Political parties also took shape during this time. When these newly formed constitutional parties threw their support to the reorganized government, revolutionary activity abated and the tsar's troops crushed the remaining pockets of resistance.

People soon began to wonder, however, if anything had really changed. From 1907 to 1917, the Duma convened, but twice when the tsar disliked its recommendations he sent the delegates home and forced new elections. Nicholas still considered himself the only source of authority. Prime Minister Pyotr Stolypin• (1863–1911), a successful administrator and landowner, was determined to eliminate the sources of discontent by ending the mir system of communal farming and taxation and canceling the land redemption payments that had burdened the peasants since their emancipation in 1861. He also made government loans available to peasants, who were then able to purchase land and to own farms outright. Although these reforms did not eradicate rural poverty, they did allow people to move to the cities in search of jobs and created a larger group of independent peasants. By 1917, some two-thirds of the peasantry had taken steps to gain title to their land, and 10 percent had acquired consolidated holdings.

Stolypin succeeded only partially in his other goal of restoring law and order. He clamped down on revolutionary organizations, executing their members by hanging them with "Stolypin neckties." The government urged more pogroms and stifled ethnic unrest by stepping up Russification. But rebels continued to assassinate government officials—four thousand were killed or wounded in 1906–1907—and Stolypin himself was assassinated in 1911. Stolypin's reforms had promoted peasant well-being, which encouraged what one historian has called a "new peasant assertiveness." The industrial workforce also grew, and another round of strikes broke out, culminating in a general strike in St. Petersburg in 1914.

Despite the creation of the Duma and other reforms, the imperial government and the conservative nobility had no solution to the ongoing social turmoil and felt little inclination to share power. Their ineffectual response to the Revolution of 1905 would foster an even greater revolution in 1917, while ongoing domestic conflicts opened one of the roads to war.

•**Pyotr Stolypin:** PYAW tur stuh LIH pihn

Growing Resistance to Colonial Domination

The Japanese military victory over two important dynasties—the Qing in China and the Romanov in Russia—had domestic repercussions in both countries. Within a decade the colonies responded to the victory, further eroding the security Westerners had once found in imperialism. The Japanese victories and the ability of Russian revolutionaries to force a great European power to reform inspired nationalist-minded opponents to European imperialism. The success of a non-Western, constitutional government fed protest throughout the globe.

Boxers in China. Uprisings began in China after its 1895 defeat by Japan forced the ruling Qing dynasty to grant more economic concessions to Western powers. Humiliated by these events, peasants organized into secret societies to restore Chinese integrity. One organization was the Society of the Righteous and Harmonious Fists (or Boxers), whose members maintained that ritual boxing would protect them from a variety of evils, including bullets. Encouraged by the Qing ruler, Dowager Empress Tz'u-hsi• (Cixi; 1835–1908), and desperate because of worsening economic conditions, the Boxers rebelled in 1900, massacring the missionaries and Chinese Christians to whom they attributed China's troubles. Seven of the colonial powers united to put down the Boxer Uprising and encouraged the Chinese troops in their service to ravage the areas in which the Boxers operated. Defeated once more, the Chinese were compelled to pay a huge indemnity for damages done to foreign property, to destroy many of their defensive fortifications, and to allow more extensive foreign military occupation.

The Boxer Uprising thoroughly discredited the Qing dynasty; a group of revolu-

•**Tz'u-hsi:** syoo see

tionaries finally overthrew the dynasty in 1911 and declared China a republic the next year. Their leader, Sun Yat-Sen◆ (1866–1925), who had been educated in Hawaii and Japan, used a cluster of Western ideas in his slogan "nationalism, democracy, and socialism." He shaped them with traditional Chinese values so that socialism contained the Chinese belief that all people have enough food. In sum, his movement called for freedom from the Qing dynasty, revival of the Chinese tradition of correctness in behavior between governors and the governed, modern economic reform, and a threat to European channels of trade and domination. Sun's stirring leadership and the changes brought about by China's revolution helped change the course of Western imperialism.

The Foreign Pig Is Put to Death
The Boxers sought to fortify the Chinese government against the many powers threatening China's survival. They used brightly colored placards to spread information about their goals and about their successes in order to build wide support among the Chinese population. They felt that the presence of foreigners had caused a series of disasters including the defection of the Chinese from traditional religion, the flow of wealth from the country, and the natural disasters such as famine that seemed to be taking place with greater frequency. This depiction shows the harsh judgment of the Boxers toward foreigners and their Chinese allies—they are pigs to be killed. **For more help analyzing this image**, see the visual activity for this chapter in the Online Study Guide at **bedfordstmartins.com/hunt**. *Bridgeman Art Library.*

Nationalists in India. In India, the Japanese victory over Russia and the Revolution of 1905 stimulated politicians to take a more radical course than that offered by the Indian National Congress. A Hindu leader, B. G. Tilak (1856–1920), fervently anti-British and less moderate than Congress reformers, preached blatant noncooperation: "We shall not give them assistance to collect revenue and keep peace. We shall not assist them in fighting beyond the frontiers or outside India with Indian blood and money." Tilak promoted Hindu customs, asserted the distinctiveness of Hindu values from British ways, and inspired violent rebellion in his followers. This brand of nationalism broke with that based on assimilating to British culture and promoting gradual change. Trying to repress Tilak, the British sponsored the Muslim League, a rival nationalist group favored for its restraint and its potential to divide Muslim nationalists from Hindus in the Congress.

Faced with political activism on many fronts, however, Britain conceded the right to vote based on property ownership and to representation in ruling councils. Because the independence movement had not fully reached the masses, these small concessions temporarily maintained British power by appeasing the best-educated and most influential dissidents among the upper and middle classes. But the British hold on India was weakening.

Young Turks in the Ottoman Empire. Revolutionary nationalism was simultaneously sapping the Ottoman Empire, which for centuries had controlled much of the Mediterranean. In the nineteenth century, several rebellions had plagued Ottoman rule, and more erupted early in the twentieth century

◆**Sun Yat-Sen:** SOON YAHT SEHN

because of growing resistance to the empire and to European influence. Just as the Habsburgs used the transnational appeal of Catholicism to quash nationalist aspirations, Sultan Abdul Hamid II (r. 1876–1909) tried to revitalize the multiethnic empire by using Islam to counteract the rising nationalism of the Serbs, Bulgarians, and Macedonians. Instead, he unwittingly provoked a burgeoning Turkish nationalism in Constantinople itself. Turkish nationalists rejected the sultan's pan-Islamic solution and built their movement on the uniqueness of their culture, history, and language, as many European ethnic groups were doing. Using the findings of Western scholarship, they first traced the history of the group they called Turks to change the word *Turk* from one of derision to one of pride. Nationalists also tried to purge their language of words from Arabic and Persian, and they popularized the folklore of rural Turkish peoples scattered across territories from eastern Europe through Asia. The events of 1904–1905 electrified these nationalists with the vision of a modern Turkey becoming "the Japan of the Middle East," as they called it. In 1908, a group of nationalists called the Young Turks took control of the government in Constantinople, which had been fatally weakened by nationalist agitation and by the empire's economic dependence on Western financiers and businessmen.

The Young Turks' triumph motivated other groups in the Middle East and the Balkans to demand an end to Ottoman domination in their regions as well. These groups adopted Western values and platforms, and some, such as the Egyptians, had strong contingents of feminist-nationalists who mobilized women to work for independence. But the Young Turks, often aided by European powers with financial and political interests in the region, brutally tried to repress the uprisings in Egypt, Syria, and the Balkans that their own success had encouraged.

The rebellions became part of the tumult shaping international relations in the decade before World War I. Empires, whether old or young, were the scene of growing resistance in the wake of Japanese, Russian, and Turkish events. In German East Africa, colonial forces countered native resistance in 1905 with a scorched-earth policy of destroying homes, livestock, food, and other resources. The Germans eventually killed more than 100,000 Africans there. The French closed the University of Hanoi, executed Indochinese intellectuals, and deported thousands of suspected nationalists merely to maintain a tenuous grip on Indochina. A French general stationed there summed up the fears of many colonial rulers in the new century: "The gravest fact of our actual political situation in Indochina is not the recent trouble in Tonkin [or] the plots undertaken against us but in the muted but growing hatred that our subjects show toward us."

Review: Why did events in overseas empires from the 1890s on prove discouraging to many Europeans back home?

❖ Roads to War

International developments simultaneously aggravated competition among the great powers and caused Western nationalism in its many varieties to swell. In the spring of 1914, U.S. president Woodrow Wilson (1856–1924) sent his trusted adviser Colonel House to Europe to assess the rising tensions among the major powers. "It is militarism run stark mad," House reported, adding that he foresaw an "awful cataclysm" ahead. Government spending on what people called the "arms race" had stimulated European economies; but arms were not stockpiled for economic growth only. As early as the mid-1890s, one socialist had called the situation a "cold war" because the hostile atmosphere made physical combat seem imminent. By 1914, the air was even more charged, with militant nationalism in the Balkan states and conflicts in domestic politics also setting the stage for war. Although historians have long debated whether World War I could have been avoided, they have never reached a consensus. Considering the feverish background of prewar change, they have had to content themselves with tracing the steps Europeans took along the road toward mass destruction.

Competing Alliances and Clashing Ambitions

As the twentieth century opened, the Triple Alliance that Bismarck had negotiated among Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy confronted an opposing alliance between France and Russia, created in the 1890s. The wild card in the diplomatic scenario was Great Britain, traditional enemy of France, nowhere more than in the contest for colonial power. Constant rivals in Africa, Britain and France edged to the brink of war in 1898 at Fashoda in the Sudan. The French government, however, backed away and both nations were frightened into getting along for mutual self-interest. To prevent another Fashoda, they entered into secret agreements, the first of which (1904) guaranteed British claims in Egypt and French claims in Morocco. This agreement marked the beginning of the British-French alliance called the **Entente Cordiale**. Despite the alliance, Britain's response to a European war remained in question; even French statesmen feared that their ally might remain neutral.

Germany's Imperial Demands. Germany under Kaiser William II became dissatisfied with its international status and inflamed rather than calmed the diplomatic atmosphere. Bismarck had maintained a policy of proclaiming Germany a "satisfied" nation, working to balance great-power interests, and avoiding the draining fight for colonies. To the contrary, the kaiser, emboldened by Germany's growing industrial might, strode onto the imperial stage with a big appetite for world power. Convinced of British hostility toward France, William II used the opportunity presented by the defeat of France's ally Russia to contest French claims in Morocco. A man who boasted and blustered and was easily prodded to rash actions by his advisers, William landed in Morocco in 1905, thus challenging French predominance in what became known as the First Moroccan Crisis. To resolve the situation, an international conference met in Spain in 1906, where Germany confidently expected to gain concessions and new territories. Instead the powers, now including the United States, decided to support French rule. The French and British military, faced with German aggression in Morocco, drew closer together.

Germany found itself weak diplomatically and strong economically, a situation that made its leaders more determined to compete for territory abroad. When the French finally took over Morocco in 1911, Germany triggered the Second Moroccan Crisis by sending a gunboat to the port of Agadir and demanding concessions from the French. This time no power—not even Austria-Hungary—backed the German move. No one acknowledged this dominant country's might, nor did the constant demands for recognition encourage anyone to do so. The British and French now made binding military provisions for the deployment of their forces in case of war, thus strengthening the Entente Cordiale. Smarting from its setbacks on the world stage, Germany refocused its sights on its role on the continent and on its own alliances.

Crises in the Balkans. Germany's bold territorial claims, along with public uncertainty about the binding force of alliances, unsettled Europe, particularly the Balkans. German statesmen began envisioning the creation of a **Mitteleuropa**◆—a term that literally meant "central Europe" but that in their minds also included the Balkans and Turkey. The Habsburgs, now firmly backed by Germany, judged that expansion into the Balkans and the resulting addition of even more ethnic groups would weaken the claims of any single ethnic minority in the Dual Monarchy. Russia, however, saw itself as the protector of Slavs in the region and wanted to replace the Ottomans as the dominant Balkan power, especially after Japan had crushed its hopes for expansion to the east. Austria's swift annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina during the Young Turk revolt in 1908 enraged not only the Russians but the Serbs as well, because these southern Slavs wanted Bosnia as part of an enlarged Serbia. The Balkans thus whetted many appetites (Map 25.4).

Even without the greedy eyes cast on the Balkans by outside powers, the situation would have been extremely complex given the tensions created by political modernity. The

◆**Mitteleuropa:** miht loy ROH pah



MAP 25.4 The Balkans, 1908–1914
Balkan peoples—mixed in religion, ethnicity, and political views—were successful in developing and asserting their desire for independence, especially in the First Balkan War, which claimed territory from the Ottoman Empire. Their increased autonomy sparked rivalries among them and continued to attract attention from the great powers. Three empires in particular—the Russian, Ottoman, and Austro-Hungarian—simultaneously sought greater influence for themselves in the region, which became a powderkeg of competing ambitions.

more Ottoman and Habsburg territory that included their own ethnic group—a complicated desire given the complex intermingling of ethnicities throughout the region.

In the First Balkan War, in 1912, Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, and Montenegro joined forces to gain Macedonia and Albania from the Ottomans. The victors divided up their booty, with Bulgaria gaining the most territory, but soon they turned against one another. Serbia, Greece, and Montenegro contested Bulgarian gains in the Second Balkan War in 1913. Much to Austrian dismay, these allies won a quick victory, though Austria-Hungary managed in the peace terms to prevent Serbia from annexing parts of Albania. Grievances between the Habsburgs and the Serbs now seemed irreconcilable. Moreover, the peace conditions did not demilitarize the region, and Balkan peoples, especially angry Serbs who continued to look to Russia for help, imagined further challenges to Austria-Hungary. The Balkans had become a perilous region along whose borders both Austria-Hungary (as ruler of many Slavs) and Russia (as their protector) stationed increasing numbers of troops. The situation tempted strategists to think that a quick war there—something like Bismarck's wars—could resolve tension and uncertainty.

nineteenth century had seen the rise of nationalism and ethnicity as the basis for the unity of the nation-state, and by late in the century ethnic loyalty challenged dynastic power in the Balkans. Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria, Romania, and Montenegro emerged as autonomous states, almost all of them composed of several ethnicities as well as Orthodox Christians, Roman Catholics, and Muslims. All these states sought

The Race to Arms

In the nineteenth century, global rivalries and aspirations for national greatness made constant readiness for war seem increasingly necessary. On the seas and in foreign lands the colonial powers battled to establish control, and they developed railroad, tele-

graph, and telephone networks everywhere to link their conquests and to move troops as well as commercial goods. Governments began to conscript ordinary citizens for periods of two to six years into large standing armies, in contrast to smaller eighteenth-century forces that had served the more limited military goals of the time. By 1914, escalating tensions in Europe boosted the annual intake of conscripts: Germany, France, and Russia called up 250,000 or more troops each year; Austria-Hungary and Italy, about 100,000. The per capita expenditure on the military rose in all the major powers between 1890 and 1914; the proportion of national budgets devoted to defense in 1910 was lowest in Austria-Hungary at 10 percent, and highest in Germany at 45 percent.

The modernization of weaponry also transformed warfare. Swedish arms manufacturer Alfred Nobel patented dynamite and developed a kind of gunpowder that improved the accuracy of guns and produced a less clouded battlefield environment by reducing firearm smoke. Breakthroughs in the chemical industry affected long-range artillery, which by 1914 could fire on targets as far as six miles away. Such weapons as howitzers, Mauser rifles, and Hotchkiss machine guns provided improved accuracy and heavy firepower, and they were tested to great effect in the Russo-Japanese and Boer wars. These made military offensives more difficult to win than in the past because neither side could overcome such weaponry, causing military leaders to devise strategies to protect their armies from overwhelming firepower: in the Russo-Japanese War, trenches and barbed wire blanketed the front around Port Arthur. Munitions factories across Europe manufactured ever-growing stockpiles of the new weapons.



FIGURE 25.1 The Growth in Armaments, 1890–1914
The turn of the century saw the European powers engaged in a massive arms race. Several comparisons offer themselves, particularly the resources newly devoted to navies and the soaring defense spending of the Germans. Historians often ask whether better diplomacy could have prevented the outbreak of world war in 1914. The enormous military buildup, however, made some people living in the early twentieth century as well as some later historians see war as inevitable. Which countries could best afford the arms race at this time? The Hammond Atlas of the Twentieth Century *(London: Times Books, 1996), 29.*

An Historian Promotes Militant Nationalism

As the nineteenth century came to an end, competitive nationalism in preparation for war was everywhere, even in classrooms. History had developed into a "science" by this time, and historians were supposed to be neutral, basing their conclusions on solid, documentary evidence and erasing all trace of religious or national bias from their work. In the climate of military buildup, competition for empire, and a prowar spirit, the goal of dispassionate objectivity weakened. Supporting his nation was a driving force in the writing and teaching, of, among others, Heinrich von Trietschke of the University of Berlin, who delivered his lectures glorifying Germany's wars to throngs of cheering students and army officers.

The next essential function of the State is the conduct of war. The long oblivion into which this principle had fallen is a proof of how effeminate the science of government had become in civilian hands. In our century sentimentality was dissipated by Clausewitz, but a one-sided materialism arose in its place, after the fashion of the Manchester school, seeing in man a biped creature, whose destiny lies in buying cheap and selling dear. It is obvious that this idea is not compatible with war, and it is only since the last war [1870–71] that a sounder theory arose of the State and its military power.

Without war no State could be. All those we know of arose through war, and the protection of their members by armed force remains their primary and essential task. War, therefore, will endure to the end of history, as long as there is multiplicity of States. The laws of human thought and of human nature forbid any alternative, neither is one to be wished for. The blind worshipper of an eternal peace falls into the error of isolating the State, or dreams of one which is universal, which we have already seen to be at variance with reason.

Even as it is impossible to conceive of a tribunal above the State, which we have recognized as sovereign in its very essence, so it is likewise impossible to banish the idea of war from the world. It is a favourite fashion of our time to instance England as particularly ready for peace. But England is perpetually at war; there is hardly an instant in her recent history in which she has not been obliged to be fighting somewhere. The great strides which civilization makes against barbarism and unreason are only made actual by the sword.

Source: Heinrich Treitschke, *Politics*, Hans Kohn, ed., Blanche Duddale and Torben de Bille, trans. (New York: Harcourt, 1965), 37–38.

Naval construction also played a sensational role in nationalist politics. To defend against the new powerful, accurate weaponry, ships were made out of metal rather than wood after the mid-nineteenth century. In 1905, the English launched H.M.S. *Dreadnought*, a warship with unprecedented firepower and the centerpiece of the British navy's plan to construct at least seven battleships per year. Germany followed British navy building step by step and made itself a great land and sea power. Grand Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz (1849–1930) encouraged the insecure William II to view the navy as the essential ingredient in making Germany a world power and oversaw an immense buildup of the fleet. Tirpitz admired the American naval theorist Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840–1914) and planned to build naval bases as far away as the Pacific, following Mahan's conclusion that command of the seas determined international power. The German drive to build battleships further motivated Britain to ally with France in the Entente Cordiale. Britain raised its annual naval spending from $50 million in the 1870s to $130 million in 1900; Germany, from $8.75 million to $37.5 million; France, from $37 million to $62.5 million (Figure 25.1 on page 995). The Germans announced the fleet buildup as "a peaceful policy," but, like the British buildup, it led only to a hostile international climate and intense competition in weapons manufacture.

Public relations campaigns and internal politics were important to shaping military policy (see "An Historian Promotes Militant Nationalism" on page 996). When critics of the arms race suggested a temporary "naval holiday" to stop British and German building, British officials opposed the moratorium by warning that it "would throw innumerable men on the pavement." Colonial leagues of those pushing for imperial expansion, nationalist organizations, and other patriotic groups lobbied for military spending, while enthusiasts in government publicized large navies as beneficial to international trade and domestic industry. To enlarge the German fleet, Tirpitz made sure the press connected naval buildup to the cause of national power and pride. The press accused Social Democrats, who wanted an equitable tax system more proportionate to wealth, of being unpatriotic. The Conservative Party in Great Britain, eager for more battleships, made popular the slogan "We want eight and we won't wait." The remarks of a French military leader typified the sentiments of the time, even among the public at large. When asked in 1912 about his predictions for war and peace, he responded enthusiastically, "We shall have war. I will make it. I will win it."

1914: War Erupts

June 28, 1914, began as an ordinary, even happy day not only for Freud's patient the Wolf-Man but also for the Austrian archduke Francis Ferdinand and his wife, Sophie, as they ended a state visit to Sarajevo in Bosnia. The archduke, in full military regalia, was riding in a motorcade to bid farewell to various officials when a group of young Serb nationalists threw bombs in an unsuccessful assassination attempt. The full danger did not register, and after a stop the archduke and his wife set out again. In the crowd was another nationalist, Gavrilo Princip, who for several weeks had traveled clandestinely to reach this destination, dreaming of reuniting his homeland of Bosnia-Herzegovina with Serbia and smuggling weapons with him to accomplish his end. The unprotected and unsuspecting Austrian couple became Princip's victims, as he shot both dead.

Some in the Habsburg government saw an opportunity to put down the Serbians once and for all. Evidence showed that Princip had received arms and information from Serbian officials, who directed a terrorist organization from within the government. Endorsing a quick defeat of Serbia, German statesmen and military leaders urged the Austrians to be unyielding and reiterated promises of support in case of war. The Austrians sent an ultimatum to the Serbian government, demanding public disavowals of terrorism, suppression of terrorist groups, and the participation of Austrian officials in an investigation of the crime. The ultimatum was severe. "You are setting Europe ablaze," the Russian foreign minister remarked of the Austrians' humiliating demands made on a sovereign state. Yet the Serbs were conciliatory, accepting all the terms except the presence of Austrian officials in the investigation. Kaiser William was pleased: "A great

Archduke Francis Ferdinand and His Wife in Sarajevo, June 1914
Archduke Francis Ferdinand, heir to the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, was a thorn in the side of many politicians because he did not want to favor Hungarian interests over other ethnic ones in his kingdom. His own family life was also unusual for royalty in those days in that his wife, Sophie, and he had married for love and did not like to be apart. Thus, the couple were traveling together to Bosnia in 1914 and were jointly assassinated—the immediate prelude to the outbreak of World War I. How was the assassination of the archduke and his wife related to the other factors that led to World War I? *Mary Evans Picture Library.*



MAPPING THE WEST Europe at the Outbreak of World War I, August 1914
All the powers expected a great, swift victory when war broke out. Sharing borders, many saw a chance to increase their territories; and as rivals for trade and empire, they were almost all convinced that war would bring them many advantages. But if European nations appeared well prepared and invincible at the start of the war, relatively few would survive the conflict intact. Where are the particular "hot spots" in Europe in which resentments and conflicting ambitions were centered?

moral success for Vienna! All reason for war is gone." His relief proved unfounded. Austria-Hungary, confident of German backing, used the Serbs' resistance to only one of the ultimatum's terms as the pretext for declaring war against Serbia on July 28.

Complex and ineffectual maneuvering now consumed statesmen, some of whom tried very hard to avoid war. The tsar and the kaiser sent pleading letters to one another not to start a European war. The British foreign secretary proposed an all-European conference, but to no avail. Germany displayed firm support for Austria in hopes of convincing the French and British to shy away from the war. The failure of either to fight, German officials believed,

would subsequently keep Russia from mobilizing. Additionally, German military leaders had become fixed on fighting a short, preemptive war that would provide territorial gains leading toward the goal of a Mitteleuropa; imposing martial law as part of such a war would justify arresting the leadership of the German Social Democratic Party, which threatened conservative rule.

The European press caught the war fever of the expansionist, imperialist, and other pro-war organizations, even as many governments were torn over what to do. Likewise, military leaders, especially in Germany and Austria-Hungary, promoted mobilization rather than diplomacy in the last days of July. The Austrians declared war and then ordered mobilization on July 31 without fear of a Russian attack. They did so in full confidence of German military aid, because as early as 1909 the German chief of staff Helmuth von Moltke had promised that his government would defend Austria-Hungary, believing Russia would not dare intervene. But Nicholas II ordered the Russian army to mobilize in defense of Russia's Slavic allies the Serbs. Encouraging the Austrians to attack Serbia, the German general staff mobilized on August 1. France declared war by virtue of its agreement to aid its ally Russia, and when Germany violated Belgian neutrality on its way to invade France, Britain entered the war on the side of France and Russia.

Review: What were the major factors leading to the outbreak of World War I?

Conclusion

Rulers soon forgot their last-minute hesitations in the general celebration that erupted with the war. "Old heroes have reemerged from the books of legends," wrote a Viennese actor after watching the troops march off. "A mighty wonder has taken place, we have become *young*." Both sides exulted, believing in certain victory. A short conflict, people maintained, would resolve tensions ranging from the rise of the working class to political problems caused by global imperial competition. Disturbances in private life and challenges to established certainties in ideas would disappear, it was believed, in the crucible of war. German military men saw war as an opportune moment to round up social democrats and reestablish the traditional deference of an agrarian society. Liberal government based on rights and constitutions, some believed, had simply gone too far in its production of new groups aspiring to full citizenship and political autonomy.

Even as modernity seemed to be an enemy, it had also given rise to the new technology, mass armies, and techniques of persuasion to support military buildup that moved the elites to embrace war. The arms race had stimulated militant nationalism and brought many Europeans to favor war over peace. Modernity had helped blaze the path to war: *The Rite of Spring*, the ballet that opened in Paris in 1913, had taken as its theme the ritualistic attraction of death. Facing continuing violence in politics, incomprehensibility in the arts, and problems in the industrial order, Europeans had come to believe that war would save them from the perils of modernity. The sense of decline and the worry over imperial tensions that so characterized the years before 1914 would end once and for all. "Like men longing for a thunderstorm to relieve them of the summer's sultriness," wrote one Austrian official, "so the generation of 1914 believed in the relief that war might bring." Such a possibility caused Europeans to rejoice. But tragically, their elation was short-lived. Instead of bringing the refreshment of summer rain, war opened an era of political turmoil, widespread suffering, massive human slaughter, and even greater doses of modernity.

Suggested References

Private Life in the Modern Age

Historians are engaged in serious study of the transformations of everyday life brought about by industrial and imperial advance in the early twentieth century. Women's striving for personal autonomy was expressed in dozens of novels about the "new woman," including the famous *Keys to Happiness*, now available in an English translation.

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