

Chapter Five

Intertextuality

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Definition

There is no utterance without relation to other utterances, and that is essential. The general theory of the utterance is, in Bakhtin's eyes, but an unavoidable detour to get him to the study of this facet of the question. The term he uses to designate the relation of every utterance to other utterances is *dialogism*, but this key term is, as one could expect, loaded with such an embarrassing multiplicity of meanings that I have preferred to proceed somewhat as I did earlier in transposing "metalinguistics" into "translinguistics": I will therefore use, for the more inclusive meaning, the term "intertextuality" introduced by Julia Kristeva in her presentation of Bakhtin, setting aside the denomination *dialogical* for certain specific instances of intertextuality, such as an exchange of responses by two speakers, or Bakhtin's conception of human personality. Bakhtin himself invites such a terminological distinction in the following remark:

These relations [between the discourse of the other and the discourse of the I] are analogous to (but certainly not identical with) the relations between the exchanges of a dialogue (29:273).

At the most elementary level, any and all relations between two utterances are intertextual.

Two verbal works, two utterances, in juxtaposition, enter into a particular kind

of semantic relation, which we call dialogical (30:297). Dialogical relations are (semantic) relations between all the utterances within verbal communication (30:296).

Intertextuality belongs to discourse and not language, and therefore falls within the sphere of competence of translinguistics and not that of linguistics. However, not all relations between utterances are necessarily intertextual. Logical relations must be excluded from dialogism (for example: negation, deduction, etc.); in themselves, they do not imply intertextuality (though the latter may be bound to them); the same is obviously true of purely formal, or linguistic, relations in the strict sense (anaphora, parallelism, etc.).

These [dialogical] relations are profoundly specific and cannot be reduced to relations of a logical, linguistic, psychological, or mechanical type, or to any other kind of natural relations. It is a particular type of *semantic* relations, whose parts must be constituted by *whole utterances* (or utterances considered whole, or potentially whole), behind which stand (and in which express themselves) actual or potential speaking subjects, the authors of the utterances in question (30:303).

The end of the last sentence is important: in the intertextual relation, the utterance is considered as evidence of the subject.

In order to become dialogical, logical relations and objectal semantic relations must achieve material existence, as was said earlier, that is, they must enter into another sphere of being: become *discourse*, that is utterance, and receive an *author*, that is the creator of the utterance, whose position is in turn expressed by the utterance. In this sense, every utterance has an author, whom we hear in the very utterance as its creator. . . . The dialogical reaction endows with personhood the utterance to which it reacts (32:246).

This does not mean, it will be recalled, that the utterance gives expression to the inimitable individuality of its author. The utterance at hand is perceived rather as the manifestation of a conception of the world, while the absent one as that of another conception; the dialogue takes place between the two. For example:

In the process of literary creation, the mutual illumination of a native language and a foreign language [if it occurs in the work] underscores and objectifies the "conception of the world" facet of both languages, as well as their internal form, and their respective systems of values. For the consciousness creating the literary work it is obviously not the phonetic system of the native language, or its morphological particularities, or even its abstract vocabulary, that appear in the field illuminated by the foreign tongue, but precisely that which makes of the language

a concrete and absolutely untranslatable conception of the world: specifically, the style of the language as a totality (24:427).

Every representation of language puts us in contact with its utterer; to make us "conscious" of what language is, is to have us identify who speaks within it. This "personhood" covers the gamut from an entire linguistic community (the use of English connotes the subject of "Englishness") to the subject of individual forms of expression, and passing through the subject of dialects and styles in all their variety. The individual forms are reserved for the private use of language; literary representation, on the other hand, cannot rely upon any intimacy on our part with the characters that it puts forward, and therefore deals only in collective subjects of enunciation.

All these [nonliterary] forms, even where they come closest to literary representation, as, for example, in some two-voiced rhetorical genres (parodic stylizations), are oriented upon the individual's utterance. . . . In the authentic novel, one can feel behind every utterance the nature of social languages with their internal logic and necessity. . . . The image of such a language in the novel is the image of the social horizon, of the social ideologue, welded to its discourse, to its language (21:167-69).

No utterance is devoid of the intertextual dimension. Already in one of his earliest publications, Voloshinov/Bakhtin remarked that every discourse refers to at least two subjects, and thus to a potential dialogue.

"Style is the man"; but we can say: style is, at least, two men, or more precisely, man and his social grouping, incarnated by its accredited representative, the listener, who participates actively in the internal and external speech of the first (7:265).

In the later writings, Bakhtin will particularly insist on another patent fact: whatever the object of speech, this object, in one way or another, has always already been said, and it is impossible to avoid encountering the discourse previously held upon this object.

The dialogical orientation is obviously a characteristic phenomenon of all discourse. It is the natural aim of all living discourse. Discourse comes upon the discourse of the other on all the roads that lead to its object, and it cannot but enter into intense and lively interaction with it. Only the mythical and totally alone Adam, approaching a virgin and still unspoken world with the very first discourse, could really avoid altogether this mutual reorientation with respect to the discourse of the other, that occurs on the way to the object (21:92).

Not only have words always already been used and carry within themselves the traces of preceding usage, but "things" themselves have been touched, at least in one of their previous states, by other discourses that one cannot fail to encounter. The only distinction that can be drawn in this regard is not between discourses endowed with intertextuality and those devoid of it, but between two roles, one weak and one strong, that intertextuality can be called on to play. Bakhtin proceeds then to make an inventory of all the types of discourse in which the intertextual dimension is essential: daily conversation; law; religion; the human sciences (it will be recalled that their distinctive features lie in their having to do with texts, with which they enter into dialogue; rhetorical genres, such as political discourse; and so on. However, the role of intertextuality is minimal in the natural sciences: the discourse of the other, to the extent it occurs, is generally confined between quotation marks (21:150-67).

Absence of Intertextuality?

Bakhtin knows perfectly well that the intertextual dimension is omnipresent, yet, at times, he is tempted to inscribe it into a simple opposition where the "intertextual" utterance would face a nonintertextual one. An examination of these attempts and their (relative) failure is instructive.

1) *Dialogic and Monologic*

Naturally, the first term to come to mind in opposition to "dialogue" is "monologue." But we have seen that Bakhtin uses "dialogic" and "dialogism" in a very broad sense that makes even the monologue dialogical (i.e., it has an intertextual dimension). In this respect, Bakhtin's hesitation in characterizing Tolstoy's writing is significant. In 1929, he asserts it is monologic, and the assertion is further amplified in the second edition of the book on Dostoevsky (1963).

Tolstoy's universe is monolithically monological. . . . In his universe, there is no second voice alongside that of the author; hence, no problem of the combining of voices, or of a special status for the author's viewpoint (13, 67-68; cf. 32:75).

But in the meantime, in 1934-1935, and again in 1975 when these other lines appear, Bakhtin upholds the contrary:

In Tolstoy, discourse is characterized by a clear internal dialogism, in the object

as much as in the reader's horizon, a dialogism whose semantic and expressive particularities are acutely perceived by Tolstoy (21:96).

In fact, the opposition of the dialogic and the monologic gives way to an internal cleavage of the dialogic, which assumes different forms (this allows the maintenance of a special place for Dostoevsky, privileged instance of dialogism).

After Dostoevsky, polyphony makes a powerful entrance into all of world literature. . . . In dialogism, especially in reference to the subjectivity of his characters, Dostoevsky crosses a kind of threshold, and his dialogism attains a (higher) new quality (30:291).

2) Prose and Poetry

From as early as the first edition of the *Dostoevsky*, and especially with "Discourse in the Novel," prose, which is intertextual, is opposed to poetry, which isn't. Poetic complexity, Bakhtin would say, locates itself between the discourse and the world; that of prose, between the same discourse and its utterers.

In the poetic image in the narrow sense (image-trope) all action—the dynamics of the image—takes place between the word (in all of its aspects) and the object (in all of its complexity). The word bathes in the inexhaustible riches and the contradictory variety of the object, in its "virginal" and as yet "unnamed" nature; it does not presuppose anything outside the frame of its context (to which are added, of course, the treasures of the language). The word forgets the history of the object's contradictory emergence into awareness, as it forgets the heterological present condition of this awareness. For the prose-artist, on the contrary, the object makes manifest, above all, the social and heterological variety of its names, definitions, and evaluations (21:91).

It isn't that the representation of discourse, and therefore of its utterer, is impossible in poetry, but it just isn't aesthetically valorized there as it is in prose.

Most poetic genres (in the strict sense of the term) do not avail themselves of the internal dialogism of discourse artistically; it does not enter into the "aesthetic object" of the work; it is conventionally stifled in poetic discourse. In the novel, on the other hand, it becomes one of the most essential features of prosaic style, and receives a specific artistic elaboration (21:97).

Should poetry attempt to avail itself of this resource, it is immediately drawn to the side of the novel. Bakhtin constantly cites Pushkin's *Eugene Onegin* as an example of the novel, not of poetry. Or again, when poetry represents discourse, it does it in clear-cut forms, in

somewhat scientific fashion (it is the direct style of the character, comparable to a quotation, whereas prose favors more subtle forms such as "double-voiced" or "hybrid" discourse whose description we will study later. In conclusion, Bakhtin will say that, in poetry "discourse upon doubt must be without doubts" (21:99): there may be complexity in the object but the discourse must remain crystal clear.

The reasons of this opposition may be seen in the fact that the poem is an uttering act whereas the novel *represents* one.

The language of the poet is *his own* language; he is wholly immersed in it, and inseparable from it; he makes use of each word, form, and expression according to its intended purpose ("without quotation marks" as it were) that is, as the pure and unmediated expression of his own intention (21:98). Every word must express in unmediated and direct fashion the poet's design; there must be no distance between the poet and his discourse (21:109). [The prose writer, for his part,] does not speak in a given language, from which he distances himself to a greater or lesser degree, but he speaks *through* language, as it were, a language that has gained in thickness, become objectivized, and moved away from his mouth (21:112).

The poet fully takes upon himself his speech act, which becomes an enunciation in the first degree, not represented, without quotation marks. The prose writer represents language, introduces a distance between himself and his discourse; his act of uttering is double (one could see in this opposition a foreshadowing of the ideas that Käte Hamburger would develop twenty years later in *Logik der Dichtung*).

3) The Novel and other genres

The novel is, for Bakhtin, the crowning achievement of prose; therefore it is in the novel that intertextuality appears most intensely.

The phenomenon of internal dialogism, as we have said, is present to a greater or lesser extent in all the realms of the life of discourse. But if, in nonliterary prose (everyday, rhetorical, scholarly), dialogism ordinarily stands apart as a particular kind of act and becomes established in plain dialogue or in other forms, clearly marked at the level of composition and designed to set off the discourse of the other for polemical purposes—then in *literary* prose, and especially in the novel, dialogism energizes from within the very mode in which the discourse conceives of its object and its means of expressing it, transforming the semantics and the syntactical structure of the discourse. Here the dialogical reciprocal orientation becomes, so to speak, an event of discourse itself, animating it and dramatizing it from within in all of its aspects (21:97).

More: intense intertextuality is the most salient feature of the novel.

The fundamental object, specific to the novel as genre, and the one that gives it its stylistic originality, is *man speaking* and his *discourse* (21:145). It is not the image of man himself that is characteristic of the genre of the novel, but the image of language. (21:149)

Dostoevsky's work is the jewel of this crown, the purest embodiment of this basic tendency of the novel.

Unlike most artists, Dostoevsky does not restrict his attention to the representational and expressive functions of discourse—the art of recreating, like an artifact, the social and individual specificity of the discourse of characters. What matters to him most of all is the dialogical interaction of the discourses, whatever their linguistic particularities. The main object of the representation he constructs is discourse itself, and especially *meaningful* discourse. Dostoevsky's works are a discourse upon discourse, addressed to discourse (32:538; cf. 13:188).

What is the novel opposed to? The answer is: to all the genres that, for this purpose, are considered to be "direct."

Every novel is, to a varying extent, a dialogical system of representations of "languages"; styles; concrete consciousnesses inseparable from language. In the novel, language does not merely represent: it is itself an object of representation. Novelistic discourse is always self-critical, and therein lies the difference between the novel and all the "direct" genres—the epic, the lyric, and drama in the strict sense (24:416).

We shall return to the problems raised by Bakhtin's theory of genre; let us note here, though, that, in other texts, Bakhtin sketches an opposition between the novel and myth, two "genres" that seem to him to constitute the opposite poles of the intertextual continuum. Myth implies a transparency of language, a coincidence of words and things; the novel starts out with plurality of languages, discourses, and voices, and the inevitable awareness of language as such; in this sense, the novel is a basically self-reflexive genre.

The absolute fusion of discourse and concrete ideological meaning is, without a doubt, one of the basic constitutive features of myth, determining, on the one hand, the development of mythological representations, and on the other determining the specific apprehension of linguistic forms, significations, and stylistic combinations. . . . Verbal and ideological decentering occurs only when a national culture sheds its closure and its self-sufficiency, when it becomes conscious of itself as only *one* among other cultures and languages. This new awareness

will then sap the roots of the mythological sense of language, based on the notion of an absolute fusion of ideological meaning with language (21:180-81).

4) *Literature and nonliterature*

This opposition is, generally speaking, alien to Bakhtin's way of thinking; we have seen him chastise the Formalists for having granted undue autonomy to "poetic language." It is significant in this respect that although one of the early texts bears the title, "Discourse in Life and Discourse in Poetry," it does not make much of this opposition: the only difference to receive attention concerns the necessity of a more explicit form of communication in literature (owing to the absence of the immediate context). And Bakhtin asserts then: "The bases and the potentialities of the artistic form to come are already present in ordinary *everyday discourse*" (7:249). Or again: "The key to the understanding of the linguistic structure of literary utterances is to be found in the simplest utterances" (18:75).

It is only at the very beginning of his career that Bakhtin makes explicit reference to the dichotomy literature/nonliterature; and he does so in terms at once familiar and opaque: literature is language in its totality, the summoning forth of all of the potentialities of language.

Poetry needs all of language, all of its aspects, and all of its elements; it does not neglect a single nuance of the linguistic word. No area of culture, with the sole exception of poetry, needs language in its totality. . . . Only in poetry does language reveal all of its potential, for the demands made upon it here are at their highest (4:46).

Or again, literature is that which, within language itself, allows language to be overcome.

Artistic creation, defined with respect to its basic material, consists in the overcoming of this material (4:46). The artist frees himself from language in its linguistic determination not through negation but by *means of its immanent perfecting*. . . . *Immanent overcoming defines formally the relation to the basic material, not only in poetry but in all of the arts* (4:49).

And in a text from the same epoch:

The artist works the language but not as language; in that capacity, he overcomes it. . . . (The word must no longer be felt as a word.) . . . The basic intention of the artist can be described as an effort to *overcome the basic material* (3:167).

Bakhtin will eventually abandon this distinction of Romantic origin. But in a late text, he sets up an equivalency, certainly not meant

to be exclusive, between literature and intertextuality as representation of language.

To what extent is a discourse purely single-voiced and without any objectal character, possible in literature? Can a discourse in which the author does not hear the other's voice, in which there is no one but the author and all of the author, can such a discourse become the raw material of a literary work? Isn't a certain degree of objectal character a necessary condition for any style? Doesn't the author always find himself *outside* of language in its capacity as the material of the literary work? Isn't every writer (even the purest lyric poet) always a "playwright" insofar as he distributes all the discourses among alien voices, including that of the "image of the author" (as well as the author's other *personae*)? It may be that every single-voiced and nonobjectal discourse is naive and inappropriate to authentic creation. The authentically creative voice can only be a *second* voice in the discourse. Only the second voice—*pure relation*, can remain nonobjectal to the end and cast no substantial and phenomenal shadow. The writer is a person who knows how to work language while remaining outside of it; he has the gift of indirect speech (30:288-89).

Authentic voice can only be a second voice. . . . Obviously these lines are a sequel to an internal dialogue in Bakhtin himself: the distribution between prose and poetry set up earlier is annulled here. Even the purest of lyric poetry no longer avoids the representation of its own language. Intertextuality is never absent; only some of its forms can be.

Typologies

Now I shall sum up briefly the various typologies Bakhtin works out from his analysis of the representation of discourse within discourse.

Matters are relatively simple at the time of *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language*. Voloshinov/Bakhtin gives his attention to only one form of representation—*reported discourse*—and he concentrates on the description of the relation between the quoting discourse and the quoted discourse. To do so, he has recourse to an opposition formulated by Wölfflin for his typology of styles in painting: they are the "basic concepts" of *linear* and *pictural*. Here are Wölfflin's definitions:

Although in the phenomenon of linear style, line signifies only part of the matter, and the outline cannot be detached from the form it encloses, we can still use the popular definition and say for once as a beginning—linear style sees in lines, painterly in masses. Linear vision, therefore, means that the sense and

beauty of things is first sought in the outline—interior forms have their outline too—that the eye is led along the boundaries and induced to feel along the edges, while seeing in masses takes place where the attention withdraws from the edges, where the outline has become more or less indifferent to the eye as the path of vision, and the primary element of the impression is things seen as patches. In the one case, the line means a track moving evenly round the form, to which the spectator can confidently entrust himself; in the other, the picture is dominated by lights and shadows, not exactly indeterminate, yet without stress on the boundaries.¹

In Wölfflin, these categories will come into opposition with "classical" and "baroque," an indication of the Romantic origin of this dichotomy. The Romantics are indeed notorious for having distinguished between the great periods of history on the basis of their capacity to reconcile opposites or draw them apart; such is certainly the basis of the opposition between "Classical" and "Romantic."

It is easy to imagine the result of the projection of this opposition on the relation between quoting discourse and quoted discourse.

What direction of development can the dynamic of interrelations between the discourse of the author and the discourse of the other take? There are two main ones. First, the basic tendency of an active reaction to the discourse of the other may lead the subject to seek to preserve his own integrity and his own authenticity. In such a case, language can tend to enclose the discourse of the other in clear and stable boundaries. Commonplaces and their variants are used: to isolate the discourse of the other in the strictest and clearest fashion; to exclude the intonations of the author; to abridge and develop his individual linguistic particularities. . . . If we use the term introduced by Wölfflin in art history, we could call this first direction taken by the dynamic of the verbal interrelation between the discourse of the author and the discourse of the other, a *linear style* (*der lineare Stil*) of transmission of the discourse of the other. Its basic tendency consists in the creation of clear and external contours for the discourse of the other, which is itself at the same time poorly individualized internally (12:117-18).

At the other pole, we have the "pictural" style:

The context of the author attempts to break up the compactness and closure of the other's discourse, to absorb it, to erase its borders. This style of transmission of the discourse of the other can be called *pictural*. Its tendency consists in crasing the clear-cut character of the contours of this discourse. In this instance, the discourse itself is individualized to a far higher degree; the perception of the different aspects of the other's utterance becomes finer and more nuanced. Not only the objective meaning of the utterance, or the assertion it contains, are


perceived, but also all the linguistic peculiarities of its verbal embodiment receive attention (12:199).

Within such a style, one of the voices can be dominant, a possibility that leads to further subdivisions.

In a study from the same period, Voloshinov/Bakhtin examines the forms of *interior dialogue*. The principle of diversification is different here: it is a question of the role played by the second voice when we talk to ourselves. In most instances, this second voice is that of a typical representative of the social group to which we belong, and the conflict between the two is that lived by the individual confronting his or her own norm. A second instance puts together two voices with equal status; such a situation implies that one feels that one belongs to two social groups at the same time, and that the conflict between them has not yet been decided by history. If finally, in a third instance, the second voice does not occupy a stable position but consists in an incoherent series of reactions exclusively determined by the circumstances of the moment, then the human being in question has lost his frame of reference, his appurtenance to a definite group, and is in danger of losing his mind.

In especially unfavorable social conditions, such a cleavage between the person and the ideological environment that provides its nourishment can ultimately lead to the complete disintegration of consciousness, to disorder or insanity (18:71).

It is in the first edition of his *Dostoevsky* that Bakhtin puts forward a general classification of the different ways of representing discourse—a classification that will be barely revised in the second edition of the book. Simplifying it somewhat, one could sum it up in the following diagram (I give in parenthesis the most common example for each species).



In the discussion of single-voiced discourse, Bakhtin encounters anew some problems evoked by Voloshinov/Bakhtin, but he does not reuse the typology previously sketched out.

The represented discourse of a character may vary in degree of objectality. It suffices to compare, for example, how Prince Andrey talks in Tolstoy with the talking done by Gogol's characters, such as Akaky Akievich. As the immediate orientation of the characters' discourse toward the object grows stronger, and, conversely, its objectal character weakens, the relations between the discourse of the narrator and the discourse of the character begin to resemble those between the replies of a dialogue (13:109-10 and 32:251-52; instead of "orientation" the earlier edition always has "intention").

Two-voiced discourse is characterized by the fact that not only is it represented but it also refers simultaneously to two contexts of enunciation: that of the present enunciation and that of a previous one. Here the author

can also use the discourse of the other toward his own ends, in such a way that he imprints on this discourse, that already has, and keeps, its own orientation, a new semantic orientation. Such a discourse must, in principle, be perceived as being another's. A single discourse winds up having two semantic orientations, two voices (13:111 and 32:253).

The difference between the *active* and *passive* species has to do with the role assumed by the earlier (or generally, the other) utterance.

In stylization as in parody . . . the author uses the discourse of the other to give expression to his own orientations. In the third species [the active], the discourse of the other remains on the outside of the discourse of the author, but the latter takes it into account and establishes a relation with it. Here the discourse of the other is not reproduced with a new interpretation, but it acts, has influence, and, in one way or another, determines the discourse of the author, all the while remaining outside of it (13:121 and 32:261; here "interpretation" takes the place of "intention").

Each category thus defined is further subdivided and illustrated with examples drawn from Dostoevsky's works.

The articulation of the different problems that the representation of discourse brings to the fore constitutes the main theme of "Discourse in the Novel," written some five years after the *Dostoevsky*. The great difference with respect to the previous classification is that Bakhtin no longer seeks to unify in a single schema all the forms of representation, but rather considers three aspects of the phenomenon, entirely independent from each other.

First, there can be a variation in the *locus* where the discourse of

the other can be “encountered”: it may be the object of which we speak or the addressee we direct our remarks to (this resembles somewhat the opposition of the “active” and “passive” forms in the earlier diagram). We recall still that, for Bakhtin, there is no object un-sullied by prior denomination.

Instead of the virginal fullness of an inexhaustible object, the prose writer is faced with a multiplicity of routes, roads and paths that have been laid down in the object by social consciousness. Along with the internal contradictions of the object itself, the prose writer comes to discover as well the social heteroglossia that *surrounds* the object, the Tower of Babel confusion of languages that goes on around any object. The dialectics of the object are interwoven with the social dialogue surrounding it. For the prose writer, the object is a condensation of heterological voices among which his own voice must also resound; these voices create the background necessary for his own voice, without which his literary nuances would not be perceived, and without which they “do not sound” (21:91-92).

The confrontation with the discourse of the other is of a “paradigmatic” nature here, in Saussure’s sense: it is a conflict between several substitutable denominations of the same object.

But there is another possible encounter, this time with the potential discourse of the interlocutor, within a new syntagmatic context; the discourse of the other belongs to the future here rather than the past.

The speaker seeks to orient his discourse, and even the horizon that has determined his discourse, in relation to the horizon of the other, the one who does the understanding, and he enters into dialogical relations with some aspects of this second horizon. . . . Very often, especially in rhetorical forms, the aiming toward the listener and the related internal dialogism of the discourse simply occult the object: persuading an actual listener redirects available attention and interferes with the discourse’s creative work on the object (21:95-96).

Second, the discourse of the other can be summoned forth, especially in a novel, in several different *forms*. Bakhtin lists the following: discourse not assumed by the actual narrator (“unreliable” in the terminology of Wayne Booth); representation of the narrator, in a situation of oral and written type; direct style and “characters’ zones”; finally, embedded genres. The first category is subdivided into such forms as parody, stylization, or irony (which is presented here as a variant of a discourse with a dual enunciation). The notion of “character zone” makes its first appearance in this context.

Heteroglossia is also diffused in the authorial discourse that surrounds the characters, creating very specific *character zones*. These zones are formed from the characters’ semi-discourses, from various forms of hidden transmission for the discourse of the other, by the words and expressions scattered in this discourse, and from the irruption of alien expressive elements into authorial discourse (ellipsis, questions, exclamation). Such a zone is the range of action of the character’s voice, intermingling in one way or another with the author’s voice (21:129-30).

Third, one can finally vary the *degree* of presence of the other’s discourse. Bakhtin puts forward a differentiation of three degrees. The first is full presence, or explicit dialogue. At the other end—the third degree—the other’s discourse receives no material corroboration and yet is summoned forth: it is because it is held available in the collective memory of a given social group; such is the case of parody, stylization, and another form of summoning forth that Bakhtin calls “variation.”

Here one language only is actualized in the utterance, but it is presented in the *light of another language*. This second language is unrealized, and it remains outside of the utterance (21:174).

Between these two, there is a second degree, doubtlessly of greatest interest for Bakhtin, who calls it “hybridization”: it is a generalization of free indirect style.

We call hybrid construction any utterance that belongs, by its grammatical (syntactic) and compositional features, to a single speaker, but that actually contains intermingled within it two utterances, two manners of speaking, two styles, two “languages,” two semantic and axiological horizons (21:118).

These two voices, Bakhtin reminds us, can only be social, not individual.

Bakhtin returns to these questions one last time in “The Problem of the Text.” No systematic classification is to be found here, but rather the evocation of several aspects of dialogism, all capable of variation. Thus, the *degree* of explicitness that can go from open dialogism to the most discrete allusion; of the *evaluation*, whether positive or negative, that we make of someone else’s discourse.

The narrow interpretation of dialogism as debate, polemic, parody. Those are the most obvious forms but also the most rough-hewn. Trust in someone else’s discourse; pious acceptance (authoritarian discourse); disciples; the search for and the (forced) extraction of a deeply lying meaning; *agreement*; its infinite

gradations and nuances (but not the logical limitations and the purely objectal reservations); the superimposition of one meaning upon another, of one voice on another; reinforcement by fusion (without identification); the combining of multiple voices (soundtrack); complementary understanding; exceeding the limits of understanding; etc. (30:300).

We can also distinguish between forms that are *intentional* and those that aren't in intertextual dialogue.

Two utterances, whatever they may be, as soon as they are set side by side on the semantic plane (not as objects or as linguistic examples) will find themselves in a dialogical relation. But it is a particular form of unintentional dialogism (for example, a selection or various utterances upon the same issue by different scholars or sages, from different periods as well) (30:246).

Finally, the *distance* between authorial voice and someone else's voice can vary as well.

The word used in quotation marks, that is felt and used as alien, and the same word (or another) without quotation marks. The infinite gradation in the degrees of strangeness (or appropriateness) between words, their different degree of distance in relation to the speaker. Words are set on different planes, at different distances, in relation to the plane of the author's words. Not only free indirect discourse, the various forms of alien discourse: hidden, semi-hidden, scattered, etc. (30:300).

The most detailed and the most systematic presentation of the entirety of these problems is indeed to be found in "Discourse in the Novel": it is the end-point of Bakhtin's reflection in the field of "translinguistics."

Chapter Six History of Literature

Categories

An initial hypothesis concerning the history of literature is formulated by Voloshinov/Bakhtin in *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language*; it is a pure projection of the typology of styles that he had just drawn up (which follows Wölfflin and his opposition of the linear versus pictorial). The variants of these two great stylistic types correspond to well-delineated historical periods.

Summing up all we have said about the possible tendencies in the dynamic relation between authorial discourse and the discourse of the other, we can distinguish the following periods: *authoritarian dogmatism*, characterized by a linear and impersonal monumental style in the transmission of the discourse of the other (the middle ages); *rationalist dogmatism*, with an even clearer linear style (seventeenth and eighteenth centuries); *realistic and critical individualism*, with its pictorial style, and a tendency to inject, into the other's discourse, the replies and commentaries of the author (late eighteenth century and nineteenth century); and finally, *relativistic individualism*, with the disintegration of the author's own context (contemporary period) (12:121).

These four great periods of literary history betoken, in effect, a moderate and an extreme form of each of the two styles, the linear and the pictorial.

The context of this opposition will remain relatively stable throughout Bakhtin's work; but its role will begin to alter as early as in the