speech) and the speech subject. The author of the utterance.

From the standpoint of the extralinguistic purposes of the utterance, everything linguistic is only a means to an end.

The problem of the author and the forms in which he is expressed in a work. To what degree can one speak about the author's "image"?

We find the author (perceive, understand, sense, and feel him) in any work of art. For example, in a painting we always feel its author (artist), but we never *see* him in the way that we see the images he has depicted. We feel him in everything as a pure depicting origin (depicting subject), but not as a depicted (visible) image. Even in a self-portrait, of course, we do not see its depicting author, but only the artist's depiction. Strictly speaking, the author's image is *contradictio in adjecto*. The so-called author's image is, to be sure, a special type of image, distinct from other images in the work, but it is an *image* and has its own author who created it. The image of the narrator in a story is distinct from the *I*, the image of the hero of an autobiographical work (autobiography, confessions, diaries, memoirs, and so forth), the autobiographical hero, the lyrical hero, and so forth. They are all measured and defined by their relationship to the author as person (as to a special subject of depiction), but they are all depicted images that have their authors, the vehicles of the purely depictive origin. One can speak of a *pure* author as distinct from a partially depicted, designated author who enters as part of the work.

The problem of the author of the most ordinary, standard, everyday utterance. We can create an image of any speaker, we can objectively perceive any work or any speech, but this objective image does not enter into the intent or project of the speaker himself and is not created by him as the author of the utterance.

This does not mean that there are no paths from the pure author to the author as person—they exist, of course, and they exist in the very core, the very depths of man. But this core can never become one of the images of the work itself. The image is in the work as a whole, and to the highest degree, but this core can never become a constituent figural (objective) part of the work. This is not *natura creata* (created nature) or *natura naturata et creans* (nature engendered and creating), but pure *natura creans et non creata* (nature creating and not created).⁸

To what degree are pure, objectless, single-voiced words possible in literature? Is it possible for a word in which the author does not hear another's voice, which includes *only* the author and *all* of the author, to become material for the construction of a literary work? Is not some measure of nonliteralness a necessary condition for any style? Does the author not always stand *outside* the language as material for the work of art? Is not any writer (even the pure lyricist) always a "dramaturge" in the sense that he directs all words to others' voices, including to the image of the author (and to other authorial masks)? Perhaps any literal, single-voiced word is naive and unsuitable for authentic creativity. Any truly creative voice can only be the *second* voice in the discourse. Only the second voice—*pure relationship*—can be completely objectless and not cast a figural, substantive shadow. The writer is a person who is able to work in a language while standing outside language, who has the gift of indirect speaking.

To express oneself means to make oneself an object for another and for oneself ("the actualizing of consciousness"). This is the first step in objectification. But it is also possible to reflect our attitude toward ourselves as objects (second stage of objectification). In this case, our own discourse becomes an object and acquires a second—its own—voice. But this second voice no longer casts (from itself) a shadow, for it expresses pure relationship and all the objectifying, materializing flesh of the word is imparted to the first voice.

We express our relation to the person who would speak in this way. In daily speech this is expressed in slightly humorous or ironic intonation (Leo Tolstoy's Karenin),⁹ intonation that expresses surprise, incomprehension, inquiry, doubt, affirmation, refutation, indignation, admiration, and so forth. This is the fairly primitive and very ordinary phenomenon of double-voicedness in daily conversational speech communication, in dialogues and debates on scientific and other ideological subjects. This is a fairly crude and less generalizing double-voicedness that is frequently directly personal: the words of one of the

speakers in attendance are repeated with exaggerated accents. Varieties of parodic stylization represent the same crude and less generalizing form. The other's voice is limited, passive, and there is no depth or productivity (creative, enriching) to the interrelations between the voices. In literature—positive and negative characters.

Literal and, one might say, physical double-voicedness is manifest in all of these forms.

The situation is more complex when it comes to the author's voice in drama, where it, to all appearances, is not in the discourse.

To see and comprehend the author of a work means to see and comprehend another, alien consciousness and its world, that is, another subject ("Du"). With explanation there is only one consciousness, one subject; with comprehension there are two consciousnesses and two subjects. There can be no dialogic relationship with an object, and therefore explanation has no dialogic aspects (except formal, rhetorical ones). Understanding is always dialogic to some degree.

The various types and forms of comprehension. The comprehension of the language of signs, that is, the comprehension (mastery) of a particular sign system (for example, a particular language). The comprehension of a work in an already known, that is, already understood, language. The absence, in practice, of sharp distinctions and transitions from one kind of comprehension to another.

Can one say that the comprehension of a language as a system is objectless and completely devoid of dialogic aspects? To what extent can one speak of the subject of a language as a system? Deciphering an unknown language: substituting possible undetermined speakers, constructing possible utterances in a given language.

Understanding any work in a familiar language (if only our native language) always enriches our understanding of the given language as a system as well.

From the subject of a language to the subjects of literary works. Various transitional stages. The subjects of language styles (of the bureaucrat, the merchant, the scholar, and so forth). The author's masks (the author's images) and the author himself.

The socio-stylistic image of the poor clerk, of the titular counselor (Devushkin, for example).¹⁰ Such an image, although it is produced by methods of self-revelation, is produced as *he* (third person) and not as *thou*. He is objectified and paradigmatic. There are no truly dialogic relations with him.

Bringing the means of depiction close to the subject of depiction as

a sign of realism (self-description, voices, social styles; not depiction, but quotation of the heroes as speaking people).

The objective and purely functional elements of any style.

The problem of understanding the utterance. In order to understand, it is first of all necessary to establish the principal and clear-cut boundaries of the utterance. The alternation of speech subjects. The ability to determine the response. The essential responsiveness of any understanding ("Kannitverstan").¹¹

When there is a deliberate (conscious) multiplicity of styles, there are always dialogic relations among the styles.¹² One cannot understand these interrelations purely linguistically (or even mechanically).

A purely linguistic (and purely discrete) description and definition of various styles within a single work cannot reveal their semantic (including artistic) interrelations. It is important to understand the total sense of this dialogue of styles from the author's standpoint (not as an image, but as a function). And when one speaks about bringing the means of depiction close to the depicted thing, one understands the depicted thing to be the object and not another subject (*thou*).

The depiction of a thing and the depiction of a person (the speaker in his essence). Realism frequently reifies man, but this is not an approach to him. Naturalism, with its tendency toward a causal explanation of man's acts and thoughts (his semantic position in the world) reifies man even more. The "inductive" approach, which is assumed to be inherent in realism, is, in essence, a reifying causal explanation of man. The voices (in the sense of reified social styles) are thus simply transformed into signs of things (or symptoms of processes); it is no longer possible to respond to them, one can no longer polemicize with them, and dialogic relations with such voices fade away.

The degrees of objectification and subjectification of depicted people (the dialogic nature of the author's relations to them) vary drastically in literature. In this respect, the image of Devushkin differs in principle from other writers' objectified images of poor clerks. And he is polemically pitted against these other images, in which there is no truly dialogic *thou*. Novels usually present completely final arguments summarized from the author's standpoint (if there are arguments at all). Dostoevsky's work contains transcriptions of incomplete and un-completable arguments. But any novel is generally filled with dialogic overtones (not always with its heroes, of course). After Dostoevsky, polyphony bursts powerfully into all world literature.

With respect to a person, love, hatred, pity, tenderness, and emotions in general are always dialogic in some measure.

In his dialogic treatment (as regards the subjectification of his heroes), Dostoevsky crosses a certain boundary and his dialogic treatment acquires a new (higher) quality.

The objectification of man's image is not pure substantiality. He can be loved, pitied, and so forth, but the main thing is that he can (and should) be understood. In artistic literature (as generally in art) the sheen of subjectification lies even on inanimate things (correlated with man).

Speech understood in an object-oriented way (and such speech necessarily requires understanding—otherwise it would not be speech—but in this understanding the dialogic aspect is weakened) can be included in a chain of causal explanation. Literal speech (purely semantic, functional) remains in an open-ended referential dialogue (e.g., scientific research).

A juxtaposition with utterance-demonstrations in physics.

The text as a subjective reflection of the objective world; the text is an expression of consciousness, something that reflects. When the text becomes the object of our cognition, we can speak about the reflection of a reflection. The understanding of the text is a correct reflection of a reflection. Through another's reflection to the reflected object.

No natural phenomenon has "meaning," only signs (including words) have meaning. Therefore, any study of signs, regardless of the direction in which it may subsequently proceed, necessarily begins with understanding.

The text is the primary given (reality) and the point of departure for any discipline in the human sciences. It is the aggregate of various kinds of knowledge and methods called philology, linguistics, literary scholarship, scientific scholarship, and so forth. Proceeding from the text, they wander in various directions, grasp various bits of nature, social life, states of mind, and history, and combine them—sometimes with causal, sometimes with semantic, ties—and intermix statements with evaluations. From indications of the real object one must proceed to a clear-cut delineation of the objects of scientific research. The real object is social (public) man, who speaks and expresses himself through other means. Is it possible to find any other approach to him and his life (work, struggle, and so forth) than through the signifying text that he has created or is creating? Is it possible to observe and

study him as a phenomenon of nature, as a thing? Man's physical action should be understood as a deed, but it is impossible to understand the deed outside its potential (that is, re-created by us) signifying expression (motives, goals, stimuli, degree of awareness, and so forth). It is as though we are causing man to speak (we construct his important testimonies, explanations, confessions, admissions, and we complete the development of possible or actual inner speech, and so forth). Everywhere the actual or possible text and its understanding. Research becomes inquiry and conversation, that is, dialogue. We do not address inquiries to nature and she does not answer us. We put questions to ourselves and we organize observation or experiment in such a way as to obtain an answer. When studying man, we search for and find signs everywhere and we try to grasp their meaning.

We are interested primarily in concrete forms of texts and concrete conditions of the life of texts, their interrelations, and their interactions.

Dialogical relations among utterances that also pervade individual utterances from within fall into the realm of metalinguistics. They differ radically from all possible linguistic relations among elements, both in the language system and in the individual utterance.

The metalinguistic nature of the utterance (speech production).

The semantic ties within a single utterance (although potentially infinite, for example, in the system of science) are referentially logical (in the broad sense of the word), but the semantic ties among various utterances become dialogic (or, in any case, they acquire a dialogic coloring). The ideas are distributed among various voices. The exceptional importance of the voice, the personality.

Linguistic elements are neutral with respect to this division into utterances; they move freely without recognizing the boundaries of the utterance, without recognizing (without respecting) the sovereignty of voices.

But how are the firm boundaries of the utterance determined? By metalinguistic forces.

Extraliterary utterances and their boundaries (rejoinders, letters, diaries, inner speech, and so forth) transferred into a literary work (for example, into a novel). Here their total sense changes. The reverberations of other voices fall on them, and the voice of the author himself enters into them.

Two juxtaposed utterances belonging to different people who know nothing about one another if they only slightly converge on one and

the same subject (idea), inevitably enter into dialogic relations with one another. They come into contact with one another on the territory of a common theme, a common idea.

Epigraphy. The problem of the genres of ancient inscriptions. The author and the addressee of the inscriptions. Compulsory patterns. Grave inscriptions ("Rejoice"). The deceased addressing the living passersby. Compulsory standardized forms for evocations, incantations, prayers, and so forth. Forms of eulogies and high praise. Forms of abuse and foul language (ritualistic). The problem of the relationship of the word to the thought and the word to the desire, to the will, to the demand. Ideas about the magicity of the word. The word as action. The entire about-face in the history of the word when it became expression and pure (actionless) information (the communicative function). The sense of one's own and another's in the word. Later, the origin of authorial consciousness.

The author of a literary work (a novel) creates a unified and whole speech work (an utterance). But he creates it from heterogeneous, as it were, alien, utterances. And even direct authorial speech is filled with recognized words of others. Indirect speaking, an attitude toward one's own language as one of the possible languages (and not the only possible and unconditional language).

Finalized, or "closed," individuals in painting (including portraiture). They present man exhaustively; he is already completely there and cannot become other. The faces of people who have already said everything, who have already died [or] may as well have died. The artist concentrates his attention on the finalizing, defining, closing features. We see all of him and expect nothing more (or different). He cannot be reborn, rejuvenated, or transformed—this is his finalizing (ultimate and final) stage.

The author's relation to what he depicts always enters into the image. The author's relationship is a constitutive aspect of the image. This relationship is extremely complex. It must not be reduced to a straightforward evaluation. Such straightforward evaluations destroy the artistic image. They are not to be found even in good satire (Gogol, Shchedrin). To see something for the first time, to realize something for the first time, already means to assume an attitude toward it: it exists neither within itself nor for itself, but for another (already two correlated consciousnesses). Understanding is a very important attitude (understanding is never a tautology or duplication, for it always involves two and a potential third). The condition of not being

heard and not being understood (see Thomas Mann).¹³ "I don't know" and "that's the way it was, but what difference did it make to me" are important attitudes. The destruction of direct evaluations that accrue to the object and the destruction of attitudes generally creates a new attitude. A special kind of emotional-evaluative attitudes. Their diversity and complexity.

The author cannot be separated from the images and characters, since he enters into these images as an indispensable part of them (images are dual and sometimes double-voiced). But the *image* of the author can be separated from the images of the characters. This image itself, however, is created by the author and is therefore also dual. It is frequently as though the images of characters had been replaced by living people.

The various semantic planes on which the speech of the characters and the authorial speech are located. The characters speak as participants in the depicted life, as it were, from private positions. Their viewpoints are limited in one way or another (they know less than the author does). The author is outside the world depicted (and, in a certain sense, created) by him. He interprets this entire world from higher and qualitatively different positions. Finally, all characters and their speech are objects of an authorial attitude (and authorial speech). But the planes of the characters' speech and that of the authorial speech can intersect, that is, dialogic relations are possible between them. In Dostoevsky, where the characters are ideologists, the author and such heroes (thinker-ideologists) end up on the same plane. The dialogic contexts and situations of the speeches of the characters differ essentially from those of the authorial speech. The speech of the characters participates in the depicted dialogues within the work and does not enter directly into the ideological dialogue of contemporaneity, that is, into the real speech communication in which the work as a whole participates and is communicated (they participate in it only as elements of this whole). Yet the author occupies a position precisely in this real dialogue and is defined by the real situation of the day. As distinct from the real author, the image of the author that is created lacks that direct participation in the real dialogue (he participates in it only through the entire work), but he can participate in the plot of the work and enter into depicted dialogue with the characters (the conversation between the "author" and Onegin). The speech of the depicting (real) author, if it exists, is speech of a fundamentally special type,

which cannot exist on the same plane with the speech of the characters. This is precisely what determines the work's ultimate unity and its ultimate semantic instantiation, as it were, its ultimate word.

The images of the author and the images of the characters are determined, according to V. V. Vinogradov, by language-styles, and their differences reduce to differences in languages and styles, that is, to purely linguistic differences. Vinogradov does not reveal the *non-linguistic interrelations* among them. But, after all, these images (language-styles) in a work do not lie next to one another as linguistic givens; they enter here into complex, dynamic semantic relations of a special type. This type of relations can be defined as dialogic relations. *Dialogic relations* have a specific nature: they can be reduced neither to the purely logical (even if dialectical) nor to the purely linguistic (compositional-syntactic). They are possible only between complete utterances of various speaking subjects (dialogue with oneself is secondary, and, in the majority of cases, already played through). We are not concerning ourselves here with the origin of the term "dialogue" (see Hirzel).¹⁴

Where there is no word and no language, there can be no dialogic relations; they cannot exist among objects or logical quantities (concepts, judgments, and so forth). Dialogic relations presuppose a language, but they do not reside within the system of a language. They are impossible among elements of a language. The specific nature of dialogic relations requires special study.

The narrow understanding of dialogue as one of the compositional forms of speech (dialogic and monologic speech). One can say that each rejoinder in and of itself is monologic (the absolutely minimal monologue) and each monologue is a rejoinder from a larger dialogue (the speech communication of a certain sphere). Monologue as speech that is addressed to no one and does not presuppose a response. Various possible degrees of monologicity.

Dialogic relations are relations (semantic) among any utterances in speech communication. Any two utterances, if juxtaposed on a semantic plane (not as things and not as linguistic examples), end up in a dialogic relationship. But this is a special form of unintentional dialogicity (for example, the selection of various utterances of various scholars or sages of various eras on a single question).

"Hunger, cold!"—one utterance of a single speaking subject. "Hunger!"—"Cold!"—two dialogically correlated utterances of two

different subjects: here dialogic relations appear that did not exist in the former case. The same thing with two developed sentences (think of a cogent example).

When an utterance is used for purposes of linguistic analysis, its dialogic nature is ignored, it is regarded within the system of the language (as its actualization) and not in the larger dialogue of speech communication.

The immense and as yet unstudied diversity of speech genres: from the unpublished spheres of inner speech to artistic works and scientific treatises. The diversity of street genres (see Rabelais), intimate genres, and so forth. In various epochs, in various genres, the emerging of language goes on.

Language and the word are almost everything in human life. But one must not think that this all-embracing and multifaceted reality can be the subject of only one science, linguistics, or that it can be understood through linguistic methods alone. The subject of linguistics is only the material, only the means of speech communication, and not speech communication itself, not utterances in their essence and not the relationships among them (dialogic), not the forms of speech communication, and not speech genres.

Linguistics studies only the relationships among elements within the language system, not the relationships among utterances and not the relations of utterances to reality and to the speaker (author).

With respect to real utterances and real speakers, the system of a language is purely potential. And the meaning of a word, to the extent that it is studied purely linguistically (linguistic semasiology) is determined only with the help of other words of the same language (or another language) and by its relations to them; it acquires a relationship to a concept or an artistic image or to real life only in an utterance and through an utterance. Such is the word as the subject of linguistics (but not the real word as a concrete utterance or part of it, a part and not a means).

Begin with the problem of speech production as the initial reality of speech life. From the everyday rejoinder to the multivolume novel or scientific treatise. The interaction of speech works in various spheres of the speech process. The "literary process," the struggle of opinions in science, the ideological struggle, and so forth. Two speech works, utterances, juxtaposed to one another, enter into a special kind of semantic relationships that we call dialogic. Their special nature. The elements of language within the language system or within the "text"

(in the strictly linguistic sense) cannot enter into dialogic relations. Can languages and dialects (territorial, social jargons), language (functional) styles (say, familiar daily speech and scientific language and so forth), enter into these relationships, that is, can they speak with one another and so forth? Only if a nonlinguistic approach is taken toward them, that is, if they are transformed into a "world view" (or some language or speech sense of the world), into a "viewpoint," into "social voices," and so forth.

The artist makes such a transformation when he creates typical or characteristic utterances of typical characters (even if they are not completely embodied and are not named); aesthetic linguistics (the Vossler school, and especially, apparently, Spitzer's latest work) makes such a transformation (on a somewhat different plane). With such transformations the language acquires a unique "author," a speaking subject, a collective bearer of speech (people, nation, occupation, social group, and so forth). Such a transformation always makes a *departure beyond the boundaries of linguistics* (in the strict or precise understanding of it). Are such transformations appropriate? Yes, they are appropriate, but only under strictly defined conditions (for example, in literature, where frequently, especially in the novel, one finds dialogues of "languages" and language-styles), and with a strict and clear methodological intent. Such transformations are not permissible when, on the one hand, one declares that the language as a linguistic system is extraideological (and also impersonal) or, on the other, when the socio-ideological characteristics of languages and styles are smuggled in (to some extent in the work of Viktor Vinogradov). This question is very complex and interesting (for example, to what degree can one speak about the subject of a language, or the speaking subject of a language style, or about the image of the scholar standing behind a scientific language, the image of a bureaucrat behind bureaucratic language, and so forth?).

The unique nature of dialogic relations. The problem of the inner dialogism. The seams of the boundaries between utterances. The problem of the double-voiced word. Understanding as dialogue. Here we are approaching the frontier of the philosophy of language and of thinking in the human sciences in general, virgin land. A new statement of the problem of authorship (the creating individual).

The *given* and the *created* in a speech utterance. An utterance is never just a reflection or an expression of something already existing outside it that is given and final. It always creates something that never

existed before, something absolutely new and unrepeatable, and, moreover, it always has some relation to value (the true, the good, the beautiful, and so forth). But something created is always created out of something given (language, an observed phenomenon of reality, an experienced feeling, the speaking subject himself, something finalized in his world view, and so forth). What is given is completely transformed in what is created. An analysis of the simplest everyday dialogue ("What time is it?"—"Seven o'clock"). The more or less complex situation of the question. One must look at the clock. The answer can be true or false, it can be significant, and so forth. In which time zone? The same question asked in outer space, and so forth.

Words and forms as abbreviations or representatives of the utterance, world view, point of view, and so forth, actual or possible. The possibilities and perspectives embedded in the word; they are essentially infinite.

Dialogic boundaries intersect the entire field of living human thought. The monologism of thinking in the human sciences. The linguist is accustomed to perceiving everything in a single closed context (in the system of a language or in the linguistically understood text that is not dialogically correlated to another, responding text), and as a linguist, of course, he is correct. The dialogic nature of our thinking about works, theories, utterances—in general our thinking about people.

Why is quasi-direct speech accepted, while an understanding of it as a double-voiced word is not?¹⁵

It is much easier to study the *given* in what is created (for example, language, ready-made and general elements of world view, reflected phenomena of reality, and so forth) than to study what is *created*. Frequently the whole of scientific analysis amounts to a disclosure of everything that has been given, already at hand and ready-made before the work has existed (that which is found by the artist and not created by him). It is as if everything given is created anew in what is created, transformed in it. A reduction to that which was previously given and ready-made. An object is ready-made, the linguistic means for its depiction are ready-made, the artist himself is ready-made, and his world view is ready-made. And here with ready-made means, in light of a ready-made world view, the ready-made poet reflects a ready-made object. But in fact the object is created in the process of creativity, as are the poet himself, his world view, and his means of expression.

The word used in quotation marks, that is, felt and used as some-

thing alien, and the same word (or some other word) without quotation marks. The infinite gradations in the degree of foreignness (or assimilation) of words, their various distances from the speaker. Words are distributed on various planes and at various distances from the plane of the authorial word.

Not only quasi-direct speech but various forms of hidden, semi-hidden, and diffused speech of another, and so forth.¹⁶ All this has remained unutilized.

When one begins to hear voices in languages, jargons, and styles, these cease to be potential means of expression and become actual, realized expression; the voice that has mastered them has entered into them. They are called upon to play their own unique and unrepeatable role in speech (creative) communication.

The mutual illumination of languages and styles. The relation toward the *thing* and the relation toward the *meaning* embodied in the work or in some other kind of sign material. The relation to the thing (in its pure thingness) cannot be dialogic (i.e., there can be no conversation, argument, agreement, and so forth). The relation to *meaning* is always dialogic. Even understanding itself is dialogic.

The *reification* of meaning so as to include it in a causal series.

The narrow understanding of dialogism as argument, polemics, or parody. These are the externally most obvious, but crude, forms of dialogism. Confidence in another's word, reverential reception (the authoritative word), apprenticeship, the search for and mandatory nature of deep meaning, *agreement*, its infinite gradations and shadings (but not its logical limitations and not purely referential reservations), the layering of meaning upon meaning, voice upon voice, strengthening through merging (but not identification), the combination of many voices (a corridor of voices) that augments understanding, departure beyond the limits of the understood, and so forth. These special relations can be reduced neither to the purely logical nor to the purely thematic. Here one encounters *integral* positions, integral personalities (the personality does not require extensive disclosure—it can be articulated in a single sound, revealed in a single word), precisely *voices*.

The word (or in general any sign) is interindividual. Everything that is said, expressed, is located outside the "soul" of the speaker and does not belong only to him. The word cannot be assigned to a single speaker. The author (speaker) has his own inalienable right to the word, but the listener also has his rights, and those whose voices are heard in the word before the author comes upon it also have their

rights (after all, there are no words that belong to no one). The word is a drama in which three characters participate (it is not a duet, but a trio). It is performed outside the author, and it cannot be introjected into the author.

If we anticipate nothing from the word, if we know ahead of time everything that it can say, it departs from the dialogue and is reified.

Self-objectification (in the lyric, in the confession, and so forth) as self-alienation and, to a certain degree, a surmounting of the self. By objectifying myself (i.e., by placing myself outside) I gain the opportunity to have an authentically dialogic relation with myself.

Only an utterance has a *direct* relationship to reality and to the living, speaking person (subject). In language there are only potential possibilities (schemata) of these relations (pronominal, temporal, and modal forms, lexical means, and so forth). But an utterance is defined not only by its relation to the object and to the speaking subject-author (and its relation to the language as a system of potential possibilities, givens), but—for us most important of all—by its direct relation to other utterances within the limits of a given sphere of communication. It does not *actually* exist outside this relationship (only as a *text*). Only an utterance can be faithful (or unfaithful), sincere, true (false), beautiful, just, and so forth.

The understanding of a language and the understanding of an utterance (including *responsiveness* and, consequently, evaluation).

What interests us is not the psychological aspect of the relationship to others' utterances (and understanding), but its reflection in the structure of the utterance itself.¹⁷

To what extent can linguistic (pure) definitions of a language and its elements be used for artistic-stylistic analysis? They can serve only as initial terms for description. But the most important thing is not described by them and does not reside within them. For here what matters is not elements (units) of the language system that have become elements of the text, but aspects of the utterance.

The utterance as a *semantic* whole.

The relationship to others' utterances cannot be separated from the relationship to the object (for it is argued about, agreed upon, views converge within it), nor can it be separated from the relationship to the speaker himself. This is a living tripartite unity. But the third element is still not usually taken into account. And even when it has been taken into account (in an analysis of the literary process, the works of journalists, in polemics, in the struggle among scientific opinions), the

special nature of relations toward other utterances as utterances, that is, toward semantic wholes, has remained undisclosed and unstudied (these relations have been understood abstractly, thematically and logically, or psychologically, or even mechanically and causally). The special dialogic nature of interrelations of semantic wholes, semantic positions, that is, utterances, has not been understood.

The experimenter constitutes part of the experimental system (in microphysics). One might say, likewise, that the person who participates in understanding constitutes part of the understood utterance, the text (more precisely, utterances and their dialogue enter the text as a new participant). The dialogic meeting of two consciousnesses in the human sciences. The framing of another's utterances with a dialogizing context. For even when we give a causal explanation of another's utterance, by that very gesture we refute it. The reification of others' utterances is a special way (a false way) of refuting them. If the utterance is understood as a mechanical reaction and dialogue as a chain of reactions (as it is in descriptive linguistics or by the behaviorists), then this understanding includes equally both true and false utterances, both works of genius and those lacking talent (the difference will be only in the mechanically understood effects, utility, and so forth). This point of view, which is relatively valid as is the linguistic point of view (even with all the differences between them), does not touch upon the essence of the utterance as a semantic whole, a semantic point of view, a semantic position, and so forth. Every utterance makes a claim to justice, sincerity, beauty, and truthfulness (a model utterance), and so forth. And these values of utterances are defined not by their relation to the language (as a purely linguistic system), but by various forms of relation to reality, to the speaking subject and to other (alien) utterances (particularly to those that evaluate them as sincere, beautiful, and so forth).

Linguistics deals with the text, but not with the work. What it says about the work is smuggled in, and does not follow from purely linguistic analysis. Of course, linguistics itself is usually from the very beginning conglomerate by nature, and saturated with nonlinguistic elements. To simplify the matter somewhat: purely linguistic relations (i.e., the object of linguistics) are relations of sign to sign and to signs at the limits of the language system or text (i.e., systemic or linear relations among signs). The relations of utterances to reality, to the real speaking subject, and to other real utterances—relations that first make the utterances true or false, beautiful, and so forth—can never

be the subject of linguistics. Individual signs, the language system, or the text (as a signifying unity) can never be true, false, beautiful, and so forth.

Each large and creative verbal whole is a very complex and multifaceted system of relations. With a creative attitude toward language, there are no voiceless words that belong to no one. Each word contains voices that are sometimes infinitely distant, unnamed, almost impersonal (voices of lexical shadings, of styles, and so forth), almost undetectable, and voices resounding nearby and simultaneously.

Any live, competent, and dispassionate observation from any position, from any viewpoint, always retains its value and its meaning. The one-sided and limited nature of a viewpoint (the position of the observer) can always be corrected, augmented, transformed (transferred) with the help of like observations from others' viewpoints. Bare viewpoints (without living and new observations) are fruitless.

Pushkin's well-known aphorism about lexicon and books.¹⁸

On the problem of dialogic relations. These relations are profoundly unique and cannot be reduced to logical, linguistic, psychological, mechanical, or any other natural relations. They constitute a special type of *semantic* relations, whose members can be only *complete utterances* (either regarded as complete or potentially complete), behind which stand (and in which are *expressed*) real or potentially real speech subjects, authors of the given utterances. Real dialogue (daily conversation, scientific discussion, political debate, and so forth). The relations among rejoinders of such dialogues are a simpler and more externally visible kind of dialogic relations. But dialogic relations, of course, do not in any way coincide with relations among rejoinders of real dialogue—they are much broader, more diverse, and more complex. Two utterances, separated from one another both in time and in space, knowing nothing of one another, when they are compared semantically, reveal dialogic relations if there is any kind of semantic convergence between them (if only a partially shared theme, point of view, and so forth). Any survey of the history of any scientific question (independent, or included in a scientific work on a given question) also produces dialogic comparisons (utterances, opinions, viewpoints) of the utterances of scientists who did not and could not know anything of one another. Here the shared nature of the problem gives rise to dialogic relations. In artistic literature—"dialogues of the dead" (in Lucian, in the seventeenth century)—there is, in keeping with the specific features of the literature, an imagined situation of a meeting in

the hereafter. The opposite example, which is widely used in comedy, is the situation of a dialogue between two deaf people, where the real dialogic contact is understood but where there is no kind of semantic contact between the rejoinders (nor any imaginable contact). Zero-degree dialogic relations. Here the viewpoint of a *third* person is revealed in the dialogue (one who does not participate in the dialogue, but *understands* it). The understanding of an entire utterance is always dialogic.

One cannot, on the other hand, understand dialogic relations simplistically and unilaterally, reducing them to contradiction, conflict, polemics, or disagreement. *Agreement* is very rich in varieties and shadings. Two utterances that are identical in all respects ("Beautiful weather!"—"Beautiful weather!"), if they are really *two* utterances belonging to *different* voices and not one, are linked by dialogic *relations of agreement*. This is a definite dialogic event in the interrelations of the two, and not an echo. For after all, agreement could also be lacking ("No, not very nice weather," and so forth).

Dialogic relations are thus much broader than dialogic speech in the narrow sense of the word. And dialogic relations are always present, even among profoundly monologic speech works.

There can be no dialogic relations among language units, regardless of how we understand them and regardless of the level of the language structure from which we take them (phonemes, morphemes, lexemes, sentences, and so forth). The utterance (as a speech whole) cannot be seen as a unit of the next, higher level or tier of the language structure (above syntax), for it enters into the world of completely different relations (dialogic) that cannot be compared with linguistic relations of other levels. (On a certain plane, only the juxtaposition of the whole utterance to the *word* is possible.) The whole utterance is no longer a unit of language (and not a unit of the "speech flow" or the "speech chain"), but a unit of speech communication that has not mere formal definition, but *contextual meaning* (that is, integrated meaning that relates to value—to truth, beauty, and so forth—and requires a *responsive* understanding, one that includes evaluation). The responsive understanding of a speech whole is always dialogic by nature.

The understanding of entire utterances and dialogic relations among them is always of a dialogic nature (including the understanding of researchers in the human sciences). The person who understands (including the researcher himself) becomes a participant in the dialogue, although on a special level (depending on the area of understanding or

research). The analogy of including the experimenter in the experimental system (as a part of it) or the observer in the observed world in microphysics (quantum theory). The observer has no position *outside* the observed world, and his observation enters as a constituent part into the observed object.

This pertains fully to entire utterances and relations among them. They cannot be understood from outside. Understanding itself enters as a dialogic element in the dialogic system and somehow changes its total sense. The person who understands inevitably becomes a *third* party in the dialogue (of course, not in the literal, arithmetical sense, for there can be, in addition to a third, an unlimited number of participants in the dialogue being understood), but the dialogic position of this third party is a quite special one. Any utterance always has an addressee (of various sorts, with varying degrees of proximity, concreteness, awareness, and so forth), whose responsive understanding the author of the speech work seeks and surpasses. This is the second party (again not in the arithmetical sense). But in addition to this addressee (the second party), the author of the utterance, with a greater or lesser awareness, presupposes a higher *superaddressee* (third), whose absolutely just responsive understanding is presumed, either in some metaphysical distance or in distant historical time (the loophole addressee). In various ages and with various understandings of the world, this superaddressee and his ideally true responsive understanding assume various ideological expressions (God, absolute truth, the court of dispassionate human conscience, the people, the court of history, science, and so forth).

The author can never turn over his whole self and his speech work to the complete and *final* will of addressees who are on hand or nearby (after all, even the closest descendants can be mistaken), and always presupposes (with a greater or lesser degree of awareness) some higher instancing of responsive understanding that can distance itself in various directions. Each dialogue takes place as if against the background of the responsive understanding of an invisibly present third party who stands above all the participants in the dialogue (partners). (Cf. the understanding of the Fascist torture chamber or hell in Thomas Mann as absolute *lack of being heard*, as the absolute absence of a *third party*.)¹⁹

The aforementioned third party is not any mystical or metaphysical being (although, given a certain understanding of the world, he can be expressed as such)—he is a constitutive aspect of the whole utterance,

who, under deeper analysis, can be revealed in it. This follows from the nature of the word, which always waits to be *heard*, always seeks responsive understanding, and does not stop at *immediate* understanding but presses on further and further (indefinitely).

For the word (and, consequently, for a human being) there is nothing more terrible than a *lack of response*. Even a word that is known to be false is not absolutely false, and always presupposes an instance that will understand and justify it, even if in the form: "anyone *in my position* would have lied, too."

Karl Marx said that only thought uttered in the word becomes a real thought for another person and only in the same way is it a thought for myself.²⁰ But this other is not only the immediate other (second addressee); the word moves ever forward in search of responsive understanding.

Being heard as such is already a dialogic relation. The word wants to be heard, understood, responded to, and again to respond to the response, and so forth *ad infinitum*. It enters into a dialogue that does not have a *semantic* end (but for one participant or another it can be physically broken off). This, of course, in no way weakens the purely thematic and investigatory intentions of the word, its concentration on its own object. Both aspects are two sides of one and the same coin; they are inseparably linked. They can be separated only in a word that is known to be false, that is, in one that wishes to deceive (the separation between the referential intention and the intention to be heard and understood).

The word that fears the third party and seeks only temporary recognition (responsive understanding of limited depth) from immediate addressees.

The criterion of *depth* of understanding as one of the highest criteria for cognition in the human sciences. The word, if it is not an acknowledged falsehood, is bottomless. To achieve this depth (and not height and breadth). The microworld of the word.

The utterance (speech work) as an unrepeatable, historically unique individual whole.

This does not exclude, of course, a compositional and stylistic typology of speech works. There exist *speech genres* (everyday, rhetorical, scientific, literary, and so forth). Speech genres are typical models for constructing a speech whole. But these generic models are distinct in principle from *linguistic* models of *sentences*.

Units of language that are studied by linguistics can in principle be

reproduced an unlimited number of times in an unlimited number of utterances (including models of sentences that are reproduced). To be sure, the frequency of reproduction differs from various units (the greatest for the phoneme, the least for the phrase). They can be units of a language and perform their function only because of this reproducibility. Regardless of how the relations among these reproducible units are defined (opposition, juxtaposition, contrast, distribution, and so forth), these relations can never be *dialogic*. This would violate their linguistic (language) function.

Units of speech communication—whole utterances—cannot be reproduced (although they can be quoted) and they are related to one another dialogically.

Notes

1. A term in structural linguistics introduced by Louis Hjelmslev, founder of the Copenhagen or so-called Glossematic School. He defines commutation as "mutation between the members of a paradigm," a member being a component and a paradigm being a class within a semiotic system (*Prolegomena to a Theory of Language*, tr. Francis J. Whitfield [Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1961], pp. 134–35).

2. In *Anna Karenina*, part 4, chapter 4, Anna accuses Karenin of being cruel during the confrontation in which he announces his decision to divorce her. He responds that she is not aware of what he has suffered. But his tongue becomes twisted and he cannot pronounce the Russian word for "I have suffered" or "endured": *perestrada*. After several attempts he finally lets it suffice to say *pelestrat* (which David Magarshack has translated as "shuffered" in the Signer Books edition).

3. A linguistic discipline created by the Russian linguist and member of the Prague Circle N. S. Trubetsky. See his *Osnovy fonologii* (Fundamentals of phonology) (Prague, 1939; Moscow, 1960). Based on the Saussurean distinction between *langue* and *parole*, Trubetsky also distinguishes between phonetics—a science of the sounds of speech as a material phenomenon that is studied by methods of natural science—and phonology, the study of the sound of language that performs certain semantic-differentiating functions in the language system.

4. "Science of the spirit" refers to what is known as the *Geisteswissenschaften* in German (i.e., the human sciences). One of the great preoccupations of the Neo-Kantian movement in German universities in the last decades of the nineteenth century was to overcome the growing disparity between the natural (or exact) sciences and the human sciences. The work of the whole Marburg School (Hermann

Cohen, Paul Natorp, Ernst Cassirer) is really a philosophy of science. The most easily assimilated ideas on the relation between the human and exact sciences are found in the work of the Freiburg School that included Wilhelm Windelband (whose 1894 distinction between the homeothetic and idiographic forms of knowledge proved seminal) and his pupil Heinrich Rickert (see his *Science and History*, ed. Arthur Goddard, tr. George Reisman [Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1962]). In "Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity," Bakhtin distinguishes between spirit (*dukh*), the general compulsion to understand or the drive to meaning shared by all humans, and soul (*dusha*), the features of any particular person that serve to situate him or her in a particular place in existence not occupied by anyone else.

5. Here, and in his very early work, we see another interest Bakhtin shared with Vygotsky: the phenomenology of acting (see "Author and Hero," in *Estetika slovesnogo tvorchestva*, pp. 63–75). Compare Bakhtin's notes with L. S. Vygotsky, "K voprosu o psikhologii tvorchestva aktera" (Concerning the question of psychology in the creative work of actors), in P. M. Jakobson, *Psikhologija stesnicheskikh chustv aktera* (The psychology of actors' feelings on stage) (Moscow: Gosizdat, 1936).

6. See note 1 in this section, above. Glossematics was Hjelmslev's attempt to create a general linguistic theory that would be maximally abstracted from the material of concrete languages: ". . . linguistic theory must be of use for describing and predicting not only any possible text composed in a certain language, but, on the basis of the information that it gives about language in general, any possible text composed in any language whatsoever" (see *Prolegomena to a Theory of Language*, p. 17).

7. See note 3 in "The Problem of Speech Genres." On "verbal reactions" and behaviorism, see also Bakhtin's remarks in V. N. Voloshinov, *Freudianism*, tr. I. R. Titunik (New York: Academic Press, 1976), p. 21, where the relation of verbal reaction to inner speech in Vygotsky is discussed.

8. See note 2 in "From Notes Made in 1970–71."

9. Reference here is to *Anna Karenina*, part 1, chapter 30. "Yes, as you see, an affectionate husband, as affectionate as in the first year of marriage, burning with impatience to see you," he said in his thin voice and that tone which he almost always used with her, a tone of mockery of someone who would actually speak that way."

10. Makar Devushkin is the hero of Dostoevsky's short novel *Poor Folk* (1845).

11. An example from Vasily Zhukovsky's "Two Stories and One More" (1831), the third of which is a poetic rendering of a story by Johann Hebel about a German craftsman who finds himself in Amsterdam without knowing any Dutch; to all his questions he receives the same answer: "Kannitverstan" (I don't understand you). The craftsman assumes after a while that this is a proper name, giving rise in his consciousness to the fantastic figure of Kannitverstan. Vygotsky also uses the example of Kannitverstan in an article Bakhtin quotes in his Freud book: "Consciousness as a Problem in the Psychology of Behavior," in *Psikhologija i Marksizm*, ed. K. Kornilov (Moscow-Leningrad: GIZ, 1925), pp. 179–80.

12. Bakhtin investigated the dialogue of styles in works that deliberately include many styles, using as his example Pushkin's *Eugene Onegin* (see "Discourse in the Novel," in *The Dialogic Imagination*). In "From Notes Made in 1970–71,"

Bakhtin points to major differences in his approach to *Eugene Onegin* from that taken by Yury Lotman in his studies of the same work.

13. See note 19, below.

14. Rudolph Hirtzel (1846–1917), a German philologist who wrote *Der Dialog: Ein literarhistorischer Versuch*, 2 vols. (Leipzig, 1895). Also of importance for understanding the *distinctiveness* of Bakhtin's dialogism among other approaches are Gustav Tarde, *L'Opinion et la foule* (Paris, 1901); L. V. Shcherba, "On Dialogic Speech," *Russkija rech* (Petrograd, 1923), vol. 1, pp. 96–194; and Jan Mukarovsky, "Two Studies of Dialogue," in *The Word and Verbal Art*, tr. John Burbank and Peter Steiner (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), pp. 81–115.

15. Between the two traditional grammatical categories of *direct speech* (*prjamaja rech*) and *indirect speech* (*kosvennaja rech*), Bakhtin posits an intermediate term, quasi-direct speech (*nesobstvenno-prjamaja rech*). This category is given detailed treatment in chapter 4 of Voloshinov, *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language*, tr. Ladislav Matejka and I. R. Titunik (New York: Academic Press, 1973), pp. 141–59. Quasi-direct speech involves discourse that is formally authorial, but that belongs in its "emotional structure" to a represented character, whose inner speech is transmitted and regulated by the author.

16. The various forms of communicating others' speech in the structures of the Russian language—anticipatory, absentminded, concealed, reified, and substituted direct speech, and, finally, quasi-direct speech (to which a separate, large chapter is devoted)—are described in *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language*.

17. From the outset of his career, Bakhtin was deeply concerned about the dangers of psychologism. The most powerful and subtle of his attacks on psychologism is found in those sections of "Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity" where he criticizes the so-called Expressionist School of aesthetics, in particular the work of Johann Volkelt (1848–1930) and Theodor Lipps (1851–1914) (see *Estetika slovesnogo tvorcestva*, pp. 58–81).

18. From Pushkin's article "On Man's Duties, an Essay for Silvio Pellico" (1836): ". . . reason is inexhaustible in the *consideration* of concepts, as language is inexhaustible in the *joining* of words. All words are in the lexicon; but the books that are constantly appearing are not a repetition of the lexicon. . . . Taken separately, an *idea* can never offer anything new, but *ideas* can be varied to infinity" (*The Critical Prose of Alexander Pushkin*, tr. Carl Proffer [Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1969], p. 205).

19. In Mann's *Dr. Faustus*, the devil describes hell as "every compassion, every grace, every sparing, every trace of consideration for the incredulous, imploring objection 'that you verily cannot do so to a soul': it is done, it happens, and indeed without being called to any reckoning in words; in the soundless cellar, far down beneath God's hearing, and happens for all eternity" (*Dr. Faustus*, tr. H. T. Lowe-Porter [London: Penguin Books, 1968], p. 238). The Gestapo and SS torture chambers were very much on Mann's mind as he was writing his novel, for at just that time the most dreadful extermination camps were being liberated and for the first time the full extent of the Nazi horrors was made apparent to all. Mann wrote a special article at this time (first published as "The German Guilt," later as "The Camps") for the newspaper distributed to the Germans in zones occupied by

American troops (see *The Story of a Novel: The Genesis of 'Doktor Faustus,'* tr. Richard and Clara Winston [New York: Knopf, 1961], p. 115).

20. See Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The German Ideology* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1964, p. 42): "The production of notions, ideas and consciousness is from the beginning directly interwoven with the material activity and material intercourse of human beings, the language of real life. The production of men's ideas, thinking, their spiritual intercourse, here appears as the direct efflux of their material condition."