


Handout 7: Control regimes

Econ 082, Political Economy of Africa / Prof O'Connell / Spring 2018

Fosu, chapter 3 of *Political Economy of Economic Growth in SSA*, Figure 3.1:

(*The Political Economy of Economic Growth in Africa, 1960-2000*, p. 139):



Fosu, chapter 3 of *Political Economy of Economic Growth in SSA*, p. 138:

Table 3.1 *Anti-growth syndromes: relative frequencies of occurrence from independence to year 2000, forty-six [twenty-six] SSA countries (percent).*

	State controls	Adverse redistribution	Intertemporal	State breakdown	Syndrome-free
Unweighted	33.8 [37.1]	21.9 [18.2]	8.8 [11.5]	10.2 [8.8]	25.4 [24.4]
Population-weighted	26.3	31.6	13.1	10.2	18.9

Notes: The first row comprises the set of non-weighted relative frequencies, with figures for the twenty-six-country case study sample (see table 3.2) in square brackets. The forty-six-country sample also includes Eritrea (as a forty-seventh country) for 1994–2000. The second row is weighted by the respective 1980 country populations.

Source: The syndrome data are reported in full in chapter 2. The format of the above table follows Fosu and O'Connell (2005), table 3.3. Figures differ because of revisions in the syndrome data, but more importantly because the current figures are conditioned on the sample space. Here each syndrome observed in a country-year, rather than each country-year itself, is treated as an observation (as is each syndrome-free country-year). The frequencies therefore sum by construction to 100 percent.

Table 3.2 *Country cases in the Growth Project, by sub-region and opportunity group.*

	Coastal and resource-poor	Landlocked and resource-poor	Resource-rich
Eastern and Central Africa	Kenya	Burundi, Chad, Ethiopia, ^a Niger, Sudan, ^a Uganda	Cameroon, Congo
Southern Africa	Mauritius, Mozambique, Tanzania	Malawi	Botswana, Namibia, Zambia
West Africa	Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Senegal, Togo	Burkina Faso, Mali	Guinea, Nigeria, Sierra Leone

Note: ^aEthiopia (literally landlocked after 1993) and Sudan are classified as landlocked for analytical purposes. The opportunity groups are defined in chapter 2.

Table 4.1 *Ex ante real deposit rate.*

	Control regimes	Other syndromes	Syndrome-free
Mean	−66.1	−309.6	−3.9
Median	−6.1	−4.1	−0.3
Count	162	90	165

Table 4.2 *Black market premium.*

	Control regimes	Other syndromes	Syndrome-free
Mean	175.4	133.6	7.4
Median	53.0	27.0	6.3
Count	317	211	314