Crime and Public Policy

EDITED BY

James Q. Wilson & Joan Petersilia

OXFORD
UNIVERSITY PRESS

Short, James F., Jr., and Fresc L. Strodbeck. 1965. *Group Process and Gang Delinquency*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Skogan, Wesley G., Susan M. Harnett, Natalie Bump, and Jill Dubois. 2008. "Evaluation of CeaseFire-Chicago." Online. Available at www.northwestern.edu/ipr/publications/ceasefire.html.
Snyder, Howard N., and Melissa Sickmund. 2006. "Juvenile Offenders and Victims: 2006 National Report." Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention[C2].
Spergel, Irving A. 2007. *Reducing Youth Gang Violence*. Lantham, MD: AltaMira Press.
Spergel, Irving A., and G. David Curry. 1993. "The National Youth Gang Survey: A Research and Development Process." In *The Gang Intervention Handbook*, eds. Arnold P. Goldstein and C. Ronald Huff, 359–392. Champaign, IL: Research Press.
Taylor, Terence J., Dana Peterson, Finn-Aage Esbensen, and Adrienne Freng. 2007. "Gang Membership as a Risk Factor for Adolescent Violent Victimization." *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency* 44: 351–380.
Thornberry, Terence. 1998. "Membership in Youth Gangs and Involvement in Serious and Violent Offending." In *Serious and Violent Offenders: Risk Factors and Successful Interventions*, eds. Rolf Loeber and David P. Farrington. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications.
Thornberry, Terence. 2008. "Blueprints for Gang Prevention: A Concept Paper." Boulder, CO: Institute of Behavioral Science, University of Colorado.
Thornberry, Terence, Marvin D. Krohn, Alan J. Lizotte, and Deborah Chard-Wierschem. 1993. "The Role of Juvenile Gangs in Facilitating Delinquent Behavior." *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency* 30: 55–87.
Thornberry, Terence, Marvin D. Krohn, Alan J. Lizotte, Carolyn A. Smith, and Kimberly Tobin. 2003. *Gangs and Delinquency in a Developmental Perspective*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Vigil, James D. 1998. *Barrio Gangs: Street Life and Identity in Southern California*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
Watkins, A., Beth Huebner, and Scott Decker. 2008. "Patterns of Gun Acquisition, Carrying and Use among Juvenile and Adult Arrestees: Evidence from a High-Crime City." *Justice Quarterly* 25: 674–700.
Weitekamp,Elmar G.M. 2001."Gangs in Europe: Assessments at the Millennium." In *The Eurogang Paradox: Street Gangs and Youth Groups in the U.S. and Europe*, eds. Malcolm W. Klein, Hans-Juergen Kerner, Cheryl L. Maxson, and Elmar G. M. Weitekamp, 309–322. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Notes

1. The NYGC defines a gang as "a group of youths or young adults in your jurisdiction that you or other responsible persons in your agency or community are willing to identify as a 'gang.'" Motorcycle gangs, hate groups, prison gangs, or "exclusively adult gangs" are excluded. A recent review of gang definitions in state legislation by Barrows and Huff (2009) finds that just two states share the same gang definition.

2. The seven domains were area characteristics, family socio-demographic characteristics, parent-child relations, school factors, peer relationships, individual characteristics, and early delinquency. Each subject was classified as above or below the median number of risk factors in each domain. A total of 40 risk characteristics were assessed in this study.

Chapter 7

Labor Markets and Crime

Shawn D. Bushway

The sustained and substantial drop in the crime rates in the second half of the 1990s coincided with the longest economic expansion since 1945. This co-occurrence, which most scholars conclude has at least some causal connection (Grogger 2000), refocused attention on the exciting possibility that crime can be reduced by increasing legitimate economic opportunities (Bernstein and Houston 2000). In the third edition of this book, Bushway and Reuter (2002) assessed the current state of knowledge on the impact of labor market–oriented programs on crime prevention. The labor market is made up of employers who demand labor, and people who supply labor. Bushway and Reuter (2002) divided programs into demand-side programs that focused on either creating new jobs or incentivizing employers to hire at-risk workers, and supply-side programs designed to increase the job skills and job readiness of potential employees who might otherwise become involved in crime. Bushway and Reuter (2002) concluded that demand-side programs had shown no significant crime reduction potential, while supply-side programs had shown some potential, particularly for a few subgroups, such as older males and low-risk populations.

This finding is consistent with the academic research that has consistently found a significant but weak causal relationship between individual employment and crime (Sampson and Laub 1993; Thornberry and Christenson 1984; Farrington et al. 1986; Needels 1996). New research has continued to reach the same conclusion. For example, Uggen and Thompson (2003) showed that legal earnings had a significant and negative effect on illegal earnings, using data from a contemporary sample of Minnesota youth in a fairly strong causal model. But the magnitude is small—a one dollar increase in legitimate earnings in a month leads to a seven cent decrease in illegal earnings. A successful labor market program such as Job Corps (Schochet, Burghardt, and McConnell 2006) that can increase earnings by 10 percent (about $100 a month) would only decrease monthly illegal earnings by seven dollars. In the same vein, Steve Raphael and David Weiman (2007) estimate that having a job reduces the probability

that the average parolee returns to prison within three years by at most 3 percent.

Finding that the average criminal is not very responsive to work incentives is consistent with the strong consensus from the deterrence literature that the bulk of serious criminals are not "rational," meaning that they are not responsive to changing incentives at the margin (Cook 1980; Pogarsky 2002; Tonry 2008). Why would individuals who are demonstrably unresponsive to large changes in potential punishment be responsive to small changes in earnings?

But work programs can, and perhaps should, be developed to serve the specialized and (small) groups of at-risk individuals who are likely to be most responsive to work incentives. Chris Uggen (2000) found that Supported Work, a subsidized work program for ex-offenders, had no impact overall, but did reduce re-arrest by 20 percent for participants over 26 years old. Lattimore, Witte, and Baker (1990) describe the Vocational Delivery System, a program unapologetically focused only on young adults identified by staff as having the most potential to benefit from work programs. This specialized subgroup (with an average IQ of 100, high for an offender population) showed a 20 percent reduction in re-arrest in a two-year follow-up study. Such creaming might not be popular among those looking for programs to serve large numbers of at risk individuals, but it represents a realistic response to the research literature on labor market programs aimed at crime prevention (Bushway and Reuter 2003).

While realistic, the conclusion that labor market crime prevention programs should be focused on motivated or marginal offenders runs the risk of putting too much emphasis on the immediate causal relationship between legitimate work and crime populations; in addition, places with a high prevalence of crime are detached from the labor market. Detachment from the legal labor market is a cause of crime, *and* a signal for substantial structural problems that will not be solved by relatively inexpensive programs focused only on getting an individual employed. Dramatic changes in incentives *and* attitudes, akin to what happened during welfare reform in the late 1990s (Blank 2002), are needed to reattach individuals to the labor market. This chapter focuses on three recent developments in the research literature that have reenergized the research on work and crime and led to important new insights for policy. Each development starts from the belief that the labor market is more than a legitimate alternative to income-generating crime. Rather, the legal labor market provides the normative social context for most of adult life, particularly for males. According to the American Time Use survey, the average employed American between the ages of 15 and 54 spends more time during a work day working than on any other activity, including sleeping (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2009). Changes in this social context caused by macro changes in the economy could plausibly have a major

effect on the behavior of individuals, including on their criminal behavior, simply by changing the landscape in which they live.

The next section reviews new research on the relationship between work and crime for adolescents. Starting in the 1980s, the prevailing opinion has been that work, particularly intense work, is bad for adolescents (for a review, Cauffman and Steinberg 1995). This research created the curious situation in which attachment to work during adolescence is considered criminogenic, but attachment to work during adulthood is prophylactic. The changing causal nature of work is consistent with a life-course view that early transitions to adult roles can be problematic for adolescents. However, this conclusion raises serious policy questions. Exactly when should policymakers start to attach adolescents to the labor market—when does work start to become "good" and stop being "bad"?

New research starting with Paternoster and colleagues (2003) has suggested that the earlier conclusion that intense work leads to crime was driven by selection bias. Delinquent kids were both more likely to work earlier and to work more than non-delinquent kids. Once selection is properly controlled for, intense adolescent work does not lead to crime (that is, is not criminogenic, Apel et al. 2007, 2008) and does not affect school grades (Rothstein 2007; Apel et al. 2007), although it may lead to increased dropout (Apel et al. 2008; Staff and Mortimer 2007; Lee and Staff 2007).

A bigger problem for youth is the lack of stable attachment to work. Adolescence is a time when youth move from a world of school to a world of work. Youth who are unattached to work in late adolescence will be unattached to work in young adulthood, and recent research has shown that unstable work patterns in adolescence are associated with elevated risks for crime (Mortimer 2002; Paternoster et al. 2009). Young adults who are unattached to work are exactly those who are most at risk for crime. Caspi and colleagues (1998) show that factors such as intelligence, family structure, and difficult temperament measured at age three can significantly predict the amount of unemployment during young adulthood. Caspi and colleagues (1998) argue that failure to control for these individual differences on the impact of unemployment can lead to overestimates of the role of unemployment on factors such as crime. Whatever the causal reasons, there is now growing evidence that lack of attachment to the workplace during adolescence *and* adulthood is associated with crime.

Although attachment to the labor market is at least partially dependent on individual characteristics, it is also true that involvement in the labor market is dependent on economic activity, or the demand for labor. Even the most motivated worker, youth or adult, cannot work if there are no jobs. Therefore, the next section moves to explore new research on the relationship between economic trends and crime. This research explicitly moves away from focusing on the relationship between unemployment

and crime at the national level, and moves to a theoretically grounded relationship between the business cycle, economic trends, and crime. The business cycle is a dynamic feature of the national economy, and is not measured well by changes in the unemployment rate. A new focus on the business cycle and long-term economic trends has led to stronger evidence of a link between the economy and crime. It also provides a new emphasis on how broad social changes that lead to detachment from the labor market can affect crime.

The final section discusses the growing literature on mass incarceration and employment. The incarceration rate in state and federal prisons in 2007 was 506 people per 100,000, 3.5 times as high as the rate in 1980. To put this in perspective, there were more people serving time in American prisons in 2007 than there were serving on active duty in the U.S. military (West and Sabol 2009; U.S. Department of Defense 2008). Prison and jail now "compete" with employment for the time of low-skilled men. Moreover, prison and felony convictions can serve as barriers to employment. The cost to the individual has gone up in the last 30 years as computerized criminal history records have made background checks easier at the same time that a criminal history record has joined teenage pregnancy as a (more) common life experience. Researchers and policymakers need to more fully come to grips with the role that the criminal justice system plays as a competitor to, and an impediment in, the labor market for the time of adult men.

YOUTH WORK AND STABILITY

The classroom and the workplace are two of the most important developmental contexts for youth in American society. Until well into the early twentieth century, adolescents were likely to mix school attendance and employment on the family farm, inside the home, or in factories, with employment generally taking up at least as much time as their schooling (Bremner et al. 1971; Kett 1977, 1978). Even children whose primary "occupation" was attending school were likely to have jobs in close proximity to the home, for example, running errands, selling papers, shining shoes, or other forms of informal work. Although the relative importance of education in the lives of America's youth grew with compulsory attendance laws, employment and schooling were always closely interwoven and have historically competed for the time and energy of young people. While concern was expressed about the working conditions of children, there was little doubt that, like schooling, employment was good for them.

Demand for reform grew slowly over the years, and the U.S. Congress finally passed the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) in 1938, which established a minimum age of 16 years for non-agricultural employment but did allow 14- and 15-year-olds to work, as long as their employment did

not interfere with their schooling and was not under conditions that proved detrimental to their health and well-being. Efforts to further restrict adolescent access to work characterized both federal and state legislation until the 1970s. In 1974, however, the Panel on Youth of the President's Science Advisory Committee (Coleman et al. 1974) signaled a change in thinking about adolescent employment. This and other blue-ribbon commissions, such as the National Commission on the Reform of Secondary Education (1973), the National Panel on High School and Adolescent Education (1976), the Work-Education Consortium of the National Manpower Institute (1978), the Carnegie Council on Policy Studies in Higher Education (1979), and the National Commission on Youth (1980), were highly critical of the age-segregated nature of American high schools and noted that youth in school were too far removed from work. With minor variations, each of these commissions maintained that working would enhance youths' education rather than detract from it, would better prepare them for the future, and therefore urged the relaxation of rules imposing limits on youth entering the workforce while still in school.

Beginning in the mid-1980s, the pendulum shifted again. Critics of the youth work movement, armed with empirical data to support their position, advocated careful consideration of the dangers and risks of adolescent employment. The first empirical studies of the effect of adolescent work indicated that employment during the school year, particularly what was called "intensive work" (an average of more than 20 hours per week), was related to poor school performance and involvement in a host of antisocial and "pseudo-adult" behaviors. Renewed skepticism about adolescent employment was given full expression in 1986 with the publication of Ellen Greenberger and Laurence Steinberg's *When Teenagers Work: The Psychological and Social Costs of Adolescent Employment*. Based on their extensive research on youth who worked during the school year, especially those who worked intensively, Greenberger and Steinberg found that adolescents often paid a high developmental price for working. The areas where youth were at greatest risk were their performance in school as well as participation in antisocial and "pseudo-mature" behaviors (e.g., smoking, drinking, using drugs, early sexuality). In rejecting the notion that high-school employment should be encouraged, Greenberger and Steinberg suggest that adolescents need a space for "daydreaming, fantasy and harmless irresponsibility" (Greenberger and Steinberg 1986, 167–173).

A voluminous amount of research published from the 1980s onward, reviewed by Paternoster and colleagues (2003), Apel and colleagues (2008), and Uggen and Wakefield (2008), only confirmed the conclusion of these developmental scholars that adolescent employment comes with high psychological and social costs and should be discouraged. Working too much during the school year appeared to lead to higher dropout rates, poorer school performance, lower educational aspirations, and an elevated

risk for delinquency and other problem behaviors such as early smoking, drinking, and illicit drug use. It was in large measure due to this growing consensus in the social science literature that intensive working during the school year was potentially harmful for adolescents that the National Research Council (NRC) proposed stricter limits on the hours that high-school students should be allowed to work during the school year. Specifically, the NRC recommended (1998, 226) that the federal government limit school-year work for young people ages 16 and 17—a group presently allowed to work as many hours as they choose under the federal child labor law—to no more than 20 hours per week.

Despite the large body of literature, the NRC conclusion was not built on a strong causal foundation. Intense workers are more delinquent than non-intense workers even before they begin to work. To deal with this real possibility of selection bias, researchers prior to the NRC report used cross-sectional comparisons with multiple control variables. After the NRC report, researchers have used panel data with fixed effects and propensity scoring techniques,[1] both of which provide stronger controls for selection. A general pattern emerged in these results, nicely demonstrated by Paternoster and colleagues (2003) and Apel and colleagues (2007), in which the positive correlation between intense work and delinquency is first weakened and then eliminated by stronger controls for selection in the National Longitudinal Study of Youth, 1997 Cohort, a nationally representative sample of youth who were ages 12 through 16 in 1997. Furthermore, research has shown that much of the negative associations of work and crime are driven by informal work and summer-only work, not the type of formal employer jobs that are the subject of legal restrictions (Apel et al. 2006). While not everyone agrees (Uggen and Wakefield 2008), the research is now clear that the conclusion of the NRC was premature—intense work is not criminogenic. On crime prevention grounds, there is little support for the notion that policymakers should discourage youth who are often detached from school and moving toward delinquency to stunt their growing attachment to the labor market.

Another serious flaw with the literature that informed the NRC recommendation is that no study actually looked at the impact of the federal laws governing work on adolescent delinquency. These federal laws seriously limit the non-agricultural employment and work hours of adolescents younger than 16 years of age. Starting at age 16, state rules take over. The state rules vary from restricting 16-year-olds to 20 hours of work to imposing no restrictions at all, essentially treating 16-year-olds as adults. In an important paper, Apel and colleagues (2008) look at the treatment effect of moving from the federal regime at age 15 to the different state regimes that exist at age 16. The results are unambiguous. The different state laws have a dramatic impact on the formal labor market involvement of 16-year-old workers, and that change is associated with a decrease in delinquency. The opportunity for "harmless irresponsibility" afforded by tight labor restrictions on 16- and 17-year-olds might not be so harmless.

Youth who are allowed to work more, do work more, and commit fewer delinquent acts as a result.

Working more has no impact on school performance (see also Rothstein 2007), but it does appear to increase school dropout. This latter result is troubling, and points to the competing nature of work and school. From a crime-prevention perspective, however, this trade-off does not appear to lead to increased crime, at least in the short run. It is also consistent with research that shows that dropout for economic reasons is associated with a drop in delinquency, while dropout motivated by a dislike of school, with no subsequent movement into the labor market, may be criminogenic (Sweeten et al. 2009; Jarjoura 1993).

The use of the state labor laws to statistically identify the causal impact of work also has the important advantage of beginning to move the discussion to the process by which people move into the labor market. The data from National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (1997) show quite clearly how the change in work rules leads to a doubling in the percentage of workers from 20 percent to 40 percent in the first six months after the individual's sixteenth birthday. But very little research has been done on describing the nature of the transition into work.

While working during the school year is normal for American teenagers, it might be developmentally disruptive if it is initiated too early or if attachment to the labor force occurs at too young an age. Further, while it is normative for workers who have finished their schooling to engage in a certain amount of developmentally healthy "job-shopping" as they try to better match their interests and skills with their jobs, "floundering" or "churning" during high school may be developmentally disruptive (Neumark 2002; Yates 2005). Sampson and Laub (1993) suggest that the *stability* of one's work is particularly important in inhibiting criminal offending because it could increase social control. The stable accumulation of work experience may also allow for the development of the kinds of human capital (hard skills, such as fluency with numbers or writing ability, and soft skills, such as punctuality and dependability) that can be called upon later as a resource for youth either in their transition to a full-time job after high school or post-secondary education (Staff and Mortimer 2007; Mortimer et al. 2008).

There are a number of empirical studies which suggest that work timing and stability may be important correlates of delinquent and criminal offending. Sampson and Laub's (1993) reanalysis of the Glueck data on the development of young boys in Boston provides some support for the importance of work stability (length of time in present or most recent job), though their interest was not in adolescent but young adult job stability. They found that those with low job stability between the ages of 17 and 25 were more likely to be involved with crime, more likely to be arrested, and more likely to have problems with alcohol than those with greater job stability. Job stability between the ages of 17 and 25 was one of the most important predictors of successful adjustment up to age 45.

Mortimer (2002) combined the dimensions of work intensity and work duration and found that a consistent pattern of low-intensity employment during school was beneficial (see also Mortimer and Johnson 1998). In a follow-up study that directly appealed to a life-course perspective, Staff and Mortimer (2007) found that steady low-intensity work over the high school years was positively related to educational attainment, particularly for a group that they called "low-promise" youth.

Although not related to crime, Alon and colleagues (2001) investigated the relationship between the timing and volatility of work experience for young women and their subsequent labor force attachment. They found that the more labor force experience that a woman acquires, the more likely she is to be attached to the labor force as an adult. With respect to whether the timing of that experience matters, they also found that high-school work experience increases the chance that a woman would attach to the labor market as an adult. With respect to volatility, Alon and colleagues found that the greater the number of work to non-work transitions, the less likely a woman was to be attached to the labor force as an adult.

Paternoster and colleagues (2009) have also studied the stability of adolescent work with the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 data set. They found that those adolescents with more job transitions were at greater risk of young adult crime. In contrast, they found no evidence that youth who enter work or attach to work at an earlier age than "normal" during the years 14–18 are at any greater risk of crime in young adulthood (ages 18–20).

These results dovetail with earlier results suggesting that working may actually lead to less, rather than more, delinquency for adolescents (Apel et al. 2008). Although adolescents are at a different developmental stage from adults, the same work-crime relationship that exists for adults is also applicable to youth. Youth and adults who work more commit less crime than they would otherwise, and at the very least, an unstable work history for adolescents is a risk factor for young adult criminal involvement. Attachment to and involvement in pro-social activities appears to be the key factor, regardless of the age of the individual. In a nutshell, "*work is work*" regardless of when it occurs, and what matters for both adolescents and adults is stable accumulation of work-related capital.

This commitment is at least partially dependent on the demand for workers. At-risk and low-skill youth are at the end of the line when it comes to jobs, and therefore should be particularly sensitive to changes in the labor market (Gould et al. 2002). Although there may be little that governments can do to increase demand for labor in ways that reduce the crime rate (Bushway and Reuter 2002), macro-level changes in the economy nonetheless have the potential to affect employment (and thus the crime rate) (Apel et al. 2008). The next section reviews research documenting the relationship between the economy and crime at the aggregate level.

THE BUSINESS CYCLE AND CRIME

Researchers have long wanted to know if the national crime rate depends in any substantial way on the national labor market (e.g., Thomas 1927). The labor market is typically measured by the unemployment rate, which is the percentage of those individuals in the labor market (either working or looking for work) who do not have a job. A large number of ambiguous results in the aggregate unemployment and crime literature has led to what Chiricos (1987, 188) referred to as the "consensus of doubt."

In a seminal series of papers, Cantor and Land (1985, 1991; Land et al. 1995) argued that the generally null and/or inconsistent findings between unemployment and crime that have characterized previous empirical work is due to the fact that the basic relationship is the result of two competing forces. In the standard rational choice explanation, unemployment has a positive effect on crime by increasing the criminal motivation of both unemployed and employed persons. The unemployed are more highly motivated to commit crimes because they are out of work and have financial needs. The employed are also at greater risk of crime during periods of high unemployment because periods of high joblessness are indicative of a poorly performing economy. When unemployment levels are high in a sluggish economy, even the employed are in a precarious economic position because they often are underemployed, have to remain in jobs they are unsuited for or dissatisfied with, and often feel that they will be the next one to be laid off.

Cantor and Land (1985) further argue that this motivational effect of unemployment is not expected to be immediate, but should be lagged by some time period. This is because those recently made jobless have a stock of resources (savings, unemployment, welfare) that they can immediately draw upon and first must exhaust before feeling the financial costs of unemployment. The motivational shift from conformer to offender is gradual, becoming more acute as one's economic resources become depleted.

Cantor and Land also argue that there is a contemporaneous negative relationship between unemployment on crime that is based on routine activities theory. This argument hypothesizes that an immediate consequence of unemployment is to reduce crime because the unemployed generally find themselves in routine activities that are more home-based. As a result of their unemployment, the argument goes, those without jobs are less likely, at least in the short term, to be in public places where the risk of being victimized is greater and are more likely to be guardians for their residences. Cantor and Land refer to these crime-reducing immediate consequences of unemployment as the guardianship and system activity effect, respectively. This introduction of the routine activities explanation (Cohen and Felson 1979) for the relationship between employment and crime represents an important theoretical contribution to the debate, by suggesting that the relationship between labor markets and crime need not

operate strictly through economic need. Labor markets can also change how people live, creating and destroying opportunities for crime.

Cantor and Land's re-specification of the problem spurred a whole new body of empirical research on the unemployment and crime relationship, although it also generated a continuing debate about the proper specification and the identification strategy (Rosenfeld and Fornango 2007; Greenfield 2001; Cantor and Land 2001; O'Brien 2001; Britt 2001; Paternoster and Bushway 2001). The results point to a weak motivation effect, particularly for property crime, with even weaker or nonexistent opportunity effects (Arvanites and Defina 2006). Paternoster and Bushway (2001) report that a 1 percentage point increase in the unemployment rate will lead to a 2 percent increase in property crime (see also Freeman 1999; Piehl 1998; Levitt 2001), a small effect size. Not all reviewers are willing to discount the opportunity effect based on the current evidence. Uggen and Wakefield conclude that "unemployment has a lagged and contemporaneous effect on crime" (2008, 204), suggesting support for both the rational choice and routine activities mechanisms for a relationship between the labor market and crime.

Alternatively, Paternoster and Bushway (2001) suggested that aggregate research on the national-level time series[2] has failed to show the expected strong relationship between the business cycle and crime because the research has not studied business cycle fluctuations. On average, business cycles have lasted 5.5 years since 1945 (NBER 2009). Table 7.1 provides the National Bureau of Economic Research data on U.S. business cycle expansions and contractions. According to this data, the average contraction since 1945 has lasted 10 months, while the average expansion has lasted 57 months, leading to an average cycle of 67 months. One-year changes do not adequately capture the change described by the business cycle.

Cook and Zarkin (1985), in contrast to Cantor and Land (1985), present an analysis that focuses explicitly on the business cycle using U.S. data covering roughly the same period as Cantor and Land's research (1933–1981). They perform two analyses. The first is a clever non-parametric test based on the changes in criminal activity during the entire business cycle. They show that robbery and burglary increase more during economic contractions than expansions, indicating evidence for a motivational theory of crime. There is no observed motivational effect for homicide. More auto theft occurs during expansions relative to contractions, suggesting that opportunity might be an especially important factor for auto theft (Paternoster and Bushway 2001). An expansion of this approach to include the most recent business cycles has been able to replicate these results—business cycle booms correspond with declines in burglary and robbery, and increases of auto theft. Booms and busts appear to have no relationship with violent crime (Bushway, Cook, and Phillips 2009).

Cook and Zarkin (1985) also try to quantify this analysis using trends in the unemployment rate, and these results are supportive of the more

Table 7.1. U.S. Business Cycle Expansions and Contractions (1945 to 2001)

		Length (months)		
Peak Date	Trough Date	Contraction (peak to trough)	Expansion (prev. trough to this peak)	Cycle (trough from prev. trough)
Feb. 1945	Oct. 1945	8	80	88
Nov. 1948	Oct. 1949	11	37	48
July 1953	May 1954	10	45	55
Aug. 1957	Apr. 1958	8	39	47
Apr. 1960	Feb. 1961	10	24	34
Dec. 1969	Nov. 1970	11	106	117
Nov. 1973	Mar. 1975	16	36	52
Jan. 1980	July 1980	6	58	64
July 1981	Nov. 1982	16	12	28
July 1990	Mar. 1991	8	92	100
Mar. 2001	Nov. 2001	8	120	128
Average (10 Cycles)		10	57	67

http://www.nber.org/cycles/cyclesmain.html

descriptive analysis. The problem, as noted by Greenberg (2001), Arvanites and Defina (2006), and Rosenfeld and Fornango (2007), is that unemployment is not a good measure of the business cycle. The National Bureau of Economic Research determines the timing of the business cycle primarily by the gross domestic product, with input from measures of income and employment. Specifically, the NBER states on its web site that:

> Unemployment is generally a lagging indicator, particularly after the trough in economic activity determined by the NBER. For instance, the unemployment rate peaked 15 months after the NBER trough month in the 1990–91 recession and 19 months after the NBER trough month in the 2001 recession. The unemployment rate (which the committee does not use) tends to lag behind employment (which the committee *does* use) on account of variations in labor-force participation. (http://www.nber.org/cycles/recessions_faq.html)

Arvanites and Defina (2006) try to construct a more realistic quantitative model of the business cycle by redoing Cantor and Land (1985) using state-level measures of gross domestic product and a panel data structure from 1986 to 2001. They find a strong and negative lagged relationship between gross state product and property crime rates, and no contemporaneous effect. Their results support motivational theory over opportunity theory and highlight the potential power of moving to a truer measure of the business cycle.

Rosenfeld and Fornango (2007) replicate these results for robbery and larceny over a longer time period (1970 to 2003) using regional rather than state measures. But Rosenfeld and Fornango (2007) also suggest using a measure of consumer sentiment rather than a measure of gross

domestic product. The argument here is similar to the question about perceptual deterrence. What matters is not the objective experience of the economy, but people's perceptions of that experience. Consumer sentiment is not used to identify business cycles by the NBER, but it has proven predictive ability (Gelper et al. 2007) and it is explicitly used by banks, manufacturers, and the government to gain real-time insight into the direction and current state of the economy.

Rosenfeld and Fornango (2007) find strong evidence for a negative relationship between consumer sentiment and property crime, even when controlling for GDP and unemployment. Indeed, they conclude that improvement in consumer sentiment can explain a third of the drop in robbery during the 1990s. This conclusion contrasts sharply with Levitt's (2004) dismissal of economic explanations of the crime drop, and serves as an upper bound on the estimates provided by others such as Grogger (2000). Moreover, they begin to tell an important theoretical story, continued by Rosenfeld (2009), for how opportunity theory can also explain how crime increases during recessions, as the underground demand for stolen goods increases.

There are at least two reasons to be excited by this renewed discussion about the relationship between the business cycle and crime. First, it reflects a renewed belief in the existence of a national time trend in crime. There is undoubtedly local variation in crime, and local factors matter for both crime and the economy (Levitt 2001). But routine activity theory (Cohen and Felson 1979; Felson 2002) relies on large-scale social changes that facilitate and impede criminal opportunities. Large-scale social factors—such as the loss of high paying U.S. manufacturing jobs, the increase in incarceration as a policy choice, the increase in female labor supply, and the rise of illegal markets such as crack—all affect the mix of motivated offenders, suitable targets, and available guardians in such a way that might affect crime. The absence of a meaningful national trend in crime would necessarily put the lie to such national level theories. Yet actually identifying a national trend is no simple matter, and it is relatively easy to show that there is substantial variation in crime trends across cities (Brownstein 1996).

McDowall and Loftin (2009) take on this challenge using 45 years of annual data on 134 U.S. cities with populations of more than 100,000 people. Using a variety of techniques, they find conservatively that the national trend can explain at least 20 percent of the overall variation of crime rates across places over time. At least in theory, this national trend can be explained by other national-level trends, such as the national business cycle.

The second reason to get more excited about explaining national trends comes from the movement to other measures of the economy besides unemployment. The focus on unemployment rates raised a difficult conceptual problem. Crime rates and unemployment rates are the products of fundamentally different stochastic or probabilistic processes (McDowall and Loftin 2005). Aggregate crime rates follow a random walk process, which means that crime does not return to a common mean, or equilibrium position (McDowall and Loftin 2009). Crime goes up or down in response to shock, and it stays up or down, without necessarily returning to the previous level. It is inherently unpredictable and tends to follow long meandering paths. Unemployment, however, is stationary—moving up and down in a rhythmic or cyclical way. Unemployment rates are more predictable than crime rates—simply checking where the unemployment rate is relative to its historical average provides a reasonable prediction about what will happen in the next year.

This difference in process implies that crime and unemployment do not track, or move together. Their relationship, if it exists, must be more complicated, perhaps with changes in unemployment affecting changes in crime in a non-linear way, or with structural breaks (meaning that the causal relationship changes over time).[3] In contrast, the economic evidence suggests that both consumer sentiment (Gelper et al. 2007) and GDP (Rapach 2002) also do not move around a common mean (like unemployment), even after taking into account the standard upward trend in measures such as GDP.[4] The key insight here is that the processes generating GDP and consumer sentiment are similar in structure to the processes generating crime (unlike unemployment). Beyond resolving some of the confusion dealing with trends that follow different processes (Paternoster and Bushway 2001), this result means that national crime trends could legitimately be caused, in the conventional sense, by these large-scale economic forces. This could also explain the apparently stronger relationship between crime and GDP and consumer sentiment in standard regressions relative to unemployment and crime.[5]

It may also help that these models (Rosenfeld and Fornango 2007; Arvanites and Defina 2006) are estimated using data from after 1970, a period that contains what is the arguably the most important macro-level trend in the United States with respect to the labor market and crime: the shift away from the heavy dependence on less-educated male workers that began in the 1970s.[6] From the early 1900s through the 1960s, the real earnings of less-educated male workers grew markedly (Mishel, Bernstein, and Boushey 2003). Increased productivity gains, relative shortages of less-educated workers, as well as expanding unionization and the federal minimum wage legislation all seemed to ensure decade by decade increases in the economic fortunes of less-educated male workers in the United States over this period.

But a shift in this trend began to occur in the 1970s and 1980s as the wages paid to less-educated male workers began to decline in both real terms and relative to the earnings of more educated (i.e., college trained) workers. These declines accelerated during the 1980s, especially for young males with a high school degree or less (Blackburn, Bloom, and Freeman 1990). These trends were especially pronounced for young black men. Not only did the earnings and employment of less-educated young

men decline more generally over the late 1970s and 1980s, but less-educated young black men's outcomes also fell relative to those of comparable whites (Bound and Freeman 1992).

The declining labor market fortunes of less-educated male workers and the growing concentration of the poor in urban areas, especially the black poor, over the 1980s could clearly have influenced criminal activity in the United States over a long period. This is especially true, given recent research on the long-term earnings shocks of layoffs during recessions (von Wachter et al. 2009). The effect on earnings for the individuals directly affected is long term, and it outlasts the recession itself. But, if the changing economic conditions faced by less-educated young men influenced their propensity to engage in criminal activities over the 1980s, then surely the relative improvements in earnings and employment that were observed during the economic boom of the mid-1990s for this age group should have reduced crime as well. While there is some evidence that the economic boom did benefit less-educated young black men by modestly increasing the wages of those who were in the labor market (Freeman and Rodgers 2001), the secular downward trend in their employment and labor force participation continued over this period.[7]

Male labor force participation in the 16–24 age group, the peak age group for criminal activity, has declined 18 percentage points from 83 percent since 1989 (BLS 2009). Only half of the men in this age group worked during July 2009, and only 36 percent of blacks worked during this month, the peak month of work for this age group. These numbers would be even worse if blacks in prison and jail were counted as part of the population (Petit 2009). This unprecedented level of detachment from the labor market should raise red flags about the potential for crime. Even if one does not believe that these potential workers will change their criminal behavior in response to changes in the economy, the fact that almost two-thirds of the non-institutionalized population of blacks in the United States did not work in July 2009 raises important questions about their "routine activities." Is this population "working" in the drug markets, or off the books in the informal economy? Have these workers, particularly the men, been displaced by welfare reform, which successfully moved thousands of women into the workforce (Blank 2002)? What is clear is that the United States has experienced a fundamental shift in the degree to which individuals in the country, particularly populations at risk for crime, are attached to the formal labor market. At the same time, the United States has experienced an unprecedented and well-documented growth in the prison population. On any given day, more black male high school dropouts aged 20–35 are incarcerated than employed (Western and Pettit 2000). Given that incarceration is now a major factor of life for large numbers of people and communities, the next section examines ways in which incarceration and employment interact.

INCARCERATION

A fundamental fact of incarceration is that people who are incarcerated are not employed. But, the causal impact of incarceration on employment depends on whether new inmates come from the population who are in the workforce itself. The exact answer is difficult to determine definitely, since incarcerated people are either not counted or counted poorly in most official counts of the U.S. population (Pettit 2009). Such an undercount would lead to an overestimate of the percent of people in the workforce, and an underestimate of the impact of incarceration on the labor force participation rate.[8]

Despite these challengers, Holzer and colleagues (2005) create a credible estimate that every one percentage point increase in the incarceration rate for black men leads to a one percentage point decline in labor force attachment. If the imprisonment rate for black men has increased from 2 percent to 5 percent from 1979 to 1999, then incarceration can account for, at most, 4 percentage points of the overall 13 percentage point decline in labor force attachment among young black men during this same period. This estimate suggests that the increased incarceration in the United States has not included employed men, but rather, the unemployed and detached workers who were marginalized by the economic restructuring of the 1970s and who were most susceptible to the lures of the drug markets that grew up around crack cocaine in the 1980s.

This interpretation is supported by a description of the average incarcerated offender. Close to 70 percent are high school dropouts, for example, and most are unemployed at the time they are arrested (Petersilia 2001). Studies of employment for incarcerated offenders using official data find only 30 percent employed in the quarter before incarceration (far below the 57 percent self-reported rate), a figure that includes part-time (but not informal) work, with yearly earnings among those employed of less than $8,000 (Holzer 2009).

This low starting point means that it is also difficult for incarceration to have a dramatic impact on the earnings and employment on those who are incarcerated. The question of the impact of incarceration on earnings and unemployment was reviewed extensively and competently by Holzer (2009). He concluded that "while the credible empirical evidence is quite mixed, the preponderance of it points to *negative effects of incarceration on the subsequent employment and earnings of offenders*" (2009, 2).

Holzer makes it clear that not everyone agrees with this conclusion. A reasonable person could conclude on the basis of this evidence that incarcerating someone (rather than putting them on probation) has no causal impact on employment and earnings for the average offender after they are released (white collar offenders are a noteworthy exception; Nagin and Waldfogel 1996).[9] Individuals convicted of felonies are in the secondary labor market with unstable employment and flat wage trajectories before they are incarcerated (Bushway 1998, 2004).

It is possible, however, to put too much weight on the causal impact of incarceration on employment and earnings after release. Even if the incarcerated offender is not in the labor market before the spell of incarceration, the incarcerated offender spends yet more time out of the formal labor market while he or she is incarcerated. Or, to put it another way, prison unquestionably has a causal impact on the lifetime earning and employment of people who are incarcerated. This is a dead weight loss to society and to this individual, which may or may not be compensated by the corresponding drop in crime associated with his or her prison sentence.[10]

Prison work industries can try to mimic employment, but employment inside and outside a prison will always be fundamentally different enterprises. Prison is not work—and it is telling that for key demographic groups, incarceration is a more common experience than is work. Prison work programs have promise (Wilson et al. 2001; Jensen and Read 2006), but few rigorous evaluations have shown positive outcomes. Mostly what criminologists know is that there are some people in prison who want to participate in vocational programs—and these people do better in both the labor market and commit less crime when released.

As prison sentences become longer (Raphael and Stoll 2009), there are more and more people reentering society at older ages with little real experience in the labor market, meaning that even these motivated offenders face bigger challenges than in years past. Bushway, Tsao, and Smith (2009) show that the median age of the average prisoner has increased by about 8 years from 1974 to 2004, and the median age of released prisoners increased 5 years from 1984 to 1994 (Langan and Levin 2002). Twenty-seven-year-olds with no job experience have a better chance of attaching to the labor market than do 34-year-olds with no job experience. Mass incarceration has taken a group of people who were detached from the labor market and extended that detachment. Even if one doubts the evidence supporting the claim that incarceration causally increases employment problems after release from incarceration, it is hard to argue that incarceration is a solution to the problem of growing detachment of adults from the labor market. Policymakers should be particularly concerned about any policy that further isolates individuals and communities from the labor market.

Mass incarceration is not the only such policy. An even more prevalent problem is the use of criminal history records by employers. It is absolutely indisputable that employers are using criminal history records to bar offenders from employment at ever higher rates (Stoll and Bushway 2008; Holzer 2009; Pager 2003; Bushway 1998; Uggen et al. 2006; Travis 2002). There is a strong consensus in the literature that a criminal history record showing a conviction of a felony, independent of an arrest or criminal activity, has a sizable, causal, negative impact on employment and earnings. The debate in this literature centers on what to do about the problem given the tension between protecting the public against the threat of ex-felons and the rights (and possible rehabilitation) of ex-felons.

Ex-felons are at a higher risk of crime, and while change can and does happen, the reality is that the social science evidence in support of work, for example, as a change agent for ex-offenders is relatively weak (Bushway and Reuter 2002; Raphael and Weiman 2007; Fagan and Freeman 1999). The last time SEARCH, the consortium of state criminal history records, reviewed its standards for conduct by the repositories, they did not choose to restrict employer access to even arrest records because social science research "suggest(s) that even where employers do use arrest information as a bar to or a restriction on employment opportunities, this may not be significant from a rehabilitation standpoint because recidivism statistics suggest that rehabilitation is seldom achieved regardless of offenders' employment prospects" (SEARCH 1988 29). Recent reviews on desistance (Laub and Sampson 2001) reach a different conclusion regarding the power of work to aid recidivism, but there is still no strong consensus about the causal mechanisms underlying the desistance process (NRC 2008).

Of course, governments could simply ban background checks. Yet employers and other policy agents clearly believe that information on criminal history records is valuable for making informed decisions about future risk. The widespread proliferation of private criminal history record checks in the last 15 years is a testimony to the demand for this information, as are the steps that agents will take to circumvent restrictions on access to official repository data (Bushway et al. 2007). Agents who believe that this information might be relevant could also resort to statistical discrimination on the basis of race, which is highly correlated to criminal history records (Bushway 2004; Holzer, Raphael, and Stoll 2005). This type of discrimination not only hurts minority ex-offenders, it also hurts minority non-offenders. For example, Pager's (2003) audit study in Milwaukee revealed that race is as salient as criminal history record among employers who do not check for a criminal history record. All things equal, it might make more sense to develop rational guidelines for the use of criminal history records than advocate a policy that could well lead to much wider employment problems for non-felons (SEARCH 2006).

One standard would limit the use of old criminal history records and eliminate lifetime bans on the basis of risk of recidivism (Kurlychek et al. 2006, 2007; Blumstein and Nakamura 2009; Bushway and Sweeten 2007). Recent research has shown that ex-offenders eventually "look like" non-offenders in terms of recidivism after 7 to 10 years. Good policy could include sunset clauses for individuals who meet certain standards of conduct, like staying "straight" for 7 to 10 years. It is possible that this sunset clause could be conditioned on age or other factors correlated with recidivism. For example, perhaps older offenders need not stay straight for that long before they can claim that they have desisted (Bushway et al. 2009).

Other policy experiments include the "ban the box" movement, in which employers are not allowed to ask about criminal history records at the beginning of the process (Henry and Jacobs 2007). This policy—which has been implemented for local government jobs in San Francisco, Chicago, Boston and

statewide in Minnesota—moves the background check to a later step in the process, essentially preventing employers from asking about a criminal history record on the application. The belief is that the information will matter less when taken in the larger context of the employee's qualifications, essentially forcing employers to evaluate the record relative to other job qualifications and the characteristics of the job. No evaluations have yet been completed of this policy, but it represents an innovative attempt to encourage employers to avoid using the criminal history record as the only measure of risk.

Private employers, however, have not followed the lead of public employers in cities with "ban the box" initiatives (Gebo and Norton-Hawk 2009). The primary reason appears to be concerns about liability. Negligent hiring lawsuits allow claimants to hold companies liable if they hire someone who does harm to the claimant if the act was "reasonably forseeable." The key is the meaning of the phrase "reasonably forseeable," which is usually interpreted in layman's terms by juries. This concept is usually not applied in a statistical sense.

But, statistically, violent acts committed on the job are rare, and therefore hard to foresee, even by people who have done such acts before. Suppose that the chance of serious harm by an employee is .1 percent, meaning that one out of every 1,000 employees will commit a serious violent act on the job in the coming year. Predicting this outcome is incredibly difficult, and even a good predictor might only identify people that are two or three times more likely to commit a crime (.3 percent rather than .1 percent) (Gottfredson and Gottfredson 1994; Gottfredson and Moriarity 2006). Using such predictors will result in the exclusion of many people who were in fact never going to commit any such crime. Legislatures and courts must decide whether this small reduction in risk is worth the further detachment and isolation of a large subset of the population from work. Even if such exclusion does not directly cause crime by the person excluded, it seems inevitable that such exclusion will heighten the detachment from work in that person's family and community. Employment exclusion, unlike incarceration, seems unlikely to prevent much crime—yet, the potential for further harm by continuing to weaken the link to employment in populations already detached from the legal labor market might swamp any harm caused by ex-offenders.

CONCLUSION

Only 55.6 percent of youth aged 16 to 24 were working in July 2008. The percentage of blacks who were working, 41.3 percent, is even lower. These numbers reflect the steady decline in labor force participation since July 1989. These trends for the most crime-prone age group are startling, and particularly alarming for a chapter on labor markets and crime. The current recession only makes the problem worse, leaving attachment to the workforce at all time lows.

This trend is worrisome on many levels. The second section of this chapter made it clear that detachment from the labor market is associated with crime for all people, including youth. Work competes with school, but attachment to both work and school lowers crime and should be encouraged for youth who lack a pro-social major life activity that leads to non-crime-centric routine activities. More research needs to focus on the reasons for and the possible solutions to this secular decline in work attachment among young adults.

Perhaps this secular decline, however, need not concern criminologists given that the United States has experienced a substantial decline in crime starting roughly around 1990. This decline has occurred mainly in violent crime, which historically has had the weakest connection to the labor market, though property crime has also declined somewhat during this same period (Levitt 2004; Rosenfeld 2009). The third section of this chapter reviewed the existing research on the relationship between the economy and crime and pointed to new research that suggests that the negative relationship between property crime and the economy is stronger than previously suggested, particularly if researchers use techniques and measures that allow them to focus both on the business cycle and secular trends such as the growing detachment of at-risk groups from work.

A discussion of crime and employment since 1989 would be deficient without a discussion of the massive increase in the prison population that accelerated starting in the 1990s. Most analysts agree that this increase in incarceration is responsible in part for the resulting decline in crime during this time period (Rosenfeld 2009; Levitt 2004; Donohue 2009). But this policy of incarceration, in combination with the increased concern about criminal history records checks by employers, has exacerbated the detachment from the labor market. The fourth section of this paper discussed the mechanisms by which this might occur.

As the United States begins a national discussion about de-incarceration, researchers and policymakers need to come to grips with the low levels of labor-market participation among young adult men. Communities in which the majority of young men are either in prison or are unemployed are not healthy places. The Welfare Reform Act of 1996 showed that a governmental and societal commitment to work could create positive outcomes for women who were detached from work (Blank 2002). Future work needs to focus on finding equally effective strategies for men who are detached from work.

References

Abbott, A. 2001. *Time Matters: On Theory and Method.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Alon, S., D. Donahoe, and M. Tienda. 2001. "The Effects of Early Work Experience on Young Women's Labor Force Attachment." *Social Forces* 79: 1005–1035.

Apel, R., S. Bushway, R. Brame, A. Hayiland, D. Nagin, and R. Paternoster. 2007. "Unpacking the Relationship Between Adolescent Employment and Antisocial Behavior: A Matched Samples Comparison." *Criminology* 45: 67–97.

Apel, R., S. Bushway, R. Paternoster, R. Brame, and G. Sweeten. 2008. "Using State Child Labor Laws to Identify the Causal Effect of Youth Employment on Deviant Behavior and Academic Achievement." *Journal of Quantitative Criminology* 24 (4): 337–363.

Arvanites, T., and R. Defina. 2006. "Business Cycles and Street Crime." *Criminology* 44 (1): 139–164.

Bernstein, L., and E. Houston. 2000. *Crime and Work: What We Can Learn from the Low-Wage Labor Market*. Washington, DC: Economic Policy Institute.

Blackburn, M. L., D. Bloom, and R. B. Freeman. 1990. "The Declining Economic Position of Less Skilled American Men." In *A Future Of Lousy Jobs: The Changing Structure of U.S. Wages*, ed. Gary Burtless. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.

Blank, R. M. 2002. "Evaluating Welfare Reform in the United States." *Journal of Economic Literature* 40 (4): 1105–1166.

Blumstein, A., and K. Nakamura. 2009. "Redemption in the Presence of Widespread Criminal Background Checks." *Criminology* 47 (2): 327–359.

Bound, J., and R. B. Freeman. 1992. "What Went Wrong? The Erosion of the Relative Earnings and Employment among Young Black Men in the 1980s." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 107: 201–232.

Bremner, R. J., J. Barnard, T. Hareven, and R. Mennel, eds. 1971. *Children and Youth in America: A Documentary History, Vol 2., 1866–1932*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Britt, C. L. 2001. "Testing Theory and the Analysis of Time Series Data." *Journal of Quantitative Criminology* 17 (4): 343–357.

Brownstein, H. H. 1996. *The Rise and Fall of a Violent Crime Wave: Crack Cocaine and the Social Construction of a Crime Problem*. New York: Criminal Justice Press, Monsey.

Bureau of Labor Statistics. 2009. *Economic News Release: American Time Use Survey Summary*. Washington, DC: United States Department of Labor.

Bushway, S. 1998. "The Impact of an Arrest on the Job Stability of Young White American Men." *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency* 35 (4): 454–479.

Bushway, S. 2004. "Labor Market Effects of Permitting Employer Access to Criminal History Records." *Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice* (Special Issue on Economics and Crime) 20: 276–291.

Bushway, S., P. Cook., and M. Phillips. 2009. "Youth Crime and Violence over the Business Cycle." Presentation at CDC working group on youth crime.

Bushway, S., P. Nieuwbeerta, and A. Blokland. 2009. "The Predictive Value of Criminal Background Checks: Do Age and Criminal History Affect Time to Redemption?" Working paper.

Bushway, S., and P. Reuter. 2002. "Labor Markets and Crime." In *Crime: Public policies for Crime Control*, 2nd ed., eds. J. Q. Wilson and J. Petersilia. San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies Press.

Bushway, S., and G. Sweeten. 2007. "Abolish Lifetime Bans for Ex-Felons." *Criminology and Public Policy* 6 (4): 697–706.

Bushway, S., H. Tsao, and H. Smith. 2009. "Has the U.S. Prison Boom Changed the Age Distribution of the Prison Population?" Working paper.

Cantor, D., and K. C. Land. 1985. "Unemployment and Crime Rates in the Post-World War II United States: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis." *American Sociological Review* 50: 317–332.

Cantor, D., and K. C. Land. 1991. "Exploring Possible Temporal Relationships of Unemployment and Crime: A Comment of Hale and Sabbagh." *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency* 28: 418–425.

Caspi, A., B. R. Entner Wright, T. E. Moffitt, and P. A. Silva. 1998. "Early Failure in the Labor Market: Childhood and Adolescent Predictors of Unemployment in the Transition to Adulthood." *American Sociological Review* 63 (3): 424–451.

Cauffman, E., and L. Steinberg. 1995. "The Cognitive and Affective Influences on Adolescent Decision-Making." *Temple Law Review* 68: 1763–1789.

Chiricos, T. 1987. "Rates of Crime and Unemployment: An Analysis of Aggregate Research Evidence." *Social Problems* 34: 187–212.

Cohen, L. E., and M. Felson. 1979. "Social Change and Crime Rate Trends: A Routine Activity Approach." *American Sociological Review* 44: 588–608.

Coleman, J. S., R. H. Bremner, B. R. Clark, J. B. Davis, D. H. Eichorn, Z. Griliches, J. F. Kett, N. B. Ryder, Z. B. Doering, and J. M. Mays. 1974. *Youth: Transition to Adulthood. Report of the Panel on Youth of the President's Science Advisory Committee*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Cook, P. 1980. "Research in Criminal Deterrence: Laying the Groundwork for the Second Decade." In *An Annual Review of Research, vol. 2*, eds. N. Morris and M. Tonry, 211–268. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Cook, P., and G. A. Zarkin. 1985. "Crime and the Business Cycle." *Journal of Legal Studies* 14: 115–128.

Donohue, J. J. 2009. "Assessing the Relative Benefits of Incarceration: The Overall Change over the Previous Decades and the Benefits on the Margin." In *Do Prisons Make Us Safer? The Benefits and Costs of the Prison Boom*, eds. S. Raphael and M. A. Stoll, 269–341. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Elder, G. H. 1985. *Life Course Dynamics: Trajectories and Transitions, 1968–1980*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Elder, G. H. 1998. "The Life Course as Developmental Theory." *Child Development* 69 (1): 1–12.

Fagan, J., and R. B. Freeman. 1998. "Crime and Work." In *Crime and Justice: A Review of Research*, ed. M. Tonry, 113–178. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Farrington, D. P., ed. 2005. *Integrated Developmental and Life-Course Theories of Offending*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.

Farrington, D. P., B. Gallagher, L. Morley, R. J. St. Ledger, and D. J. West. 1986. "Unemployment, School Leaving, and Crime." *British Journal of Criminology* 6: 335–356.

Felson, M. 2002. *Crime and Everyday Life*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Freeman, R. B. 1999. "The Economics of Crime." In *The Handbook of Labor Economics, vol. 3*, eds. O. Ashenfelter and D. Card, 3529–3571. New York: Elsevier Science.

Freeman, R. B., and W. Rodgers. 2003. "Crime and the Labor Market Outcomes of Young Men in the 1990s Expansion." Presented at the Association for Public Policy and Management Meetings, Oct 31–Nov 2.

Gebo, E., M. Norton-Hawk. 2009. "Criminal Record Policies and Private Employers." *Justice Policy Journal* 6: 1.

Gelper, S., A. Lemmens, and C. Croux. 2007. "Consumer Sentiment and Consumer Spending: Decomposing the Granger Causality Relationship in the Time Domain" *Applied Economics* 39: 1–11.
Gottfredson, S. D., and D. Gottfredson. 1994. "Behavioral Prediction and the Problem of Incapacitation." *Criminology* 32: 441–474.
Gottfredson, S. D., and L. J. Moriarty. 2006. "Statistical Risk Assessment: Old Problems and New Applications." *Crime and Delinquency* 52 (1): 178–200.
Gould, E. D., B. A. Weinberg, and D. B. Mustard. 2002. "Crime Rates and Local Labor Market Opportunities in the United States: 1977–1997." *The Review of Economic and Statistics* 84 (1): 45–61.
Greenberg, D. 2001. "Time Series Analysis of Crime Rates." *Journal of Quantitative Criminology* 17 (4): 291–327.
Greenberger, E., and L. Steinberg. 1986. *When Teenagers Work: The Psychological and Social Costs of Adolescent Employment.* New York: Basic Books.
Greenfield, L. 2001. *The Spirit of Capitalism: Nationalism and Economic Growth.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Grogger, J. 2000. "An Economic Model of Recent Trends in Violence." In *The Crime Drop*, eds. A. Blumstein and J. Wallman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Henry, J., S. James, and B. Jacobs. 2007. "Ban the Box to Promote Ex-Offender Employment." *Criminology and Public Policy* 6 (4): 755–762.
Holzer, H. J. 2009. "Collateral Costs: The Effects of Incarceration on the Employment and Earnings of Young Workers." In *Do Prisons Make Us Safer? The Benefits and Costs of the Prison Boom*, eds. S. Raphael and M. A. Stoll, 119–150. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Holzer, H. J., P. Offner, and E. Sorenson. 2005. "Declining Employment among Young Black Men: The Role of Incarceration and Child Support." *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management* 24: 329–350.
Holzer, H. J., S. Raphael, and M. A. Stoll. 2006. "Perceived Criminality, Criminal Background Checks, and the Racial Hiring Practices of Employers." *Journal of Law and Economics* 49: 451–480.
Jarjoura, G. R. 1993. "Does Dropping Out of School Enhance Delinquent Involvement? Results from a Large-Scale National Probability Sample." *Criminology* 31: 149–172.
Jensen, E., and G. Reed. 2006. "Adult Correctional Education Programs: An Update on Current Status Based on Recent Studies." *Journal of Offender Rehabilitation* 44 (1): 81–98.
Kett, J. F. 1977. *Rites of Passage: Adolescence in America, 1970 to the Present.* New York: Basic Books.
Kett, J. F. 1978. "Curing the Disease of Precocity." In *Turning Points: Historical and Sociological Essays on the Family*, eds. J. Demos and S. S. Boocock, 183–211. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Kurlychek, M. C., R. Brame, and S. Bushway. 2006. "Scarlet Letters and Recidivism: Does an Old Criminal Record Predict Future Offending?" *Criminology and Public Policy* 5 (3): 483–522.
Kurlychek, M. C., R. Brame, and S. Bushway. 2007. "Enduring Risk: Old Criminal Records and Prediction of Future Criminal Involvement." *Crime and Delinquency* 53 (1): 64–83.
Land, K. C., D. Cantor, and S. T. Russell. 1995. "Unemployment and Crime Rate Fluctuations in the Post-World War II United States: Statistical Time Series Properties and Alternative Analysis of Time Series Data." In *Crime and Inequality*, eds. J. Hagan and R. Peterson, 55–79. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.

Langan, P. A., and D. Levin. 2002. *Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 1994.* Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report. Washington, DC: United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics.
Lattimore, P. K., A. D. Witte, and J. R. Baker. 1990. "Experimental Assessment of the Effect of Vocational Training on Youthful Property Offenders." *Evaluation Review* 14 (2): 115–133.
Lee, J. C., and J. Staff. 2007. "When Work Matters: The Varying Impact of Adolescent Work Intensity on High School Drop-Out." *Sociology of Education* 80: 158–178.
Levitt, S. D. 2001. "Alternative Strategies for Identifying the Link Between Unemployment and Crime." *Journal of Quantitative Criminology* 17 (4): 377–390.
Levitt, S. D. 2004. "Understanding Why Crime Fell in the 1990s: Four Factors That Explain the Decline and Six That Do Not." *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 18 (1): 163–190.
Lewontin, R. C. 2000. *The triple Helix: Gene, Organism, and Environment.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Ludwig, J. 1999. Information and inner city educational attainment. *Economics of Education Review* 18 (1):17–30.
McDowall, D., and C. Loftin. 2005. "Are United States Crime Rate Trends Historically Contingent?" *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency* 42 (35): 359–383.
McDowall, D., and C. Loftin. 2009. "Do United States City Crime Rates Follow a National Trend? The Influence of Nationwide Conditions on Local Crime Patterns." *Journal of Quantitative Criminology* 25 (3): 307–324.
Mishel, L., J. Bernstein, and H. Boushey. *The State of Working America 2002/2003.* Ithaca, NY: ILR Press.
Mortimer, J. T. 2002. *Working and Growing Up in America.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Mortimer, J. T., and M. K. Johnson. 1998. "Adolescent Part-Time Work and Educational Achievement." In *The Adolescent Years: Social Influences and Educational Challenges*, ed. K. Borman and B. Schneider, 183–206. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Mortimer, J. T., M. C. Vuolo, J. Staff, S. Wakefield, and W. Xie. 2008. "Tracing the Timing of a "Career" Acquisition in a Contemporary Youth Cohort." *Work and Occupations* 35 (1): 44–84.
Nagin, D., and J. Waldfogel. 1995. "The Effects of Criminality and Conviction on the Labor Market Status of Young British Offenders." *International Review of Law and Economics* 15: 109–126.
National Research Council. 1998. *Protecting Youth at Work: Health, Safety, and Development of Working Children and Adolescents in the United States.* Washington, DC: National Academy Press.
Needels, K. 1996. "Go Directly to Jail and Not Collect? A Long-Term Study of Recidivism, Employment, and Earnings Patterns among Prison Releases." *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency* 33: 471–496.
Neumark, D. 2002. "Youth Labor Markets in the United States: Shopping Around vs. Staying Put." *Review of Economics and Statistics* 84 (3): 462–482.

O'Brien, R. M. 2001. "Theory, Operationalization, Identification, and the Interpretation of Different Differences in Time Series Models." *Journal of Quantitative Criminology* 17 (4): 359–375.

Pager, D. 2003. "The Mark of a Criminal Record." *American Journal of Sociology* 108 (5): 937–975.

Pager, D. 2006. "Evidence-Based Public Policy for Successful Prisoner Reentry." *Crime and Public Policy* 5 (3): 501–511.

Paternoster, R., R. Apel, and S. Bushway. 2009. "The Effect of Adolescent Work Timing and Stability on Young Adult Crime." Working paper.

Paternoster, R., and S. Bushway. 2001. "Theoretical and Empirical Work on the Relationship Between Unemployment and Crime." *Journal of Quantitative Criminology* 17 (4): 391–407.

Paternoster, R., S. Bushway, R. Brame, and R. Apel. 2003. "The Effect of Teenage Employment on Delinquency and Problem Behaviors." *Social Forces* 82: 297–335.

Petersilia, J. 2001. "Prisoner Reentry: Public Safety And Reintegration Challenges." *Prison Journal* 81 (3): 360–375.

Pettit, B. 2009. "Enumerating Inequality: The Constitution, the Census Bureau, and the Criminal Justice System". *University of Connecticut Public Interest Law Journal*. http://www.law.uconn.edu/connecticut-public-interest-law-journal/current-issue

Piehl, A. 1998. "Economic Conditions, Work, and Crime." In *Handbook on Crime and Punishment*, ed. M. Tonry, 302–319. New York: Oxford University Press.

Pogarsky, G. 2002. "Identifying Deterrable Offenders: Implications for Deterrence Research." *Justice Quarterly* 19: 431–452

Rapach, D. E. 2002. "Are Real GDP Levels Nonstationary? Evidence from Panel Data Tests." *Southern Economic Journal* 68 (3): 473–495.

Raphael, S., and D. Weiman. 2007. "The Impact of Local Labor Market Conditions on the Likelihood That Parolees Are Returned to Custody." In *Barriers to Reentry: The Labor Market for Released Prisoners in Post-Industrial America*, ed. S. Bushway, M. Stoll, and D. Weiman. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Rondeaux, C., and D. Morse. 2007. "For Thieves, Copper Is Gold in the Gutter." *The Washington Post*, July 25, 2007.

Rosenfeld, R. 2009. "Crime Is the Problem: Homicide, Acquisitive Crime, and Economic Conditions." *Journal of Quantitative Criminology* 25: 287–306.

Rosenfeld, R., and R. Fornango. 2007. "The Impact of Economic Conditions on Robbery and Property Crime: The Role of Consumer Sentiment." *Criminology* 45: 735–770.

Rothstein, D. S. 2007. "High School Employment and Youths' Academic Achievement." *Journal of Human Resources* 42: 194–213.

Sampson, R., and J. Laub. 1993. *Crime in the Making*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Schochet, P. Z., J. Burghardt, and S. McConnell. 2006. *National Job Corps Study and Longer-term Follow-Up Study: Impact and Benefit-Cost Findings Using Survey and Summary Earnings Records Data*. Princeton, NJ: Mathematic Policy Research.

SEARCH. 1998. Report of the National Task Force on the Criminal Background of America. SEARCH Group. The National Consortium for Justice Information and Statistics. Sacramento, CA.

SEARCH. 2006. Report of the National Task Force on the Criminal Background of America. SEARCH Group. The National Consortium for Justice Information and Statistics. Sacramento, CA.

Staff, J., and J. T. Mortimer. 2007. "Educational and Work Strategies from Adolescence to Early Adulthood: Consequences for Educational Attainment." *Social Forces* 85: 1169–1194.

Stoll, M. A., and S. Bushway. 2008. "The Effect of Criminal Background Checks on Hiring Ex-Offenders." *Criminology and Public Policy* 7 (3): 371–404.

Sweeten, G., S. Bushway, and R. Paternoster. 2009. "Does Dropping Out of School Mean Dropping into Delinquency?" *Criminology* 47 (1): 47–91.

Thomas, D. 1927. "Social Aspects of the Business Cycle." NY: E. P. Dutton.

Thornberry, T., and R. L. Christenson. "Unemployment and Criminal Involvement: An Investigation of Reciprocal Causal Structures." *American Sociological Review* 49: 397–411.

Tonry, M. A. 2008. "Learning from the Limitations of Deterrence Research." In *Crime and Justice: A Review of Research, vol. 37*, ed. M. A. Tonry. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Travis, J. 2002. "Invisible Punishment: An Instrument of Social Exclusion." In *Invisible Punishment: The Collateral Consequences of Mass Imprisonment*, eds. M. Mauer and M. Chesney-Lind. New York: The Free Press.

U.S. Department of Defense. 2008. *Department of Defense Active Duty Military Personnel by Rank/Grade*. Washington, DC: United States Department of Defense.

Uggen, C. 2000. "Work as a Turning Point in the Life Course of Criminals: A Duration Model of Age, Employment, and Recidivism." *American Sociological Review* 65: 529–546.

Uggen, C., J. Manza, and M. Thompson. 2006. "Citizenship, Democracy, and the Civic Reintegration of Criminal Offenders." *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 605: 281–310.

Uggen, C., and M. Thompson. 2003. "The Socioeconomic Determinants of Ill-Gotten Gains: Within-Person Changes in Drug Use and Illegal Earnings." *American Journal of Sociology* 109: 146–185.

Uggen, C., and S. Wakefield. 2007. "What Have We Learned from Longitudinal Studies of Adolescent Employment and Crime?" In *The Long View of Crime: A Synthesis of Longitudinal Research*, ed. A. Liberman. New York: Springer.

Von Wachter, T., J. Manchester, and J. Song. 2009. Long-term Earnings Losses Due to Mass-Layoffs during the 1982 recession: An Analysis Using Longitudinal Administrative Data from 1974 to 2004.

Weiman, D. F., M. A. Stoll, and S. Bushway. 2007. "The Regime of Mass Incarceration: A Labor Market Perspective." In *Barriers to Reentry? The Labor Market for Released Prisoners in Post-Industrial America*, eds. D. Weiman, M. A. Stoll, and S. Bushway, 29–79. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

West, H. C., and W. J. Sabol. *Prison Inmates at Midyear 2008*. U.S. Department of Justice: Office of Justice Programs. Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics.

Western, B. 2002. "The Impact of Incarceration on Wage Mobility and Inequality." *American Sociological Review* 67: 526–546.

Western, B., and B. Pettit. 2000. "Incarceration and Racial Inequality in Men's Employment." *Industrial and Labor Relations Review* 54: 3–16.

Wilson, D. B., C. A. Gallagher, and D. L. MacKenzie. 2001. "A Meta-Analysis of Corrections-Based Education, Vocation, and Work Programs for Adult Offenders." *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency* 37: 347–368.

Yates, J. A. 2005. "The Transition from School to Work: Education and Work Experiences." *Monthly Labor Review* 128 (2): 21–32.

Notes

Many of the themes in this chapter are extensions and reflections of themes in my research with several different sets of co-authors with whom I have been fortunate to work over the last 10 years. Special thanks belong to Robert Apel, Arjan Blokland, Robert Brame, Phil Cook, Megan Kurlychek, Daniel Nagin, Paul Nieuwbeerta, Raymond Paternoster, Herb Smith, Michael Stoll, Gary Sweeten, Hui-shien Tsao, and David Weiman. Special thanks also belong to Peter Reuter, with whom I had the privilege of writing on this topic in an earlier edition of this volume. Please address all correspondence to Shawn Bushway at 219 Draper Hall, School of Criminal Justice; University at Albany; Albany, NY 12222.

1. Fixed-effect models control for all unobserved, time stable differences that might exist between people, which represents an improvement over controls for observable differences only. Propensity score models try to mimic an experiment by matching people who look otherwise similar on observable variables, but differ on work status. They have the conceptual advantage of comparing similar people.

2. A one percentage point increase in the unemployment rate when the unemployment rate is 6 percent represents a 17 percent increase in unemployment. The corresponding 2 percent increase in crime rates reflects a low elasticity of .11.

3. But see McDowall and Loftin (2005) for evidence against the possibility of structural breaks.

4. There is a substantial literature on this question of the stationarity of macroeconomic trends. The basic tests are relatively low power, making it hard to reject the null hypothesis of non-stationarity. New tests are constantly being invented with more power, so that there is some controversy about whether or not these trends are truly non-stationary. See Fleissig and Strauss (1999) for a paper that claims that GDP is stationary. This ambiguity does not surround unemployment rates, which are clearly stationary, even with low power tests.

5. A reasonable person might begin to question whether a movement to these broader economic indicators reflects an abandonment of labor markets, the ostensible focus on this chapter. Does consumer sentiment really reflect labor market outcomes? Rosenfeld (2009) provides a partial answer by focusing on the relationship between consumer sentiment and consumer choices rooted in the rational choice or economic model of behavior. People with less income or with real concerns about the future might buy fewer legal goods, and begin to look for illegal goods to buy. This boost in demand leads to increased demand for thieves, which should result in an increase in theft, in much the same way that an increase in copper prices has led to a spike in scrap copper theft (Rondeaux and Morse 2007). The discouragement reflected in the consumer sentiment could also be reflective of a loss of income, perhaps through detachment from the legal labor market, as employment becomes more difficult to find and maintain. In other words, consumer sentiment can predict both the demand for and the supply of labor in both the legal and illegal markets—and these factors could well influence crime.

6. For a more complete treatment of this trend, see Weiman et al. 2007.

7. It is also worth noting that the crime drop during this period was concentrated in violent crime. Property crime, which has a stronger tie to the labor market, has stayed relatively constant (Levitt 2004).

8. In fact, numbers used in Western and Pettit (2005) suggests that labor market participation among black males has stayed constant. The BLS numbers reported in the last section using alternative sources raise serious questions about these numbers. See also Weiman et al. 2007.

9. Much of the disagreement hinges on the weight one is willing to give a prominent article by Bruce Western (2002), which, unlike other studies, relies on self-reported employment data. Because of the lack of information on conviction, arrest, or criminal activity, Western's work compares incarcerated offenders to all other individuals, including those who are not convicted. This strategy makes it hard to isolate the impact of incarceration over and above that of criminal activity or conviction and probation. The same problem limits demand-side studies such as the well-known audit study by Pager (2003).

10. See an excellent article by Donohue (2009) on the cost and benefits of prison for a discussion of whether lost wages should be included in the cost-benefit equation.

Chapter 8

The Community

Robert J. Sampson

Public crime policy at the dawn of the twenty-first century was dominated by the ever-greater use of penal control—especially in the form of mandatory sentences and imprisonment. The results were dramatic, as rates of incarceration in the United States skyrocketed to unprecedented historical levels (Western 2006). With the costs of incarceration rising and municipal resources for police services stretched thin after 9/11, community-based policy alternatives became widely debated across the political spectrum. Most prisoners usually return home, after all (Travis 2005), so whether in the context of the etiology of committing crime in the first place or the reintegration of offenders upon release, the role of local communities has assumed increasing importance.

In this chapter, I advance a community-level approach as a promising way to think about explaining and preventing crime, with a specific focus on urban neighborhoods. It is not the only or necessarily most effective approach, of course, but it has the advantage of being an intellectually distinctive one. Namely, instead of seeking to predict or change *individual* behavior—the traditional criminological approach—the neighborhood level of social inquiry asks how *community structures and cultures produce differential rates of crime*. What characteristics of neighborhoods are associated with high rates of violence? Are communities safe or unsafe because of the persons who reside in them or because of community properties themselves? Perhaps most important, by changing communities can we bring about changes in crime rates? As implied by these questions, the goal of community-level research is to explain variations in rates of crime across neighborhoods and other social-ecological units of analysis. A community-level perspective also aims to uncover how federal, state, and local governmental policies not directly concerned with crime may nonetheless bear indirectly on crime rates through their influence on neighborhood structures and cultures.

My argument synthesizing research on neighborhood social characteristics, crime rates, and policy implications may be summarized as follows:

- There is substantial inequality between neighborhoods in terms of economic status and correlated social resources. There is particularly strong evidence that links concentrated poverty, unemployment, and family disruption to the geographical isolation of racial minority groups—what is called *concentrated disadvantage*.
- Crime, violence, arrest, and incarceration are all spatially clustered in the same neighborhoods that are characterized by severe concentrated disadvantage. There are neighborhood "hot spots"of crime *and* criminal justice intervention, in other words.
- Although neighborhoods are constantly in flux, with individuals moving in and out, there is simultaneously a general durability or stability in the relative social positions that neighborhoods hold; disadvantage is both concentrated and cumulative in nature.
- In turn, mechanisms such as informal social control, trust, moral cynicism, network ties, and organizational capacity are hypothesized to explain violence rates, mediating in part neighborhood structural characteristics and durable concentrated disadvantage.
- A community-level approach to crime prevention implies intervening in neighborhoods, changing places not people. I outline ten strategies, focusing on: neighborhood "hot spot" policing, reducing disorder, building collective efficacy, housing-based stabilization, deconcentration of poverty, municipal services, child development, increasing organizational capacity, community-based prisoner reentry, and an "eco-metrics" for evaluation.

In short, a long tradition of research yields important clues about why communities matter for crime. I begin by highlighting the broad continuities that characterize research to the present day, and I then turn to the implications of a community-level approach to crime policy.

DEFINITIONS AND PATTERNS

Although there are many types of communities that one could define in terms of shared values or primary group ties, I define neighborhoods and local communities in spatial terms, letting properties of social organization vary. Sometimes neighborhoods make a community in the traditional sense of shared values, but often they do not—neighborhoods are *variable* in the nature and content of social ties, and they are nested within successively larger communities.

This conception is consistent with the classic view that a neighborhood is a collection of both people and institutions occupying a spatially defined area influenced by ecological, cultural, market, and political forces (Park 1915). Suttles (1972) refined this view by arguing that neighborhoods do not form their identities or composition as the result of free-market competition or internal dynamics only, the usual emphasis. Instead,

some neighborhoods and local communities have their identity and boundaries imposed on them by outsiders.

Virtually all empirical studies of neighborhoods employ operational definitions that depend on geographic boundaries set by the government (e.g., the Census Bureau) or other administrative agencies (e.g., school districts, police districts). Although administratively defined units such as census tracts are reasonably consistent with the notion of nested ecological structures and permit the analysis of rich sources of linked data, researchers have become increasingly interested in strategies to define neighborhoods that respect the logic of street patterns and the social networks of neighbor interactions (Grannis 1998). Still, there is no one correct definition of neighborhood that enjoys universal support, nor should there be—definitions vary according to the research question and theory, just as they do for other social phenomena.

Research conducted in Chicago in the early part of the twentieth century provided the impetus for modern American studies of neighborhoods and crime. In their classic work—*Juvenile Delinquency and Urban Areas*—Shaw and McKay (1969 [1942]) argued that low economic status, ethnic heterogeneity, and residential instability led to the disruption of local community social organization, which in turn accounted for variations in crime and delinquency. They also demonstrated that high rates of delinquency in Chicago persisted in certain areas over many years, regardless of population turnover. More than any other, this finding led Shaw and McKay to question individualistic explanations of delinquency and to focus on the processes by which criminal patterns of behavior, especially group-related, were transmitted across generations in areas of poverty, instability, and weak social controls (Bursik 1988).

Neighborhood Stratification

Neighborhood research in the post—Shaw and McKay era has tended to focus on the socially structured dimensions of disadvantage, especially the geographic isolation of the poor, and, in the United States, the racial isolation of African Americans in concentrated poverty areas (Massey and Denton 1993; Wilson 1987). The range of outcomes associated with concentrated disadvantage extends well beyond crime and violence to include infant mortality, low birth weight, teenage childbearing, dropping out of high school, and child maltreatment (Brooks-Gunn et al. 1997; Sampson et al. 2002). The evidence thus suggests that there are geographic hot spots for crime and problem behaviors, and that such hot spots are characterized by the concentration of multiple forms of disadvantage that are surprisingly stable over time (Sampson 2009b).

To a lesser extent, research has considered aspects of neighborhood social differentiation other than concentrated disadvantage, including life-cycle status, residential stability, home ownership, population density, and ethnic heterogeneity. The evidence on these factors is mixed, especially for density

and ethnic heterogeneity (Morenoff et al. 2001). Perhaps the most extensive area of ecological inquiry about disadvantage, dating back to the early Chicago school, concerns residential stability and home ownership. There is research showing that residential instability and low rates of home ownership are durable correlates of many problem behaviors (Brooks-Gunn et al. 1997), but also that residential stability interacts with poverty. In contexts of deprivation and poverty, residential stability has been shown to correlate with negative rather than positive outcomes (Ross et al. 2000), which makes theoretical sense if long-term exposure to concentrated disadvantage is a risk factor. Another object of inquiry is concentrated affluence. Brooks-Gunn and colleagues (1993) argue that it is the positive influence of concentrated socioeconomic resources and educated neighbors, rather than the presence of low-income neighbors, that matters most for adolescent behaviors. According to this view, the common tactic of focusing on disadvantage may obscure the potential protective effects of affluence and education.

In brief, empirical research on neighborhood differentiation has established a reasonably consistent set of facts relevant to crime. First, there is considerable social inequality between neighborhoods in terms of socioeconomic resources and their link to racial/ethnic segregation. Second, a number of social problems tend to come bundled together at the neighborhood level, including, but not limited to crime, adolescent delinquency, social and physical disorder, low birth weight, infant mortality, school dropout and child maltreatment. Third, these two sets of clusters are themselves related—neighborhood predictors common to many child and adolescent outcomes include the concentration of poverty, racial isolation, single-parent families, and, to a lesser extent, rates of home ownership and length of tenure. Fourth, these results tend to persist over time, and the empirical results have not varied much with the operational unit of analysis. Stratification of local communities with respect to crime and disadvantage is a robust phenomenon that emerges at multiple levels of geography (Sampson et al. 2002).

SOCIAL MECHANISMS AND PROCESSES

The empirical evidence points to a number of durable neighborhood-level correlates of crime rates but it does not answer what is potentially the most important question: *Why* does community structure matter? Put differently, what are the mechanisms and social processes that help explain why factors such as concentrated poverty lead to increases in crime and violence? It is to these questions that criminologists have increasingly turned their attention.

The most famous approach to mechanism-based theory can be traced back to those working in the Chicago-school tradition of *social disorganization theory*, including Shaw and McKay. Social disorganization has been defined as the inability of a community structure to realize the common

interests of its residents in maintaining effective social controls (Sampson and Groves 1989). The social disorganization approach views local communities and neighborhoods as a complex system of friendship, kinship, and acquaintanceship networks, and formal and informal associational ties rooted in family life and ongoing socialization processes. From this view, both social organization and social *dis*organization are inextricably tied to systemic networks that facilitate or inhibit social control.[1] When formulated in this way, social disorganization is analytically separable not only from the processes that may lead to it (e.g., poverty, residential mobility), but from the degree of criminal behavior that may be a result. This conceptualization also goes beyond the traditional account of community as a strictly geographical phenomenon by focusing on social networks and voluntary associations.

A major emphasis in social disorganization is the ability of a community to supervise and control peer groups—especially adolescent gangs. Delinquency is primarily a group phenomenon, suggesting that the capacity of the community to control group-level dynamics is a key theoretical mechanism linking community characteristics with crime. Cultural heterogeneity is another, related mechanism. A venerable finding is that the majority of gangs develop from unsupervised, spontaneous play-groups (Thrasher 1963 [1927]). Shaw and McKay thus argued that residents of cohesive communities with greater agreement on normative rules were better able to control the teenage behaviors that set the context for gang violence. Examples of such controls include the supervision of leisure-time youth activities, intervention in street-corner congregation (Thrasher 1963, 339; Shaw and McKay 1969, 176–185), and challenging youth "who seem to be up to no good" (Skogan 1986, 217). Socially disorganized communities with extensive street-corner peer groups are also expected to have higher rates of adult violence, especially among younger adults who still have ties to youth gangs.

A different dimension of community social organization is the density or "connectivity" of local friendship and acquaintanceship networks. Systemic theory holds that locality-based social networks constitute the core social fabric of human ecological communities (Bursik 1988). When residents form local social ties, their capacity for social control is in theory increased because they are better able to recognize strangers and are more apt to engage in guardianship behavior against victimization (Taylor et al. 1984, 307; Skogan 1986, 216). The greater the density and overlapping nature of interpersonal networks in a community, therefore, the greater the constraint on deviant behavior within the network, according to disorganization theory.

The social networks among adults and children in a community are particularly important in fostering the capacity for collective socialization and supervision. In a system involving parents and children, communities characterized by an extensive set of obligations, expectations, and social networks connecting the adults are better able to facilitate the control and supervision of children. The notion of intergenerational closure helps us

to understand parent-child relations that extend beyond the household. For example, when closure is present through the relationship of a child to two adults whose relationship transcends the household (e.g., friendship, work-related acquaintanceship), the adults have the potential to "observe the child's actions in different circumstances, talk to each other about the child, compare notes, and establish norms" (Coleman 1990, 593; Coleman 1988). This form of relation can also provide reinforcement for disciplining the child, as found when parents in communities with dense social networks and high stability assume responsibility for the supervision of youth that are not their own (Coleman 1990, 320). The closure of local networks can therefore provide the child with norms and sanctions that could not be brought about by a single adult alone, or even married-couple families in isolation.

Collective Efficacy

Social networks and closure are not sufficient to understand local communities, however. Networks are differentially invoked, and dense, tight-knit networks may impede social organization if they are isolated or weakly linked to collective expectations for rules of action. At the neighborhood level, the willingness of local residents to intervene on behalf of public safety depends, in large part, on conditions of mutual trust and shared expectations among residents. In particular, one is unlikely to intervene in a neighborhood context where the rules are unclear and people mistrust or fear one another. It is the linkage of mutual trust and the shared willingness to intervene for the common good that defines the neighborhood context of what Sampson et al. (1997) term *collective efficacy*. Just as individuals vary in their capacity for efficacious action, so too do neighborhoods vary in their capacity to achieve common goals. Moreover, just as self-efficacy is situated rather than global (one has self-efficacy relative to a particular task or type of task), neighborhood efficacy exists relative to collective tasks such as maintaining public order. Collective efficacy with respect to crime is thus a task-specific construct that refers to shared expectations and mutual engagement by residents in local social control.

Moving from a focus on private ties to social efficacy signifies an emphasis on shared beliefs in neighbors' joint capability for action to achieve an intended effect, and hence an active sense of engagement on the part of residents. As Bandura (1997) argues, the meaning of efficacy is captured in expectations about the exercise of control, elevating the "agentic" aspect of social life over a perspective centered on the accumulation of "stocks" of social resources. Distinguishing between the resource potential represented by personal ties, on the one hand, and the shared expectations among neighbors for engagement in social control represented by collective efficacy, on the other, helps clarify the systemic model: social networks foster the conditions under which collective efficacy may flourish, but they are not sufficient for the exercise of control. In this way, collective

efficacy may be seen as a logical extension of systemically based social disorganization theory. The difference is mainly one of emphasis: locality-based networks may enhance neighborhood social organization, but the collective capacity for social action, even if rooted in weak personal ties, constitutes the more proximate social mechanism for understanding between-neighborhood variation in crime rates.

A theory of social organization and collective efficacy can ill afford to ignore institutions or the wider political environment in which local communities are embedded. Indeed, many neighborhoods exhibit intense private ties (e.g., among friends, kin) and yet still lack the institutional capacity to achieve social control (Hunter 1985). The institutional component is thus crucial and refers to the resource stock of neighborhood organizations and their linkages with other organizations both within *and* outside the community. Kornhauser (1978, 79) argues that when the horizontal links among institutions within a community are weak, the capacity to defend local interests is weakened. Bursik and Grasmick (1993) highlight vertical links, or the capacity of local community organizations to obtain extra-local resources (police, fire services, block grants) that help sustain neighborhood social stability and local controls.

Empirical Evidence

I focus in this section on research that examines neighborhood social mechanisms and collective processes linked theoretically to crime. There is a large research on land use and other aspects of the physical environment that I do not address because of space constraints.

In one of the first "social process" studies of its kind, Taylor and colleagues (1984) examined variations in violent crime (e.g., mugging, assault, murder, rape) across street blocks in Baltimore. They constructed block-level measures of the proportion of respondents who belonged to an organization to which co-residents also belonged, and the proportion of respondents who felt responsible for what happened in the area surrounding their home. Both dimensions of informal social control were significantly and negatively related to rates of violence, exclusive of other ecological factors (1984, 320). These results support the hypothesis that organizational participation and informal social control of public space depress criminal violence. Around the same time, Simcha-Fagan and Schwartz (1986) collected survey-based information on over 500 residents of 12 different neighborhoods in New York City. Although the number of neighborhoods was small, they found a significant negative relationship between delinquency and rates of organizational participation by local residents. A multivariate analysis provided further support for this pattern—"level of organizational participation and residential stability have unique effects in predicting survey-reported delinquency" (1986, 683).

In a study conducted in Great Britain in 1982 and 1984, Sampson and Groves (1989) showed that the prevalence of unsupervised teenage peer-groups in a community had the largest effect on rates of robbery and violence by strangers. The density of local friendship networks also had a significant negative effect on robbery rates, while the level of organizational participation by residents had significant inverse effects on both robbery and stranger violence (1989, 789). Central to present concerns, variations in these structural dimensions of community social (dis)organization transmitted in large part the effects of community socioeconomic status, residential mobility, ethnic heterogeneity, and family disruption in a theoretically consistent manner. Notably, socioeconomic status significantly predicted organizational participation.

Elliott and colleagues (1996) examined survey data from neighborhoods in Chicago and Denver. A multilevel analysis revealed that a measure of "informal control" was significantly and negatively related to adolescent problem behavior in both sites. Like the British results, informal control mediated the prior effects of neighborhood structural disadvantage—declining poor neighborhoods displayed less ability to maintain social control, and they in turn suffered higher delinquency rates. Similarly, several studies have used survey data from over 5,000 Seattle residents living within 100 census tracts to investigate the connection between social control processes and crime. Warner and Rountree (1997) found a significant negative association between assault rates and the proportion of respondents in white neighborhoods who engaged in neighboring activities with one another—including borrowing tools or food, having lunch or dinner, or helping each other with problems. In a subsequent study, Bellair (2000) approached the neighboring question from a somewhat different perspective on mediating processes. He assumed that neighboring activities affect crime rates only indirectly, by increasing the likelihood that neighbors will engage in informal surveillance of one another's property. These causal paths were consistent with the empirical results he obtained.

A large-scale research program in Chicago (Project on Human Development in Chicago Neighborhoods, or PHDCN) proposed as a primary objective the study of criminal behavior in community context. A major component of this study was a community survey of 8,782 residents of 343 Chicago neighborhoods in 1995. Sampson and colleagues (1997) developed a two-part scale from this survey to examine rates of violence. One component was shared expectations about "informal social control," represented by a five-item Likert-type scale. Residents were asked about the likelihood ("Would you say it is very likely, likely, neither likely nor unlikely, unlikely, or very unlikely?") that their neighbors could be counted on to take action if: (1) children were skipping school and hanging out on a street corner, (2) children were spray-painting graffiti on a local building, (3) children were showing disrespect to an adult, (4) a fight broke out in front of their house, and (5) the fire station closest to home was threatened with budget cuts. The second component was "social cohesion," measured by asking respondents how strongly they agreed (on a five-point scale) that "People around here are willing to

help their neighbors"; "This is a close-knit neighborhood"; "People in this neighborhood can be trusted"; and (reverse coded): "People in this neighborhood generally don't get along with each other"; "People in this neighborhood do not share the same values." Social cohesion and informal social control were closely associated across neighborhoods, suggesting that they tapped aspects of the same latent construct. Sampson et al. (1997) combined the two scales into a summary measure termed "collective efficacy."

The PHDCN study found that collective efficacy varied widely across Chicago neighborhoods and was associated with lower rates of violence measured by independent methods, all the time controlling for concentrated disadvantage, residential stability, immigrant concentration, and a comprehensive set of individual-level characteristics (e.g., age, sex, SES, race/ethnicity, home ownership) as well as indicators of personal ties and the density of local organizations. Whether measured by homicide events or violent victimization reported by residents, neighborhoods high in collective efficacy consistently had significantly lower rates of violence. Even after adjusting for prior violence, a two standard-deviation elevation in collective efficacy was associated with a 26 percent reduction in the expected homicide rate (Sampson et al. 1997, 922). In addition, the association of concentrated disadvantage and residential instability with higher violence declined after collective efficacy was controlled, suggesting a potential causal pathway at the community level. This pathway is presumed to operate over time, wherein collective efficacy is undermined by the concentration of disadvantage, racial segregation, family disruption, and residential instability, which in turn fosters more crime. A later study in Chicago using the same PHDCN collective efficacy scale found that robbers were less likely to choose high efficacy neighborhoods to carry out robberies, controlling for racial and economic composition (Bernasco and Block 2009). Morenoff et al. (2001) also used PHDCN to show that the density of personal ties was associated with higher collective efficacy but did not translate directly into lower crime rates—the association of dense ties with lower crime was entirely indirect.

We must bear in mind that social ties are neutral in the sense that they can be drawn upon for negative as well as positive goals. With this in mind, Browning and colleagues (2004) found that dense networks attenuate the effect of collective efficacy on crime, adding a twist to the idea that strong ties are not necessarily a good thing. In what is termed a *negotiated coexistence* model, collective efficacy is negatively associated with the prevalence of violent crime in urban neighborhoods, but the density of exchange networks interacts with collective efficacy such that as network density increases, the regulatory effect of collective efficacy on violence declines. However, adding to the complexity, another study by Browning (2002) showed a direct association between collective efficacy and lower partner violence.

What are the kinds of structural and normative contexts that promote (or undermine) collective efficacy and non-exclusive social networks other than those already considered? This is a question that cannot be answered easily, but there is evidence that the civic infrastructure of local organizations and voluntary associations helps sustain capacity for social action in a way that transcends traditional personal ties. Organizations are equipped to foster collective efficacy, often through strategic networking of their own or by creating tasks that demand collective responses (Small 2009). Whether disorder removal, school improvements, or police responses, a continuous stream of challenges faces contemporary communities, challenges that no longer can be met by relying solely on individuals. Effective action can thus be conceived as depending in part on organizational settings and connections that are not necessarily reflective of the density of personal ties in a neighborhood. PHDCN-related research supports this position by showing that the density of local organizations as reported by residents, along with their involvement in voluntary associations, predicts higher levels of both collective efficacy and collective civic events, controlling for poverty, social composition, and prior crime rates (Morenoff et al. 2001).

There is evidence from beyond Chicago that supports these general observations on collective efficacy. Rather than provide a review of the evidence from individual studies, I rely on an independent review of more than 200 empirical studies from 1960 to 1999 using meta-analysis (Pratt and Cullen 2005). Collective efficacy emerged with an overall correlation of −.303 with crime rates across studies (95 percent confidence interval of −.26 to −.35). By meta-analysis standards this is a robust finding, and the authors' rank collective efficacy number 4 when weighted by sample size, ahead of traditional suspects such as poverty, family disruption, and race. Although the number of studies and hence the empirical base is limited, and while there is considerable variability in units of analysis across studies, the class of mechanisms associated with social disorganization theory and its offspring, collective efficacy theory, shows a robust association with lower crime rates (Kubrin and Weitzer 2003; Sampson et al. 2002). Moreover, comparative research in Stockholm using similar measures suggests a general mechanism is at work in the collective efficacy—crime rate relationship (Sampson and Wikström 2008).

Recent studies have also shown a direct link between violence and heterogeneity in age-appropriate cultural scripts (Harding 2010) and moral cynicism about whether laws or collective moral rules are considered binding. For example, PHDCN respondents were asked to report their level of agreement with statements such as "Laws were made to be broken"; "It's okay to do anything you want as long as you don't hurt anyone"; and "To make money, there are no right and wrong ways anymore, only easy ways and hard ways." In communities with high levels of cynicism and a perceived lack of legitimacy of normative and legal rules, violent offending was significantly higher after controlling for demographic composition (Sampson et al. 2005). These

findings bear on the larger theoretical assertion of social disorganization theory: Where there is greater normative heterogeneity and moral skepticism or legal cynicism, violence is higher.

Summarized briefly, I would argue that the cumulative results of research support the theory that neighborhoods characterized by (a) mistrust, (b) perceived lack of shared expectations and cultural heterogeneity, (c) sparse acquaintanceship and exchange networks among residents, (d) attenuated social control of public spaces, (e) a weak organizational and institutional base, (f) low participation in local voluntary associations, and (g) moral/legal cynicism are associated with an increased risk of interpersonal crime and public disorder within their borders. Moreover, the data suggest that key dimensions of social organization and collective action are influenced (although not determined) by neighborhood structural differentiation. Collective efficacy in particular appears to be undermined by concentrated poverty that is coupled with long-term patterns of racial subjugation, family disruption, and residential instability.

Effects of Crime on Social and Economic Organization

It is important to recognize that crime and its consequences may themselves have important reciprocal effects on community structure and process. Skogan (1990) has provided an overview of some of the "feedback" processes that may further increase levels of crime. These include:

- physical and psychological withdrawal from community life because of fear
- weakening of the informal social control processes that inhibit crime
- decline in the organizational life and mobilization capacity of the neighborhood
- deteriorating business conditions
- importation and domestic production of delinquency and deviance
- further dramatic changes in the composition of the population.

For example, if people shun their neighbors and local facilities out of fear of crime, fewer opportunities exist for local networks and organizations to take hold. Street crime may be also accompanied by residential out-migration and business relocation from inner-city areas. As a result, crime can lead to simultaneous demographic "collapse" and a weakening of the informal control structures and mobilization capacity of communities, which in turn fuels further crime.

Although the number of empirical studies is relatively small, the evidence is consistent that crime can undermine the social and economic fabric of urban areas. One of the most important findings is that crime generates fear of strangers and a general alienation from participation in community life (Skogan 1986, 1990). Besides weakening neighborhood social organization, high crime rates and concerns about safety may trigger population out-migration. For example, delinquency rates are not only one of the outcomes of urban change; they are an important part of the process of urban change. Studying Chicago neighborhoods, Bursik (1986, 73) observes that "although changes in racial composition cause increases in the delinquency rate, this effect is not nearly as great as the effect that increases in the delinquency rate have in minority groups being stranded in the community." In a study of 40 neighborhoods in eight cities, Skogan (1990) found that high rates of crime and disorder were associated with higher rates of fear, neighborhood dissatisfaction, and intentions to move out. Using the PHDCN, Morenoff and colleagues (2001) found a dynamic process where prior violence depressed collective efficacy (presumably because of fear or cynicism), even as collective efficacy helped stave off later crime. Similarly, Sampson and Raudenbush (1999) found a reciprocal negative relationship between collective efficacy and rates of violence in Chicago neighborhoods. While businesses may be less sensitive to crime than individual residents, they too are not immune from the social disorganization, fear, and social incivilities associated with street violence (Skogan 1990).

Although the empirical base is limited, the overall picture painted by prior research on the effects of crime is one of population abandonment of urban neighborhoods, business relocation to the suburbs, loss of economic revenue, a decrease in economic status and property values, and escalating levels of fear in central cities. Consider that many cities in the North and Midwest that lost population in the 1970s and 1980s became increasingly poorer and racially isolated (Wilson 1987). An important part of this racially selective decline in population and economic status apparently stems from violent crime. Interestingly, however, many of these same cities recovered and even thrived during the most recent era of the great crime decline (Blumstein and Wallman 2000). New York City is perhaps the "poster city" for how low crime rates serve as a leading indicator of urban vitality. As Skogan (1990) has emphasized, crime is a salient event that has important symbolic consequences for perceptions of the inhabitability and civility of city life. Breaking the cycle of violence in communities and maintaining the declines in crime that have blessed many central cities in recent years is thus crucial to a general strategy for urban policy.

LIMITATIONS OF THE COMMUNITY APPROACH

Like any complex phenomenon, numerous challenges confront research on neighborhoods and crime. Among other limitations, the use of administrative and sometimes highly aggregated units of analysis, potentially biased sources of information on violence (e.g., police data), indirect measures of key social mechanisms, feedback or reciprocal effects from crime, widely varying analytical techniques, selection effects, and high correlations among ecological variables all hinder the attempt to draw causal inferences about the unique explanatory power of neighborhood characteristics (Sampson and Lauritsen 1994, 75–85; Sampson et al.

2002). "Selection bias" has drawn the most concern: if area differences in violence rates result from the characteristics of individuals selectively located in those communities, the findings derived from community-level research may be confounded and thus hard to interpret. For example, is the correlation of concentrated poverty with rates of violence caused by an aggregation of individual-level effects of poverty, a causal community-level effect, or is it a differential selection of individuals into communities based on some prior (e.g., antisocial) behavior? Or do common third factors cause individuals to both commit violence and end up in poverty? And if violent and antisocial tendencies are formed in childhood, what plausible roles can community labor markets and economic stratification play in understanding violence?

Simply put, the level at which a causal relation occurs is a complex issue that is not solved simply by the nature of how variables are measured or the unit for which they are measured. To make matters more complicated, the concrete actions of individuals feed back to shape the collective environment itself. Thus the unit of analysis does not define the level of causal explanation, and social processes do not necessarily generate the information contained in aggregate data. But it is likewise true that individual-level data are not necessarily produced by individual level causal processes. The difference is that the assumptions embodied in individual-level research are usually accepted at face value. Consider that many individual or group-level correlates of crime (e.g., race, family supervision) may in fact stem from community-related processes (Sampson and Wilson 1995). The "individualistic fallacy" and individual reductionism are just as problematic as the so-called selection bias in neighborhood research.

Even if the analytic problems of neighborhood research were solved, there seems to be a consensus in evaluation research that community crime-prevention programs have achieved only limited success. Probably the most common crime-prevention approach has been the "neighborhood watch," where attempts are made to increase residents' participation in local efforts at social control (e.g., community meetings, neighborhood patrols). Other interventions have tried to increase social interaction among neighbors and instill concern for the public welfare of local residents. There have also been even more general efforts to change neighborhood opportunity structures, such as the classic Chicago Area Project patterned after Shaw and McKay's original theory. Yet evaluations of these programs are for the most part pessimistic about concrete reductions in crime (Bursik and Grasmick 1993, 148–175; Hope 1995; Rosenbaum 1986).

Although disappointing results from evaluation research could mean that neighborhood-level theories are wrong, another possibility is that programs were not implemented correctly. We know, for example, that community crime prevention is especially hard to implement in the areas that need them the most—poor, unstable neighborhoods with high crime

rates—and that participation levels tend to fall off quickly once interventions are removed. Efforts to reduce crime are most likely to succeed if they are embedded in more comprehensive programs for neighborhood stabilization that local residents support. "One shot" interventions that are externally imposed and simply try to reduce crime in the short run without confronting durable aspects of a neighborhood's vulnerability are, not surprisingly, highly susceptible to failure (Hope 1995). Whether the poor track record of community interventions (not dissimilar from the poor track record of individual interventions) is due to a failure of theory or a programmatic failure of implementation is thus unknown. It is perhaps most likely that neighborhood-level interventions have pulled the wrong levers of change or targeted non-essential mechanisms.

A confluence of factors—selective decisions to live in different communities, potential misspecification due to population composition effects, overlap among ecological variables, a static conceptualization of community structure, the early onset of individual criminal careers, the indirect measurement of neighborhood social processes, and weak intervention results—combine to warrant caution in the interpretation of community-level research. Nevertheless, I believe that a community-level perspective not only improves our understanding of the etiology of crime and violence, but that it expands our conceptual apparatus to think about fresh policies for the public agenda on crime. Indeed, what seem most promising are policies that embed a concern for crime reduction in larger, more systemic efforts to improve the social organizational capacities of the neighborhood. The following section builds on this general idea.

PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS: CHANGING PLACES, NOT PEOPLE

Having outlined both the strengths and weaknesses of a community-level perspective on crime and social organization, I now examine some policy-related implications that attempt to move beyond past efforts. I focus primarily on community-level mechanisms reviewed above that are theoretically related, whether directly or indirectly, to the policy decisions of public officials. For the most part, these are policy domains that focus on crime prevention and the enhancement of community social organization from other than criminal justice agencies. Initiatives that rely on the police, prisons, and other agencies of social control have been reviewed at length many times, and hence I do not cover them here, except as they interface with community-level efforts. For example, I do not cover the traditional literature on neighborhood watch and community crime prevention. Rather, my discussion focuses on alternative neighborhood-level policies most directly related to crime and justice concerns, along with

more comprehensive strategies that attack "root causes" of crime but that I argue are still amenable to community-level policy.

Identify Neighborhood "Hot Spots" for Crime

One area of promise is simple yet powerful. Research has long demonstrated that crimes are not randomly distributed in space. Rather, they are disproportionately concentrated in certain neighborhoods and "places" (e.g., taverns, parking lots). Ecologically oriented criminologists have dubbed these areas "hot spots" of crime (Sherman et al. 1989). Drawing on community theory and advances in computer mapping technology, my argument is that policing strategies can be more effective if they are implemented using information on neighborhood hot spots.

Consider, for example, a pilot program in Chicago that instituted an "early warning system" for gang homicides. By plotting each homicide incident and using state-of-the-art mapping and statistical clustering procedures, the early warning system allowed the police to identify potential neighborhood crisis areas at high risk for suffering a "spurt" of gang violence (Block 1991). Places may also be mapped and then modified so as to reduce the opportunities for crime to occur. Sherman and colleagues (1989, 48) advocated place-based interventions whereby hot spot data are used to study the effects of differential patrol allocations, selective revocation of bar licenses, and removal of vacant "crack" houses. Recent experimental-based research shows that policing and situational crime-prevention strategies targeted to small ecological areas (about two blocks in size) reduces crime. Moreover, crime is not simply displaced elsewhere—instead, there is a spatial diffusion of safety (Braga and Bond 2008; Braga et al. 1999; Weisburd et al. 2006).

The evidence on hot spots thus suggests that a neighborhood-level response may be more effective than policies that simply target individuals or even families. By proactively responding to neighborhoods (and smaller places within them) that disproportionately generate crimes, policing strategies can more efficiently stave off epidemics of crime and its spatial diffusion.

Reduce Social Disorder and Physical "Incivilities"

Both the logic of social disorganization theory and the extant evidence suggest that "incivilities" such as broken windows, trash, public drinking, and prostitution increase fear of crime (Skogan 1986, 1990). Incivilities and signs of disorder may increase not just fear but crime itself. One possibility is that potential offenders recognize such deterioration and assume that residents are so indifferent to what goes on in their neighborhood that they will not be motivated to confront strangers, intervene in a crime, or call the police (Wilson and Kelling 1982). Another possibility is that physical and social elements of disorder comprise highly visible cues to which all neighborhood observers respond, potentially influencing

migration patterns, investment by businesses, and overall neighborhood viability (Sampson and Raudenbush 1999; Taylor 2001). Thus if disorder operates in a cascading fashion by encouraging people to move (increasing residential instability) or discouraging efforts at building collective responses, it would indirectly have an effect on crime (Sampson 2009a). To foster a climate of safety, public order, and social organization, policy should consider collective strategies that would:

- clean up graffiti, trash, needles, vials, and the like
- stagger bar closing times; enact strict zoning/licensing
- organize against public drinking, open drug use, and street prostitution
- form walking, sports, and other groups for collective activities in public areas.

Although limited in frequency, there is evidence to support the idea that neighborhood-based cleanup and disorder interventions increase perceptions of safety and potentially reduce crime (Braga and Bond 2008; Keizer et al. 2008; Rosenbaum 1986). The Police Foundation also conducted a study in which a specially trained group of officers performed disorder-reduction tasks within a Newark experimental area (Skogan 1990). The results were mixed, but they did indicate that crime was lower under conditions of aggressive field interrogations.

The optimal strategies for reducing disorder would appear to be those that involve both the police *and* community residents in the definition of the specific disorder problem to be solved and the planning of any interventions. The reason is that disorder is not a unitary concept, and people living in the same neighborhoods do not always agree on whether disorder is in fact a problem. Moreover, the evaluation of disorder depends on the racial and economic status of the neighborhood (Sampson 2009a). It follows that citizen perceptions or input about the meanings of disorder and the legitimacy of police efforts are ignored at potentially large cost.

3. Build Informal Social Control and Collective Efficacy

As described earlier, a major dimension of social organization is the ability of a community to supervise and control teenage peer-groups. Communities characterized by an extensive set of obligations, expectations, and social networks connecting the adults are better able to facilitate this task. For example, when the parents' friends or acquaintances are the parents of their children's friends, the adults have the potential to observe the child's actions in different circumstances, talk to each other about the child, compare notes, and establish norms (Coleman 1988). This form of relation can provide reinforcement for inculcating positive youth outcomes, as found when parents in communities with dense or overlapping social networks assume responsibility for the supervision of youth that are not their own. Closure of local networks provides the child with social resource of a collective nature—a social good that is created when relations

among persons facilitate action. One can extend this model to closure among networks involving parents and teachers, religious and recreational leaders, businesses that serve youth, and even agents of criminal justice.

Programs that might foster informal social controls and collective efficacy include:

- organized supervision of leisure-time youth activities
- monitoring/reduction of street-corner congregation in high crime areas
- staggered school closing times to reduce peer-control system
- parent surveillance/involvement in after-school and nighttime youth programs
- adult-youth mentoring systems; create forums for parent acquaintanceship.

The key here is to increase positive connections among youth and adults in the community. Stricter sanctions such as curfews for adolescents in public areas may be necessary, but my focus is on informal social controls that arise from ongoing social interactions and community support. Consider as a possibility what Meares and Kahan (1998) describe as the emergence of a "working trust" between the police and residents of Chicago's poverty-stricken West Side in the co-creation of zones of safety. Policies including juvenile curfews and policing of minor disorders were supported by residents largely because of the leadership role of the local police commander, who was a longtime resident. In fact, the police commander led a prayer vigil to protest the occurrence of drug dealing and crime in the community. Over 1,000 residents participated, and in groups of ten they marched and reclaimed street corners where drug dealers had previously dominated. Following the prayer vigil, over 7,000 residents retired to a local park for a celebration. Such a coalition is surely controversial, but from the perspective of collective efficacy theory, coupled with the strength of the black church as a site for collective-action strategies, the Chicago alliance is a fascinating development that bears watching. Indeed, it appears that participation by residents in a newly constituted and legitimized community policing effort was in itself an action that increased community solidarity and collective efficacy.

Promote Housing-Based Neighborhood Stabilization

A more general option for enhancing social organization is to focus on joint public/private intervention programs to help stabilize and revitalize deteriorating neighborhoods. My focus is primarily on investment in the housing structure of declining but still-reachable communities. As noted above, a long history of community-based research shows that population instability and housing decay are linked to crime and social problems among youth. This research becomes more salient in the era of housing foreclosures brought on by the 2008 economic collapse. The implication is that community-based policy interventions may help to reverse the tide

of vacancies and deterioration in many neighborhoods across America, not just the concentrated poverty areas of our large cities. These policies might include:

- resident management of public housing
- tenant buyouts
- rehabilitation of existing low-income housing
- strict code enforcement
- low-income and vacancy reduction tax credits.

Inner-city neighborhoods have historically suffered from severe population and housing loss of the sort that is disruptive of the social and institutional order. Bursik (1989) has shown that the planned construction of new public housing projects in Chicago's poor communities in the 1970s was associated with increased rates of population turnover, which in turn were related to increases in crime independent of racial composition. More generally, Skogan (1990) has noted how urban renewal and forced migration contributed to the wholesale uprooting of many urban black communities, especially the extent to which freeway networks, driven through the hearts of many cities in the 1950s, destroyed viable, low-income communities. In Atlanta one in six residents were dislocated through urban renewal, and the great majority of these were poor blacks (Logan and Molotch 1987, 114). Nationwide, fully 20 percent of all central city housing units occupied by blacks were lost in the period 1960–1970 alone.

Recognizing these patterns, housing policies should focus more on stabilization of existing areas—especially those at risk of a tipping point to widespread vacancy. When considered with the practices of redlining and disinvestments by banks and "block-busting" by real estate agents (Massey and Denton 1993), local policies toward code enforcement—which on the surface are far removed from crime—have nonetheless contributed to crime through neighborhood deterioration, forced migration, and instability. By acting to reduce population flight, residential anonymity, and housing deterioration, the hope is that neighborhood stabilization and ultimately a more cohesive environment for youth socialization will emerge.

Deconcentrate Poverty; Scattered-Site New Housing

This strategy is linked to that above, but it is more focused on promoting certain forms of class and race integration. As Wilson (1987) argued, the social transformation of the inner city in the late twentieth century resulted in the disproportionate concentration and segregation of the most disadvantaged segments of the urban black population—especially poor, female-headed families with children. This social transformation was fueled by macro structural economic changes related to the de-industrialization of central cities where disadvantaged minorities are concentrated (e.g., shift from goods-producing to service-producing industries; increasing

polarization of the labor market into low-wage and high-wage sectors). But perhaps more important, the steady out-migration of middle and upper-income black families from core inner-city areas may have removed a former source of institutional supports. Consistent with a social organizational approach, Wilson (1987, 56; 1996) theorized that the basic institutions of a neighborhood (e.g., churches, schools, stores, recreational facilities) were more likely to remain viable if the core of their support came from more economically stable families.

An understanding of concentration effects must also recognize not just voluntary migration decisions but the negative consequences of policy decisions to concentrate minorities and the poor in public housing. Opposition from organized community groups to the building of public housing in their "backyard," de facto federal policy to tolerate segregation against blacks in urban housing markets, and decisions by local governments to neglect the rehabilitation of existing residential units led to massive, segregated housing projects, which became ghettos for the minorities and disadvantaged (Massey and Denton 1993). The great American crime decline and the economic boom of the 1990s offered new opportunities to reverse these changes, and in fact growing evidence shows real progress on the health of many U.S. cities. Building on the previous strategy, community-level approaches that merit further investigation are:

- dispersing concentrated public housing
- scattered-site, new, low-income housing
- mixed-income housing development and incentives for mixed-income neighborhoods.

The evidence that dispersion policies and scattered-site and mixed-income housing can work is small but encouraging (Cisneros and Engdahl 2009; Popkin and Cove 2007). In a major example, the Chicago Housing Authority embarked on an ambitious plan to "scatter" tens of thousands of units of high-rise public housing in the city's ghetto as a means to break down the severe segregation that was firmly in place. The infamous Robert Taylor Homes that became a national symbol of urban despair no longer exists—in its place, a black middle class is now emerging. There is also quasi- and experimental evidence that offering poor mothers on welfare the opportunity to relocate to more thriving neighborhoods improves their mental health and many of the outcomes of their children (Kling et al. 2007; Turner and Rawlings 2005). Safety and fear reduction appear to be key (see also Popkin and Cove 2007). These results suggest the positive outcomes of housing policies that incentivize or promote increased integration by class and race. To these I would add immigrant status. Counter to public perceptions, increases in the foreign-born population have revitalized many inner-city neighborhoods while concentrated immigration has contributed to lower rates of violence (Sampson 2009b; Sampson et al. 2005).

Maintain and Build Municipal Service Base

The provision of city municipal services for public health and fire safety—decisions presumably made with little if any thought to crime and violence—appear to be salient in the social (dis)integration of poor communities. As Wallace and Wallace (1990) argue based on an analysis of the "planned shrinkage" of New York City fire and health services: "The consequences of withdrawing municipal services from poor neighborhoods, the resulting outbreaks of contagious urban decay and forced migration which shred essential social networks and cause social disintegration, have become a highly significant contributor to decline in public health among the poor" (1990, 427). The loss of social integration and networks from planned shrinkage of services may increase behavioral patterns of violence, which cause further social disintegration (1990, 427). This pattern of destabilizing feedback (see Skogan 1986) is central to an understanding of the role of municipal service policies in fostering the downward spiral of low-income, high-crime areas, and by implication, *their turnaround and stabilization.* Housing and community-based policies in the previous two categories should thus be coordinated with local policies regarding fire, sanitation, and other municipal services.

Integrate Community and Child Development/Health Policy

Research has demonstrated a substantial connection between structural disadvantage and childhood development. One link comes in the form of physical abuse and maltreatment. In a study of 20 sub-areas and 93 census tracts within a city, Garbarino and Crouter (1978) found that poverty, residential mobility, and single-parent households accounted for over 50 percent of the variation in rates of child abuse. Coulton and colleagues' (1995) analysis of Cleveland showed that children who live in neighborhoods characterized by poverty, population turnover, and the concentration of female-headed families are at highest risk of abuse. The influence of concentrated poverty extended to adolescent risk factors as well, including the teen birth rate, delinquency, and high-school dropout rate. Similar to Shaw and McKay (1969 [1942]), they suggest that child maltreatment is a manifestation of community disorganization and that its occurrence is related to the same underlying social conditions that foster other urban problems.

Additional evidence consistent with social disorganization theory is found in a series of studies by Wallace and colleagues of community-level variations in low-birth-weight babies and infant mortality (Wallace and Wallace 1990). These authors document the strong upsurge in infant mortality and low birth weight in the late 1970s in New York City, especially in devastated areas of the Bronx. In particular, they found that poverty, overcrowded housing, and rapid population change were the main predictors of increased rates of low birth weight starting in 1974. Community instability, coupled with concentrated poverty, predicted

increased infant mortality beyond what was expected based on migration. There is thus evidence that concentrated urban poverty and social disorganization combine to increase child abuse/neglect, low birth,weight, cognitive impairment, and other adjustment problems, which in turn constitute risk factors for later crime and violence. For these reasons, community-based interventions are needed to foster prenatal health care, infant/child health, and support programs for effective family management (e.g., child-rearing skills; conflict resolution).

The science is clear that human capital interventions are important for children, the earlier the better (Heckman 2006). I would argue the same for community-level interventions. The good news is that these formerly disconnected ideas are being combined in innovative programs such as the Harlem Children's Zone, with encouraging early results. The initiative of President Obama to create "Promise Neighborhoods" and "Choice Neighborhoods" in multiple cities is a concrete affirmation of the goal of safe, educationally intensive communities with a commitment to the human and social capital development of the next generation.[2]

Increase Community Organizational Base

Stable interlocking organizations form a major linchpin of building social capital, collective efficacy, and effective social control (Small 2009). When local organizations are unstable and isolated, and when the vertical links of community institutions to the outside are weak, the capacity of a community to defend its local interests is thus weakened. As Bursik and Grasmick (1993) argue, along similar lines, public control refers to the regulatory capacities that develop from the networks among neighborhoods and between neighborhoods and public/private agencies. More specifically, this dimension "refers to the ability to secure public and private goods and services that are allocated by groups and agencies located outside of the neighborhood" (1993, 19). It follows that interventions promoting public control might:

- increase local involvement in community organizations
- promote the vertical integration of local institutions with extra local resources
- promote collective civic action and awareness of resource allocation strategies.

Although it cannot be said with certainty that large changes will result from this type of mobilization, success at the margins produces cumulative changes that may ultimately promote a more stable and long-lasting social organization.

Community Justice and Re-entry

As I noted in the introduction, imprisonment rates have soared, but most prisoners return to a home community (Travis 2005). The logic of this chapter is consistent with recent calls for a community-level approach that seeks to reintegrate offenders and help counteract the hardships that already disadvantaged neighborhoods face when unemployed ex-felons return home. Not only might concentrated incarceration have the unintended consequence of increasing crime rates through its negative impact on the labor market and social capital prospects of former prisonsers (Clear et al. 2001; Western 2006), there is evidence that neighborhood context plays a major role in the recidivism rates of ex-prisoners (Hipp et al. 2010). It follows that a policy of integrating prisoner release programs with efforts to build community capacity and achieve community justice is an important step for policy (Clear and Karp 1999; Clear et al. 2001). I think of this as "collective efficacy meets prisoner re-entry."

"Ecometrics"—Toward a National Strategy of Community Monitoring

Finally, community-based policy is not complete without a rigorous system of measurement and evaluation. One of the most important "first-order" findings from recent research is that community-based surveys can yield reliable and valid measures of neighborhood social and institutional processes. However, unlike individual-level measurements, which are backed up by decades of psychometric research into their statistical properties, the methodology needed to evaluate neighborhood mechanisms is not widespread. Raudenbush and Sampson (1999) thus proposed moving toward a science of ecological assessment, which they call "ecometrics," by developing systematic procedures for directly measuring neighborhood mechanisms, and by integrating and adapting tools from psychometrics to improve the quality of neighborhood-level measures. Leaving aside statistical details, the important procedural point is that neighborhood processes can and should be treated as ecological or collective phenomena, rather than as stand-ins for individual-level traits. A national or codified system of measurement, with standard protocols for evaluation, would enhance the science behind any community-based policy. Furthermore, local communities could use standardized measures for benchmarking or monitoring their progress or capacities in meeting stated goals.

CONCLUSION

What seem to be "non-crime" policies—that is, where or if to build a housing project, enforcement of municipal codes, reduction in essential municipal services, rehabilitation of existing residential units, the breakdown of concentrated poverty, building social connections among adults and youth, increasing collective efficacy to achieve common goals, and community monitoring through "ecometrics"—may nonetheless have important bearing on assessing communities and preventing crime. As detailed

above, for example, residential instability and the concentration of poor, female-headed families with children appear to have been shaped by planned governmental policies at local, state, and federal levels. This conceptualization diverges from the natural market assumptions of the early Chicago school theorists by considering the role of political decisions in shaping local community structure. Crime also generates a reciprocal feedback effect by undermining social and economic organization, which in turn leads to further increases in crime. Even decisions to relocate businesses appear to be shaped in part by the corrosive impact of serious crime on the quality of life for workers and customers alike. Hence policies on urban development can ill afford to ignore the symbolic and economic consequences of crime for the habitability, civility, and economic vitality of city life.

On the positive side, the implication of this paper's community-level perspective is that realistic policy options may help reverse the tide of social disorganization in concentrated poverty areas and maintain the crime declines in communities that are now well underway. The unique value of a community-level perspective is that it cautions against a simple "kinds of people" analysis by suggesting a focus on how social characteristics of collectivities are interrelated with crime. Based on the theory and research reviewed here, it seems that policymakers should pay special attention to integrating crime-targeted interventions (e.g., early-warning systems, "hot spot" identification; reduction of social disorder; community prisoner re-entry) with more general "non-crime" policies that address mediating processes of social organization (e.g., intergenerational closure, control-of-street-corner peer groups, organizational participation and mobilization, collective efficacy), the political economy of place (e.g., how concentrated poverty and vacancy rates are influenced by housing policy and municipal services), and community investments in early child development. Only then can we expect a more lasting effect of neighborhood-based interventions on the reduction of crime and disorder and the enhancement of community social infrastructure. The widespread return migration to U.S. cities and the broad crime reductions of the early twenty-first century suggest that community-level approaches are not utopian and may even be responsible for some of the observed gains.

References

Bandura, Albert. 1997. *Self Efficacy: The Exercise of Control.* New York: W. H. Freeman.

Bellair, Paul E. 2000. "Informal Surveillance and Street Crime: A Complex Relationship." *Criminology* 38: 137–167.

Bernasco, Wim, and Richard Block. 2009. "Where Offenders Choose to Attack: A Discrete Choice Model of Robberies in Chicago." *Criminology* 47: 93–130.

Block, Carolyn. 1991. *Early Warning System for Street Gang Violence Crisis Areas: Automated Hot Spot Identification in Law Enforcement.* Chicago: Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority.

Blumstein, A., and J. Wallman. 2000. *The Crime Drop in America.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Braga, Anthony, and Brenda J. Bond. 2008. "Policing Crime and Disorder Hot Spots: A Randomized Controlled Trial." *Criminology* 46: 577–607.

Braga, Anthony, David L. Weisburd, Elin J. Waring, Lorraine Green Mazerolle, William Spelman, and Francis Gajewski. 1999. "Problem-Oriented Policing in Violent Crime Places: A Randomized Controlled Experiment." *Criminology* 37: 541–580.

Brooks-Gunn, Jeanne, Greg Duncan, and Lawrence Aber, eds. 1997. *Neighborhood Poverty: Policy Implications in Studying Neighborhoods.* New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Brooks-Gunn, Jeanne, Greg Duncan, Pamela Kato, and Naomi Sealand. 1993. "Do Neighborhoods Influence Child and Adolescent Behavior? " *American Journal of Sociology* 99: 353–395.

Browning, Christopher R. 2002. "The Span of Collective Efficacy: Extending Social Disorganization Theory to Partner Violence." *Journal of Marriage and the Family* 64: 833–850.

Browning, Christopher R., Seth L. Feinberg, and Robert Dietz. 2004. "The Paradox of Social Organization: Networks, Collective Efficacy, and Violent Crime in Urban Neighborhoods." *Social Forces* 83: 503–534.

Bursik, Robert J. 1988. "Social Disorganization and Theories of Crime and Delinquency: Problems and Prospects." *Criminology* 35: 677–703.

Bursik, Robert J. 1989. "Political Decision-Making and Ecological Models of Delinquency: Conflict of Consensus." In *Theoretical Integration in the Study of Deviance and Crime*, eds. S. Messner, M. Krohn, and A. Liska. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Bursik, Robert J., and Harold Grasmick. 1993. *Neighborhoods and Crime: The Dimensions of Effective Community Control.* New York: Lexington Books.

Cisneros, Henry G., and Lora Engdahl, eds. 2009. *From Despair to Hope: Hope VI and the New Promise of Public Housing in America's Cities.* Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.

Clear, Todd, and David Karp. 1999. *The Community Justice Ideal: Preventing Crime and Achieving Justice.* Boulder, CO: Westview.

Clear, Todd R., Dina R. Rose, and Judith A. Ryder. 2001. "Incarceration and Community: The Problem of Removing and Returning Offenders. "*Crime and Delinquency* 47: 335–351.

Coleman, James. 1990. *Foundations of Social Theory.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Coleman, James S. 1988. "Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital." *American Journal of Sociology* 94: S95–120.

Coulton, Claudia, Jill Korbin, Marilyn Su, and Julian Chow. 1995. "Community Level Factors and Child Maltreatment Rates." *Child Development* 66: 1262–1276.

Elliott, Delbert, James Q. Wilson, David Huizinga, Robert J. Sampson, Amanda Elliott, and Bruce Rankin. 1996. "Effects of Neighborhood Disadvantage on Adolescent Development." *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency* 33: 389–426.

Garbarino, James, and A. Crouter. 1978. "Defining the Community Context for Parent-Child Relations: The Correlates of Child Maltreatment." *Child Development* 49: 604–616.

Grannis, Rick. 1998. "The Importance of Trivial Streets: Residential Streets and Residential Segregation." *American Journal of Sociology* 103: 1530–1564.
Harding, David J. 2010. *Living the Drama: Community, Conflict, and Culture among Inner-City Boys*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Heckman, James J. 2006. "Skill Formation and the Economics of Investing in Disadvantaged Children." *Science* 312: 1900–1902.
Hipp, John R., Joan Petersilia, and Susan Turner. 2010. "Parolee Recidivism in California: The Effect of Neighborhood Context and Social Service Agency Characteristics." *Criminology*: Forthcoming.
Hope, Tim. 1995. "Community Crime Prevention." In *Building a Safer Society*, eds. M. Tonry and D. Farrington, 21–89. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Hunter, Albert. 1985. "Private, Parochial and Public Social Orders: The Problem of Crime and Incivility in Urban Communities." In *The Challenge of Social Control*, edds. G. Suttles and M. Zald. Norwood, NJ: Ablex.
Keizer, Kees, Siegwart Lindenberg, and Linda Steg. 2008. "The Spreading of Disorder." *Science* 322: 1681–1685.
Kling, Jeffrey, Jeffrey Liebmanm and Lawrence Katz. 2007. "Experimental Analysis of Neighborhood Effects." *Econometrica* 75: 83–119.
Kornhauser, Ruth Rosner. 1978. *Social Sources of Delinquency: An Appraisal of Analytic Models*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Kubrin, Charis E., and Ronald Weitzer. 2003. "New Directions in Social Disorganization Theory." *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency* 40: 374–402.
Logan, John, and Harvey Molotch. 1987. *Urban Fortunes: The Political Economy of Place*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Massey, Douglas S., and Nancy Denton. 1993. *American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the Underclass*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Meares, Tracey, and Dan Kahan. 1998. "Law and (Norms of) Order in the Inner City." *Law and Society Review* 32: 805–838.
Morenoff, Jeffrey D., Robert J. Sampson, and Stephen Raudenbush. 2001. "Neighborhood Inequality, Collective Efficacy, and the Spatial Dynamics of Urban Violence." *Criminology* 39: 517–560.
Park, Robert E. 1915. "The City: Suggestions for the Investigations of Human Behavior in the Urban Environment." *American Journal of Sociology* 20: 577–612.
Popkin, Susan, and Elizabeth Cove. 2007. "Safety Is the Most Important Thing: How Hope VI Helped Families." Washington, DC: Urban Institute, Metropolitan Housing and Communities Center.
Pratt, Travis, and Frances Cullen. 2005. "Assessing Macro-Level Predictors and Theories of Crime: A Meta-Analysis." In *Crime and Justice: A Review of Research*, ed. M. Tonry, 373–450. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Raudenbush, Stephen W., and Robert J. Sampson. 1999. "'Ecometrics': Toward a Science of Assessing Ecological Settings, with Application to the Systematic Social Observation of Neighborhoods." *Sociological Methodology* 29: 1–41.
Rosenbaum, Dennis P., ed. 1986. *Community Crime Prevention: Does It Work?* Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
Ross, Catherine E., J. R. Reynolds, and Karlyn J. Geis. 2000. "The Contingent Meaning of Neighborhood Stability for Residents' Psychological Well-Being." *American Sociological Review* 65: 581–97.
Sampson, Robert J. 2009a. "Disparity and Diversity in the Contemporary City: Social (Dis)Order Revisited." *British Journal of Sociology* 60: 1–31.

Sampson, Robert J. 2009b. "Racial Stratification and the Durable Tangle of Neighborhood Inequality." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 621: 260–280.
Sampson, Robert J., and W. B. Groves. 1989. "Community Structure and Crime: Testing Social-Disorganization Theory." *American Journal of Sociology* 94: 774–802.
Sampson, Robert J., and Janet L. Lauritsen. 1994. *Violent Victimization and Offending: Individual-, Situational-, and Community-Level Risk Factors*. Washington, DC: National Academy Press.
Sampson, Robert J., Jeffrey D. Morenoff, and Thomas Gannon-Rowley. 2002. "Assessing 'Neighborhood Effects': Social Processes and New Directions in Research." *Annual Review of Sociology* 28: 443–78.
Sampson, Robert J., Jeffrey D. Morenoff, and Stephen W. Raudenbush. 2005. "Social Anatomy of Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Violence." *American Journal of Public Health* 95: 224–232.
Sampson, Robert J., and Stephen W. Raudenbush. 1999. "Systematic Social Observation of Public Spaces: A New Look at Disorder in Urban Neighborhoods." *American Journal of Sociology* 105: 603–651.
Sampson, Robert J., and Per-Olof Wikström. 2008. "The Social Order of Violence in Chicago and Stockholm Neighborhoods: A Comparative Inquiry." In *Order, Conflict, and Violence*, eds. S. N. Kalyvas, I. Shapiro, and T. Masoud, 97–119. New York and Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Sampson, Robert J., and William Julius Wilson. 1995. "Toward a Theory of Race, Crime, and Urban Inequality." In *Crime and Inequality*, eds. J. Hagan and R. D. Peterson, 37–56. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Shaw, Clifford R., and Henry D. McKay. 1969 [1942]. *Juvenile Delinquency and Urban Areas*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Sherman, Lawrence, Patrick Gartin, and M. Buerger. 1989. "Hot Spots of Predatory Crime: Routine Activities and the Criminology of Place." *Criminology* 27: 27–56.
Simcha-Fagan, O., and J. E. Schwartz. 1986. "Neighborhood and Delinquency: An Assessment of Contextual Effects." *Criminology* 24: 667–703.
Skogan, Wesley. 1986. "Fear of Crime and Neighborhood Change." In *Communities and Crime*, eds. J. Albert J. Reiss and M. Tonry, 203–229. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Skogan, Wesley. 1990. *Disorder and Decline: Crime and the Spiral of Decay in American Cities*. Berkele: University of California Press.
Small, Mario. 2009. *Unanticipated Gains: Origins of Network Inequality in Everyday Life*. New York: Oxford University Press.
Suttles, Gerald D. 1972. "The Defended Community." In *The Social Construction of Communities*, ed. G. D. Suttles, 21–43. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Taylor, Ralph B. 2001. *Breaking Away from Broken Windows: Baltimore Neighborhoods and the Nationwide Fight against Crime, Grime, Fear, and Decline*. Boulder, CO: Westview.
Taylor, Ralph B., Stephen D. Gottfredson, and Sidney Brower. 1984. "Block Crime and Fear: Defensible Space, Local Social Ties, and Territorial Functioning." *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency* 21: 303–331.
Thrasher, Frederick. 1963 [1927]. *The Gang: A Study of 1.313 Gangs in Chicago*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Travis, Jeremy. 2005. *But They All Come Back: Facing the Challenges of Prisoner Reentry*. Washington, DC: Urban Institute Press.
Turner, Margery Austin, and Lynette A. Rawlings. 2005. "Overcoming Concentrated Poverty and Isolation: Ten Lessons for Policy and Practice." Washington, DC: Urban Institute.
Wallace, Rodrick, and Deborah Wallace. 1990. "Origins of Public Health Collapse in New York City: The Dynamics of Planned Shrinkage, Contagious Urban Decay and Social Disintegration." *Bulletin of the New York Academy of Medicine* 66: 391–434.
Warner, Barbara, and Pamela Rountree. 1997. "Local Social Ties in a Community and Crime Model: Questioning the Systemic Nature of Informal Social Control." *Social Problems* 44: 520–536.
Weisburd, David, Laura Wyckoff, Justin Ready, John Eck, J. Hinkle, and F. Gajewski. 2006. "Does Crime Just Move around the Corner? A Controlled Study of Spatial Displacement and Diffusion of Crime Control Benefits." *Criminology* 44: 549–1592.
Western, Bruce. 2006. *Punishment and Inequality in America*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Whyte, William F. 1943. *Street Corner Society: The Social Structure of an Italian Slum*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Wilson, James Q., and George Kelling. 1982. "Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety." *Atlantic*, 29–38.
Wilson, William Julius. 1987. *The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass, and Public Policy*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Notes

1. This conceptualization of community addresses the early criticism that Chicago-school social ecologists over-emphasized disorganization and dysfunction. In *Street Corner Society*, W. F. Whyte (1943) argued that what looks like social disorganization from the outside is actually an intricate internal organization. That is, he maintained that the real problem of slums was that their social organization failed to mesh with the structure of the society around it. However, public and parochial dimensions of informal social control (e.g., collective supervision of youth; density and strength of local organizations) may be weak even when certain forms of internal social organization (e.g., dense primary group relations; organized crime) are present. Social disorganization theory thus does not assume that there is no organization in high crime areas. It assumes variability in the ability of residents to achieve a crime-free environment.

2. As of late 2009, Congress has signed legislation to spend over $65 million to replicate the Harlem Children's Zone in 20 neighborhoods across the United States. This represents a major opportunity for criminologists who are interested in child development and neighborhood context. See also http://www.alliance1.org/Public_Policy/Neighborhoods/Tipping_neighborhoods.pdf.

Chapter 9

Race and the Administration of Criminal Justice in the United States

Randall Kennedy

Racial politics have made a deep imprint on the administration of criminal justice in the United States. From the founding of the nation until Reconstruction, there existed virtually no legal constraints on the authority of the central government or the states to discriminate invidiously on racial grounds against blacks and other peoples of color. Officials at every level availed themselves of this power. States that permitted Negro slavery typically created separate laws and institutions to govern those deemed to be mere human chattel (Flanigan 1987; Morris 1996). In many contexts, slaves were subjected to a separate judicial system and regime of punishments. Long after branding, ear cropping, whipping, and castration had been retired as modes of correction for whites deemed to be criminals, they remained available for use against blacks deemed to be criminals. Even more telling than the way in which the legal system subjected people of color to hyper-punishment was the way in which it subjected them to under-protection. In *State v. Mann* (13 NC 263 [1829]), for example, the North Carolina Supreme Court reversed the conviction of a white man who had wantonly shot and injured an enslaved woman. Noting the absence of a statute expressly prohibiting such conduct, the Court held that the shooting posed no violation of common law. In *George v. the State* (37 Miss 316 [1859]), a state supreme court reversed the conviction of a male slave convicted of raping a female slave under the age of ten, observing that there existed no statute that criminalized the rape or attempted rape of a female slave. Addressing what it perceived to be a deficiency highlighted by this ruling, the Mississippi legislature enacted a law criminalizing the rape or attempted rape of "a female negro or mulatto"—but only if the victim was under twelve years of age and only if the perpetrator was also "a negro or mulatto."

Although virtually all slaves in the antebellum United States were "black" (a designation capable of various meanings but typically denoting a person with apparent African ancestry), not all blacks were slaves. Yet